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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation enhances existing understanding of the role of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms as driving forces of organizational path dependence and thus limiting factors 
for organizational adaptation. In this way, the dissertation sheds light on the underlying 
dynamics of scale, complementary, learning, coordination, and expectation effects that 
keep organizations on a once entered development path. 
To investigate the specific development of six German utility companies between the 
liberalization of the German energy market in 1999, and 2015, this dissertation applies a 
multiple-case study approach to empirically uncover the self-reinforcing mechanisms’ 
modes of action in replicating existing activity patterns and thus shaping firms’ 
development paths. 
Thereby, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in three respects. First, it advances understanding of the underlying 
dynamics of self-reinforcing mechanisms by adding new dimensions to conceptions of 
learning, coordination, and expectation effects and providing in-depth explanations for 
their stabilizing effects. Second, this dissertation enhances a differentiated view on self-
reinforcing mechanisms while offering empirical evidence that these effects not only have 
a limiting influence but might also facilitate organizational adaptation in certain 
contextual settings. Third, this dissertation contributes to an understanding of the role of 
managerial agency while empirically substantiating that agency matters, even in a state 
of path dependence.  
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Accordingly, this dissertation proposes a reconceptualization of the classic theory of 
organizational path dependence in a less deterministic manner, placing greater emphasis 
on the role and influence of corporate actors in breaking existing paths. Indeed, this 
dissertation strongly suggests that the driving forces of path dependence should be 
understood as temporal influencing factors on firms’ strategic initiatives that appear to 
have either a widening or a limiting effect on the scope of alternatives, and which can 
consciously be overcome. 
Besides its contributions to theory, this dissertation provides concrete practical guidance 
for managers to increase their awareness and to counteract those stabilizing influencing 
factors in the context of strategic decision making. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the 
turbulence – it is to act with yesterday’s logic. 
Peter Drucker 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC 
Today’s business environments in almost every industry are characterized by a high level 
of dynamism and uncertainty. This issue particularly manifests itself in frequent 
disruption and hypercompetition, that is, competitive pressure from new market entrants 
and shortening product or business model life cycles (D’Aveni 1995; Teece and Leih 
2016). Major drivers of this development include changing consumer behaviors, 
technological innovations, and shifting requirements due to legal and political events 
(Barreto 2010; Teece et al. 2016). In such environmental settings, one can observe 
formerly successful firms failing to realign their strategies to new circumstances, 
ultimately finding themselves traveling down a dead-end road.  
One prominent example illustrating this development is Nokia. The Finnish company was 
able to constantly reinvent itself for a period of over 140 years. Indeed, having been 
founded as a paper mill operator in 1865, Nokia evolved into a producer of paper 
products, rubber boots, and tires, before becoming one of the world’s leading cell phone 
producers with a worldwide market share of over 50 per cent in 2007. On its journey to 
become number one in the cell phone business, the company divested all businesses other 
than telecommunications in order to strengthen its core (Harreld et al. 2006). However, 
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with the smartphone revolution pioneered by Apple in 2007, an entirely new market 
segment was created besides classic cell phones (Teece et al. 2016). Nurtured by further 
technological developments and changing consumer preferences toward smartphones, 
this new market segment constantly gained market share and eroded the established cell 
phone market. Nevertheless, Nokia continued focusing on the cell phone segment despite 
the continuous decreasing relevance and demand of this market segment. By the time 
Nokia had recognized the growing importance of the smartphone business, it was too late 
to realign its strategy, as the company had already been overtaken by competitors like 
Apple, Google, and Microsoft. To date, Nokia finds itself in a complicated situation that 
is characterized by scarce financial resources and a limited range of potential strategic 
alternatives. 
Apple represents another example, as the company passed through a similar development, 
although it did not reach the dead end yet. Since the return of its former CEO Steve Jobs 
in 1997, Apple launched a series of groundbreaking innovations. Beginning with the iPod 
(2001) and the music store iTunes (2003), Apple revolutionized music consumption. In 
2007, the company launched the iPhone and thereby created an entire new market 
segment within the cell phone market. Just three years later, Apple launched yet another 
breakthrough innovation. While inventing the iPad, the company created a new market 
for tablet computers. However, for several years after Jobs’ passing, Apple did not 
generate any further groundbreaking innovations, instead focusing on incremental 
improvements of its existing product range. Thus, the company adheres to its once entered 
strategy. While its competitors continuously gain market shares, Apple faces a decline in 
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sales of its products and, as the market still expects it to produce the next big thing, the 
company’s share price is continuously decreasing. 
These examples revive the old debate about organizations naturally drifting toward 
efficiency (Fainshmidt and Frazier 2017) and thus being inherently prone to tendencies 
of persistence within their processes of strategic change. Leading scholars in the field of 
organizational realignment state that organizations are generally unable “to change their 
familiar ways of doing when confronted with new developments” (Schreyoegg and 
Kliesch-Eberl 2007, p. 916). Stemming from different theoretical directions, the existing 
literature addresses five antecedents of organizational persistence.  
First, the literature on resource commitment stresses the binding effects of a company’s 
investments through increasing subsequent exit barriers, resulting in the persistence of 
organizational strategies (Ghemawat 1991). Although conceived as a prerequisite for 
competitive advantage by building heterogeneity and superior performance, firm-specific 
investments increasingly become irreversible and rigid (Ghemawat 1991). This downside 
is a result of the rising cost of separating and abandoning sticky resources, similar to the 
argumentation of sunk costs (Ghemawat 1991).  
Second, research on escalating commitment draws on the phenomenon of throwing good 
money after bad (Guler 2007) as an outcome of self-justification processes and fear of 
losing face (Staw 1976; Brockner 1992; Ross and Staw 1993). Despite experiencing 
negative feedback, escalating commitment prevents organizational decision makers from 
admitting and reversing bad prior decisions of resource allocation (Staw 1976; Brockner 
1992; Ross and Staw 1993). Conversely and driven by an urge to save face, decision 
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makers support insufficient decisions of resource allocation in order to reaffirm their 
usefulness (Brockner 1992). 
Third, population ecology research considers structural inertia a prerequisite for 
organizational success while facilitating an organization’s reliability and identification as 
a decisive unit (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Huff et al. 1992). However, in changing 
environments, organizations are tied to these stabilized organizational structures and 
activity patterns (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Markides 1998). A tendency to resist 
departing from proven structural schemes becomes manifested in structural resistance to 
fundamental reorganization (Schwarz 2010). Consequently, the risk of maladaptation 
increases (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Paradoxically, overcoming structural inertia has 
been deemed key to survival (Schreyoegg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). 
Fourth, the concept of imprinting stresses the power of initial cognitive schemes, 
competencies, and contextual conditions at the time of founding that imprint 
organizational processes in the future (Stinchcombe 1965; Johnson 2007). As a result, 
reproduced activity patterns persist and continue to influence future activities 
(Stinchcombe 1965; Johnson 2007). Institutionalization processes are considered key 
drivers for imprinting (Johnson 2007). Even where the requirement for change is 
recognized, imprinted activity patterns lead decision makers to trace alternatives only in 
the surroundings of the imprinted processes (Johnson and Johnson 2002). 
Fifth, self-reinforcing mechanisms have been identified as the key drivers behind 
organizational path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; 
Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). This body of literature argues that self-reinforcing 
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mechanisms lie “at the core of the theory of path dependence” (Schreyoegg et al. 2011, 
p. 96) as they initiate a process leading to a narrowing scope of alternative actions 
available to the organization, which eventually results in a state of persistence, or at least 
limited choice (Koch 2011; Schreyoegg et al. 2011). Thereby, once successful activities 
generate positive feedback loops while initiating dynamics of increasing returns (David 
1985; Arthur 1989, 1990). Consequently, such influential factors lead to a replication of 
activity patterns that “become fixed to the constellations in which they proved to be 
successful” (Schreyoegg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007, p. 916). 
Although these drivers of persistence share in common the fact that they all lead to rigid 
activity patterns of the organization based on the consequences of former activities, they 
significantly differ in their explanations concerning how organizations become resistant 
to change. The theoretical concepts of resource commitment and sunk cost (Ghemawat 
1991) and escalating commitment (Staw 1976; Brockner 1992) both focus on economic 
factors in explaining organizational persistence. Structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 
1984; Schwarz 2010) blames organizational effects for inducing tendencies of persistence 
in organizations. Finally, the concept of imprinting (Stinchcombe 1965; Johnson 2007) 
argues that social effects are the critical drivers of persistence. Thereby, the 
abovementioned concepts only focus on a single perspective to explain the phenomenon 
of organizational persistence. 
By contrast, the concept of self-reinforcing mechanisms, which is rooted in the theory of 
organizational path dependence, combines all three perspectives in order to explain an 
organization’s tendency to persist, i.e., economic, organizational, and social effects 
(Sydow et al. 2009). Based on this multi-perspective view, the concept of self-reinforcing 
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mechanisms seems to provide the most comprehensive and thus most promising 
explanations for organizational persistence (Schreyoegg et al. 2011). 
However, after 20 years of research since Sydow et al.'s (2009) seminal work on 
organizational path dependence, and despite an accumulation of case studies on path 
dependence (Vergne 2013), a clear understanding of the workings of the self-reinforcing 
mechanisms underlying the constitution of organizational path dependence is still missing 
(Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Vergne and Durand 2010; Vergne 2013). So 
far, “organization and management scholars have done a poor job at exploring path 
dependence [and its driving forces of self-reinforcing mechanisms] empirically” (Vergne 
2013, p. 1194), resulting in “a significant portion of the scholarly community still do not 
buy the path dependence story” (Vergne 2013, p. 1192). 
For this reason, this dissertation follows a strong call from the field of path dependence 
research to shed light on the modes of action of self-reinforcing mechanisms at the core 
of organizational path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009). The aim of this study is to 
advance research on path dependence while unpacking self-reinforcing mechanisms in 
practice (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011) and explaining which components 
of these driving dynamics are at play in keeping organizations on an once entered 
development path while continuously impeding organizational adaptation (Vergne and 
Durand 2010). Consequently, the guiding research question of this dissertation is: 
RQ: How do self-reinforcing mechanisms impede organizational adaptation? 
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1.2. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
This chapter provides an overview of the underlying philosophical assumptions of this 
dissertation in terms of ontology (i.e., the nature of the world), epistemology (i.e., how 
the world is perceived and how knowledge is generated and transferred), human nature 
(i.e., the relationship between human beings and their environment), and methodology 
(i.e., concepts, measures, and underlying themes) as a consequence of the aforementioned 
dimensions (Burrell and Morgan 1979). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), these 
four philosophical assumptions can be divided into two broad and polarized perspectives 
– the subjectivist approach versus the objectivist approach to social sciences – as outlined 
in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: A Scheme for Analyzing Assumptions about the Nature of Science 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979, p. 3) 
 
Ontology
Epistemology
Human nature
Methodology
Nominalism
The subjectivist approach 
to social science
Anti-positivism
Voluntarism
Ideographic
Realism
Positivism
Determinism
Nomothetic
The objectivist approach 
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First, in terms of ontology, the subjectivist perspective assumes that reality is the product 
of one’s individual cognition (nominalism), while the objectivist approach views it as 
having an objective nature, given in the world (Kolakowski 1972; Keat and Urry 1975; 
Burrell and Morgan 1979). The latter assumption refers to the realism perspective (Keat 
and Urry 1975). Second, with respect to epistemology, the subjectivist approach assumes 
that knowledge is soft, subjective, and spiritual (anti-positivism), whereas the objectivist 
approach defines it as hard, real, and capable of being transmitted in tangible forms 
(positivism) (Douglas 1970; Giddens 1974; Burrell and Morgan 1979). Third, the two 
ends of the continuum concern assumptions about human nature by distinguishing 
voluntarism (subjective approach) from determinism (objectivist approach). Whereas the 
former conceptualizes humans as creators of their environments, the latter understands 
humans as being conditioned by their environments and thus products of them (Burrell 
and Morgan 1979). Fourth, the methodological dimension distinguishes the ideographic 
(subjective approach) from the nomothetic dimension (objectivist approach). In extreme 
cases, the ideographic dimension focuses on “what is unique and particular to the 
individual rather than of what is general and universal” (Burrell and Morgan 1979, p. 
3). Thus, the subjectivist approach generally applies qualitative methods, while the 
objectivist approach typically uses quantitative reasoning (Blumer 1969; Burrell and 
Morgan 1979). 
On the basis of the analytic framework established by Burrell and Morgan (1979) with its 
four constituting perspectives, this dissertation gravitates toward the objectivist approach 
to social sciences. With respect to the ontological dimension, this dissertation applies the 
assumption of a social world being constituted of hard, tangible and measurable structures 
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that exist as empirical entities: A perspective of realism (Kolakowski 1972; Keat and Urry 
1975; Burrell and Morgan 1979). Furthermore this dissertation refers to a positivist 
epistemology that “seek[s] to explain and predict what happens in the social world by 
searching for regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements” 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979, p. 5). Thereby, the positivist perspective allows individuals’ 
activities to be observed from the outside in order to generate knowledge (Douglas 1970; 
Giddens 1974).  
While the two perspectives of human nature proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979) – 
voluntarism (i.e., completely autonomous and free-willed) and determinism (i.e., 
completely determined by the environment) – represent two extreme ends of a continuum, 
this dissertation adopts a rather immediate standpoint with respect to the conception of 
human nature. Thus, it is argued that the influence of situational and voluntary factors 
shape the behavior and activities of actors in organizations (Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
This perspective of human nature is congruent with the conception proposed by 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 1012), highlighting the “reconstructive, (self-) 
transformative potentialities of human agency, when faced with contradictory or 
otherwise problematic situations.” That is, human beings are able to change their 
behavior even within constrained contextual situations (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), or 
put differently, human agency is not determined by the environment, although human 
behavior is influenced by it. While this immediate perspective on human nature 
contradicts the initial and rather deterministic understanding of the phenomenon of path 
dependence presented by David (1985), Arthur (1990, 1989) and Sydow et al. (2009), it 
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follows the conception of Garud and Karnøe (2001) and Djelic and Quack (2007) by 
arguing that agency matters in the concept of path dependence.  
With respect to the methodological dimension, this dissertation advocates a subjectivist 
approach to social science. Thus, this research takes an ideographic perspective by 
applying qualitative methods (Burrell and Morgan 1979) to shed light on a phenomenon 
with less empirical substantiation. Stated more philosophically, the purpose of the 
qualitative approach is to gain an understanding of reality (Gephart 2004). Following 
Gephart (2004, p. 455): 
Qualitative research can provide thick, detailed descriptions of actual actions in 
real-life contexts that recover and preserve the actual meanings that actors ascribe 
to these actions and settings. Qualitative research can thus provide bases for 
understanding social processes that underlie management. 
Therefore, even though qualitative methodologies’ insights are less generalizable than 
quantitative reasoning, they are more powerful, substantial and relevant (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Yin 2009). In this research, the data collected are used to explore the 
phenomenon of self-reinforcing mechanisms in practice, to identify themes and patterns, 
and to contribute to the advancement of the theory of path dependence. Thus, this research 
applies an interpretive and inductive approach to theory development (Van Maanen 1998; 
Gephart 2004). 
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1.3. STRUCTURE AND LINE OF ARGUMENTATION 
Figure 2 outlines the structure of this dissertation and the anchoring of the corresponding 
research question. Chapter one – the introduction – presents the context of this research, 
outlines the research gap, and formulates the guiding research question (RQ). 
Furthermore, the underlying philosophical assumptions of science are explained in this 
chapter.  
 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the Dissertation 
1. Introduction
4. Methodology
2. Theoretical Framework
3. Empirical Research Setting
5. Qualitative Study:
The case of German Utilities
Explorative case studies of six German 
utilities to explore the working and 
unpacking of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in practice
7. Findings
8. Discussion
RQ: How do self-reinforcing 
mechanisms impede organizational 
adaptation?
9. Conclusion
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Chapter two highlights the theoretical framework of this work by introducing the theory 
of organizational path dependence, outlining the latest research in the field, and 
explaining the concept of self-reinforcing mechanisms as the driving forces that shape 
organizational paths.  
In chapter three, the development of the German utility market as the empirical research 
setting of this dissertation is described, facilitating a detailed understanding of the market 
dynamics and the particular contexts in which the actions of the focal firms – the six 
German utility companies – took place.  
Chapter four discusses the methodology applied in this dissertation. As this research is 
based on qualitative reasoning, and in particular on an explorative, longitudinal multiple-
case study approach, the first subchapter outlines the case selection method and highlights 
the reasons for choosing the specific focal firms. The second subchapter then explains 
how the data were collected, and the third subchapter illustrates the process of data coding 
and analysis. 
Chapter five represents the heart of this dissertation. Divided into three groups, the 
specific development of and the reasons behind the particular courses of action taken by 
the focal firms are illustrated. Thereby, the modes of action of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in practice are demonstrated in different organizational and contextual 
settings in order to explore how these processes unfold and impede organizational 
adaptation. The findings of the qualitative study are then outlined in chapter six.  
Chapter seven discusses the findings of this dissertation and elucidates its theoretical 
implications and contributions to the theory of organizational path dependence. Chapter 
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seven also highlights the implications for managerial practice and the limitations of this 
work. The dissertation concludes by indicating promising directions for future research 
in chapter eight. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
He who loves practice without theory is like the 
sailor who boards ship without a rudder and 
compass and never knows where he may cast. 
Leonardo da Vinci 
 
2.1. ORGANIZATIONAL PATH DEPENDENCE 
Research on path dependence is rooted in the years 1985 to 1990 with the seminal works 
of David (1985) and Arthur (1989, 1990). While undertaking an industry perspective, the 
focus of their research was on the development of certain technologies, such as the 
QWERTY keyboard. Since then, the concept of path dependence saw the accumulation 
of considerable research focusing on certain so-called path-dependent trajectories 
(Vergne 2013). Path dependence became a frequently applied notion in strategy literature. 
Nevertheless, the term was mostly used as a metaphor stressing the importance of a firm’s 
history (Schreyoegg et al. 2011), i.e., an organization’s current and future trajectory is 
shaped or influenced by past decisions and underlying activity patterns (David 1985; 
Arthur 1989, 1990). Excessive use saw the term’s effectiveness become exhausted, 
leading to many scholars refusing to accept the path dependence story today (Vergne 
2013). 
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Table 1: Summary of Selected Research on Organizational Path Dependence 
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t a
l. 
(2
00
9)
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l
–
–
• 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 fr
am
ew
or
k 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 h
ow
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 b
ec
om
e 
pa
th
 d
ep
en
de
nt
• 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
em
er
ge
nt
 p
ro
ce
ss
 o
f p
at
h 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 a
lo
ng
 th
re
e 
di
st
in
ct
 s
ta
ge
s:
 (1
) P
re
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ph
as
e;
 
(2
) f
or
m
at
io
n 
ph
as
e 
th
at
 is
 d
riv
en
 b
y 
se
lf-
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s;
 a
nd
 (3
) l
oc
k-
in
 p
ha
se
• 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
liz
in
g 
fo
ur
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
at
 th
e 
he
ar
t o
f o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l p
at
h 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
: (
1)
 
C
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 e
ffe
ct
s;
 (2
) l
ea
rn
in
g 
ef
fe
ct
s;
 (3
) c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
s;
 a
nd
 (4
) a
da
pt
iv
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
s
• 
Sc
op
e 
fo
r a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
to
 u
nl
oc
k 
pa
th
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
is
 li
m
ite
d
G
ru
be
r (
20
10
)
Em
pi
ric
al
 
(q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
Su
rv
ey
44
6 
en
tre
pr
en
eu
rs
 
of
 n
ew
ly
 fo
un
de
d 
fir
m
s
• 
M
an
y 
ag
en
ts
 d
o 
no
t c
on
si
de
r a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
 fo
r p
ro
du
ct
-m
ar
ke
t p
at
h 
cr
ea
tio
n 
pr
io
r t
o 
em
ba
rk
in
g 
on
 a
 s
pe
ci
fic
 p
at
h
• 
G
en
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
 o
nl
y 
pl
ay
s 
a 
m
in
or
 ro
le
 in
 th
e 
ea
rly
 s
ta
ge
s 
of
 p
at
h 
cr
ea
tio
n:
 M
os
t f
irm
s 
fo
llo
w
 th
e 
fir
st
 p
at
h 
th
ey
 d
et
ec
t
• 
Ex
is
te
nc
e 
of
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
pa
th
s 
is
 u
nk
no
w
n 
at
 th
e 
tim
e 
de
ci
si
on
s 
on
 p
at
h 
cr
ea
tio
n 
ar
e 
m
ad
e:
 E
nt
er
in
g 
a 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
pa
th
 
of
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t i
s 
no
n-
de
lib
er
at
e 
in
 th
e 
ea
rly
 s
ta
ge
s
• 
C
or
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
-le
ve
l h
um
an
 c
ap
ita
l a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l c
ap
ita
l e
nd
ow
m
en
ts
 h
av
e 
an
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
n 
th
e 
en
te
re
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
at
h
G
ar
ud
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
0)
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l
–
–
• 
C
on
ve
rs
el
y 
to
 V
er
gn
e 
&
 D
ur
an
d'
s 
(2
01
0)
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
on
 p
at
h 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 (i
n 
w
hi
ch
 a
ct
or
s 
be
co
m
e 
lo
ck
ed
-in
 b
y 
se
lf-
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
in
to
 p
at
hs
 w
ho
se
 e
vo
lu
tio
n 
is
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 b
y 
co
nt
in
ge
nc
ie
s 
an
d 
on
ce
 lo
ck
ed
-in
, a
ct
or
s 
ca
nn
ot
 b
re
ak
 o
ut
 u
nl
es
s 
ex
og
en
ou
s 
sh
oc
ks
), 
th
e 
au
th
or
s 
pr
op
os
e 
an
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
co
nc
ep
t l
ab
el
ed
 a
s 
pa
th
 c
re
at
io
n,
 in
 
w
hi
ch
 a
ge
nc
y 
is
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
as
 b
ei
ng
 d
is
tri
bu
te
d 
an
d 
em
er
ge
nt
 th
ro
ug
h 
re
la
tio
na
l p
ro
ce
ss
es
 th
at
 c
on
st
itu
te
 a
 p
at
h 
• 
Pa
th
 c
re
at
io
n 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
di
ffe
rs
 fr
om
 th
e 
pa
th
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
in
 fo
ur
 m
aj
or
 p
oi
nt
s:
 (1
) I
ni
tia
l c
on
di
tio
ns
 
ar
e 
no
t g
iv
en
, b
ut
 fl
ex
ib
ly
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
nd
 c
on
st
ru
ct
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
ne
gt
ia
tio
ns
 b
y 
ac
to
rs
; (
2)
 c
on
tig
en
ci
es
 (c
ha
nc
e 
ev
en
ts
) a
re
 
em
er
ge
nt
 c
on
te
xt
s 
fo
r a
ct
io
n,
 i.
e.
, n
on
-p
ur
po
si
ve
 a
nd
 s
om
ew
ha
t r
an
do
m
 e
ve
nt
s;
 (3
) s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
st
ra
te
gi
ca
lly
 m
an
ip
ul
at
ed
; a
nd
 (4
) l
oc
k-
in
 is
 a
 te
m
po
ra
ry
 s
ta
bi
liz
at
io
n 
of
 p
at
hs
 in
-th
e-
m
ak
in
g
V
er
gn
e 
an
d 
D
ur
an
d 
(2
01
0)
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l
–
–
• 
Pa
th
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
as
 a
 p
ro
pe
rty
 o
f a
 s
to
ch
as
tic
 p
ro
ce
ss
 w
hi
ch
 o
bt
ai
ns
 u
nd
er
 tw
o 
co
di
tio
ns
 –
 c
on
tin
ge
nc
y 
an
d 
se
lf-
re
in
fo
rc
em
en
t –
 a
nd
 c
au
se
s 
lo
ck
-in
 in
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 e
xo
ge
no
us
 s
ho
ck
• 
C
on
tin
ge
nc
y 
de
sc
rib
e 
un
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e,
 n
on
-p
ur
po
si
ve
, a
nd
 s
ee
m
in
gl
y 
ra
nd
om
 e
ve
nt
s
• 
Se
lf-
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
ar
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 s
us
ta
in
 a
 p
at
h 
th
ro
ug
h 
co
nt
in
uo
us
ly
 d
ec
re
as
in
g 
th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
at
tra
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
: A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
pa
th
s 
ar
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 o
ut
 a
s 
th
e 
gi
ve
n 
pa
th
 b
ec
om
es
 m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
do
m
in
an
t 
ov
er
 ti
m
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
pa
th
s
• 
Lo
ck
-in
 a
s 
a 
si
tu
ta
tio
n 
of
 re
la
tiv
el
y 
st
ab
le
 e
qu
ili
br
iu
m
, c
au
se
d 
by
 p
at
h 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
, f
ro
m
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
es
ca
pe
 w
ith
ou
t t
he
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
of
 s
ho
ck
s 
ex
og
en
ou
s 
to
 th
e 
sy
st
em
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Table 1: Summary of Selected Research on Organizational Path Dependence (continued) 
St
ud
y
Ty
pe
 o
f S
tu
dy
D
at
a 
So
ur
ce
Sa
m
pl
e
Pr
op
os
al
s 
or
 F
in
di
ng
s
K
oc
h 
(2
01
1)
Em
pi
ric
al
 
(q
ua
lit
at
iv
e)
Se
m
i-s
tru
ct
ur
ed
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
2 
ne
w
sp
ap
er
 
pu
bl
is
he
rs
• 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f a
 s
tra
te
gi
c 
pa
th
 a
s 
a 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
pa
tte
rn
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 o
ve
r t
im
e;
 c
on
st
itu
te
d 
by
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s;
 a
nd
 o
rig
in
al
ly
 tr
ig
ge
re
d 
by
 b
ig
 e
ve
nt
s 
(c
rit
ic
al
 ju
nc
tu
re
) l
ea
di
ng
 to
 a
 la
ck
 o
f s
tra
te
gi
c 
ch
oi
ce
 (p
.3
41
)
• 
R
an
ge
 o
f v
ar
ie
ty
 is
 in
 g
en
er
al
 re
st
ric
te
d 
by
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
pa
th
 o
f a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
• 
D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 th
e 
ra
ng
es
 o
f v
ar
ie
ty
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
di
ffe
re
nt
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l c
on
te
xt
s 
in
 w
hi
ch
 p
at
h-
de
pe
nd
en
t s
tra
te
gi
c 
pa
tte
rn
s 
em
er
ge
 (a
nd
 le
ss
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
di
ffe
re
nt
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
its
el
f)
Sc
hr
ey
oe
gg
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
1)
Em
pi
ric
al
 
(q
ua
lit
at
iv
e)
Se
m
i-s
tru
ct
ur
ed
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
an
d 
ar
ch
iv
al
 d
at
a
B
oo
k 
cl
ub
 
di
vi
si
on
 o
f 
G
er
m
an
 p
ub
lis
he
r 
B
er
te
ls
m
an
n
• 
Em
pi
ric
al
ly
 te
st
ed
 fr
am
ew
or
k 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 h
ow
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 b
ec
om
e 
pa
th
 d
ep
en
de
nt
: I
llu
st
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 
th
e 
em
er
ge
nc
e 
of
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l p
at
h,
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 w
ith
 tr
ig
ge
rin
g 
ev
en
ts
, s
tre
ng
th
en
ed
 b
y 
se
lf-
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s,
 a
nd
 fi
na
lly
 le
ad
in
g 
in
to
 a
 lo
ck
-in
 th
at
 s
ee
m
ed
 im
po
ss
ib
le
 to
 b
re
ak
• 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 tr
ig
ge
rin
g 
ev
en
ts
 th
at
 in
du
ce
 th
e 
em
er
ge
ce
 o
f a
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
at
h 
of
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
• 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
in
 th
e 
fo
rm
 o
f s
ca
le
 a
nd
 c
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 e
ffe
ct
s 
th
at
 s
tre
ng
th
en
ed
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
at
h 
of
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
(w
hi
le
 o
th
er
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s,
 i.
e.
, l
ea
rn
in
g,
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
s,
 w
er
e 
id
en
tif
ie
d 
to
 p
la
y 
a 
le
ss
 im
po
rta
nt
 ro
le
)
V
er
gn
e 
an
d 
D
ur
an
d 
(2
01
1)
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l
–
–
• 
Pa
th
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
is
 le
ss
 a
bo
ut
 h
ow
 a
ct
ua
l p
at
hs
 a
re
 c
ho
se
n,
 b
ut
 m
or
e 
ab
ou
t h
ow
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
pa
th
s 
ge
t s
el
ec
te
d 
ou
t 
(p
.3
71
)
• 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
of
 p
at
h 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 v
ar
y 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
pa
th
 s
el
ec
tio
n 
cr
ite
ria
 th
at
 a
re
 e
m
be
dd
ed
 in
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t o
f o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
• 
W
hi
le
 a
ss
um
in
g 
th
at
 p
at
h 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
 is
 a
t w
or
k 
at
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l l
ev
el
 a
nd
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
id
en
tif
ie
d,
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 
ca
n 
re
ly
 o
n 
hi
gh
er
-le
ve
l d
yn
am
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s 
to
 b
re
ak
 p
at
h 
de
pe
nd
en
ce
: C
ar
ef
ul
 m
an
ag
er
s 
ca
n 
de
ci
de
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 a
n 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 c
ha
ng
e 
ce
rta
in
 ro
ut
in
es
 –
 in
te
rn
al
ly
 o
r w
ith
 th
e 
he
lp
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l e
xp
er
ts
 (p
.3
77
)
• 
Pa
th
 d
ep
en
de
nc
e 
as
 a
 p
ro
pe
rty
 th
at
 c
an
 (b
ut
 n
ot
 n
ee
d 
to
) c
ha
ra
ct
er
iz
e 
dy
na
m
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s
• 
So
m
e 
sc
ho
la
rs
 li
ke
 T
ee
ce
 (2
00
7)
 o
ve
re
m
ph
as
iz
e 
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l a
bi
lit
y 
to
 re
co
nf
ig
ur
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l p
at
hs
: 
D
yn
am
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
tie
s 
ha
ve
 a
 tr
ue
 s
ub
st
an
ce
 th
at
 is
 d
is
tin
ct
 fr
om
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l a
ct
io
n 
(p
.3
76
)
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Table 1: Summary of Selected Research on Organizational Path Dependence (continued) 
St
ud
y
Ty
pe
 o
f S
tu
dy
D
at
a 
So
ur
ce
Sa
m
pl
e
Pr
op
os
al
s 
or
 F
in
di
ng
s
A
pa
ja
la
ht
i a
nd
 
Lo
vi
o 
(2
01
2)
Em
pi
ric
al
 
(q
ua
lit
at
iv
e)
A
rc
hi
va
l d
at
a
H
el
si
ng
in
 
En
er
gi
a 
(la
rg
es
t 
m
un
ic
ip
al
ly
-
ow
ne
d 
he
at
 a
nd
 
el
ec
tri
ci
ty
 
pr
od
uc
er
 in
 
Fi
nl
an
d)
• 
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
ex
pl
ai
ni
ng
 p
at
h 
br
ea
k-
ou
t t
ha
t i
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
th
eo
ry
 o
f S
yd
ow
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
9)
 a
nd
 th
e 
ph
as
e-
m
od
el
 o
f d
es
ta
bi
liz
at
io
n 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
by
 T
ur
nh
ei
m
 &
 G
ee
ls
 (2
01
2)
• 
Ea
rly
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 (t
rig
ge
rin
g 
ev
en
ts
) t
ha
t i
ni
tia
te
 th
e 
pa
th
 fo
rm
at
io
n 
ph
as
e 
m
ig
ht
 w
el
l b
e 
st
ra
te
gi
ca
l a
nd
 d
el
ib
er
at
e 
an
d 
no
t n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
ra
nd
om
• 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
in
 th
e 
fo
rm
 o
f s
ca
le
, c
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
, l
ea
rn
in
g,
 a
nd
 c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
th
at
 s
tre
ng
th
en
ed
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t p
at
h 
of
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
• 
Pa
th
-b
re
ak
in
g 
re
qu
ire
s 
ex
te
rn
al
 im
pu
ls
e 
or
 p
re
ss
ur
e;
 p
at
h-
br
ea
ki
ng
 b
eh
av
io
r c
an
no
t b
e 
in
iti
at
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ac
to
rs
 
w
ho
 lo
st
 th
ei
r p
ow
er
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
a 
pa
th
-d
ep
en
de
nt
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
• 
D
es
ta
bi
liz
at
io
n 
of
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
fo
llo
w
s 
(1
) a
 m
is
-m
at
ch
 o
f t
he
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n'
s 
in
te
rn
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
an
d 
an
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 e
xt
er
na
l p
re
ss
ur
e 
an
d 
(2
) t
he
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n'
s 
un
ab
ili
ty
 to
 a
da
pt
 to
 th
is
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
by
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
its
 
do
m
in
an
t l
og
ic
Sc
hr
ey
oe
gg
 a
nd
 
Sy
do
w
 (2
01
2)
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l
–
–
• 
Pr
op
os
in
g 
si
x 
se
lf-
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
lo
gi
c 
of
 fe
ed
ba
ck
 s
pi
ra
ls
: (
1)
 S
ca
le
 e
ffe
ct
s 
(e
co
no
m
ie
s 
of
 
sc
al
e)
, (
2)
 c
om
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 e
ffe
ct
s,
 (3
) l
ea
rn
in
g 
ef
fe
ct
s,
 (4
) c
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
s,
 (5
) a
da
pt
iv
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
, a
nd
 (6
) 
di
re
ct
 a
nd
 in
di
re
ct
 n
et
w
or
k 
ex
te
rn
al
iti
es
• 
In
 c
er
ta
in
 c
on
te
xt
ua
l s
et
tin
gs
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 o
cc
ur
: E
nv
iro
nm
en
ts
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
iz
ed
 b
y 
am
bi
gu
ity
 a
nd
 c
om
pl
ex
ity
 fa
ci
lit
at
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
(in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 P
ie
rs
on
 
20
00
) (
p.
19
)
• 
Li
m
ite
d 
po
w
er
 o
f a
ge
nc
y:
 S
oc
ia
l p
at
te
rn
s 
(s
uc
h 
as
 s
el
f-r
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s)
 a
re
 li
ke
ly
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 b
eh
in
d 
th
e 
ba
ck
 o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
l a
nd
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ac
to
rs
 (p
.2
5)
Sy
do
w
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
2)
Em
pi
ric
al
 
(q
ua
lit
at
iv
e)
Se
m
i-s
tru
ct
ur
ed
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
an
d 
ar
ch
iv
al
 d
at
a
Se
m
ic
on
du
ct
or
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
in
du
st
ry
• 
Te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l p
at
hs
 a
re
 n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ril
y 
an
 e
m
er
ge
nt
 p
he
no
m
en
on
, i
.e
., 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f s
oc
ia
l p
ro
ce
ss
es
 th
at
 a
re
 
be
yo
nd
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
f a
ge
nt
s
• 
St
ra
te
gi
c 
ag
en
cy
 (c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ag
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In 2009, the seminal work of Sydow and colleagues raised research on path dependence 
to a new level. While introducing the concept of organizational path dependence, Sydow 
et al. (2009) theorized that the concept is more than just a metaphorical phrase indicating 
that history matters, but represents a central driver of organizational persistence. Table 1 
presents a summary of selected research on organizational path dependence that is based 
on or refers to Sydow et al. (2009). 
In this way, the essence of organizational path dependence is rooted in an organizational 
developmental process driven by emerging dynamics that lead to an increasingly 
narrowed scope of alternatives. Hence, organizations’ development might result in a state 
of persistence or at least limited choice (Koch 2011; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012), in which 
organizational adaptation is absent. 
 
 
Figure 3: Constitution of Organizational Paths (Sydow et al. 2009, p. 692) 
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As Figure 4 indicates, an organizational path is understood as comprising three stages 
(Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). Beginning with a small and contingent 
event in stage one, self-reinforcing mechanisms come into motion at a critical juncture 
(stage two), and increasingly assume control of the developmental process. From this 
point in time, the firm finds itself in a state of path dependence.  
This second stage represents the focus of this dissertation. At this point, self-reinforcing 
dynamics progressively narrow the variation and range of managerial discretion and may 
ultimately lead to a state of lock-in – conceptualized as a corridor of significantly limited 
scope of feasible options and hence a state of organizational persistence – in phase three 
(Arthur 1990; Koch 2011). Self-reinforcing mechanisms have been identified as more or 
less subtle driving forces on the road to persistence, or put differently, as key drivers of 
path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; Schreyoegg and Sydow 
2012). 
 
2.2. SELF-REINFORCING MECHANISMS 
Self-reinforcing mechanisms are said to lie “at the core of the theory of path dependence” 
(Schreyoegg et al. 2011, p. 96). They emerge due to the prevalence of positive 
(amplifying) feedback (Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012), induced by increasing returns on 
a small and contingent initial action (Arthur 1989, 1990). Thus, self-reinforcing 
mechanisms “drastically reduce the range of available options” (Koch 2011, p. 338). 
Although self-reinforcing mechanisms involve managerial agency at the very beginning, 
they increasingly work behind the back of individual agents (Giddens 1984; Schreyoegg 
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and Sydow 2012). That is, unintended dynamics of the system increasingly and 
unnoticeably gain control (Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012) while stabilizing and 
automatizing the collective activity patterns of the organization (Sydow et al. 2009). 
Hence, self-reinforcing mechanisms are twofold in their nature. In the first instance, the 
stabilization effect of self-reinforcing mechanisms is beneficial to the organization as it 
facilitates profitability (Apajalahti and Lovio 2012) and operating efficiency (Levinthal 
and March 1993; Gilbert 2005). Thus, in this state, self-reinforcing mechanisms are quite 
favorable. 
However, this is true only until a certain point of development. Thereafter and under 
certain environmental conditions, these dynamics may reverse (Schreyoegg et al. 2011; 
Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012), with self-reinforcing dynamics leading to negative 
outcomes in terms of diminished profitability and operating profits as strategic options 
are either not noticed or are intentionally excluded. The key issue of this double-edged 
nature of self-reinforcing mechanisms is that the tipping point from positive to negative 
characteristics is difficult to reverse, even if it is recognized by management. The 
literature on organizational path dependence argues that this owes to unintended 
dynamics unconsciously controlling and stabilizing organizational processes, that is, self-
reinforcing mechanisms (Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). 
At the organizational level, five self-reinforcing mechanisms have been found to establish 
organizational paths: Scale, complementary, learning, coordination, and expectation 
effects (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; 
Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). 
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Scale effects. Scale effects refer both to economies of scale and economies of scope. By 
definition, economies of scale are achieved where small proportional increases in the 
levels of all input factors lead to over-proportional increases in the levels of outputs 
(Panzar and Willig 1977; Rumelt 1982). Thus, economies of scale describe cost 
reductions due to larger size and, for example, larger volumes of production. Economies 
of scope are achieved “whenever the costs of providing the services of the sharable input 
to two or more product lines are sub-additive,” meaning that costs are “less than the total 
costs of providing these services for each product line separately” (Panzar and Willig 
1981, p. 268). As a result, scale effects lead to greater profitability as the cost per unit 
decreases. Thus, the company receives positive feedback in the form of efficiency gains 
from doing more of the same. On the other hand, strategic alternatives that might be more 
favorable in the long term will not be perceived or will be overlooked due to lower short-
term and concrete profit streams. 
Complementary effects. Complementary effects are based on synergies through the 
connection and interaction of two or more separate sub-systems that produce an additional 
surplus: K(x+y) > K(x) + K(y) (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). The interaction of 
complementary sub-systems may lead to the development of growth opportunities in 
adjacent and interrelated areas and thereby increase profitability based on the potential 
for synergies (Schreyoegg et al. 2011). In this context, the interconnection of the sub-
systems is based on shared resources, such as in terms of skills and competencies or a 
jointly used customer base. In order to capitalize on such synergy potentials, the 
interactions between the sub-systems must be continuously deepened and amplified, 
resulting in an ever-growing level of interdependency. Consequently, activity patterns 
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increasingly become stabilized, potentially leading to suboptimal resource configurations 
in case one sub-system suffers (for example, when the demand for one of the sub-system’s 
outcomes decreases). 
Learning effects. Learning effects are based on the assumption that the more often an 
activity is performed, the more efficiently and proficiently it can be performed (Argote 
1999). Thus, it becomes increasingly beneficial to adhere to already familiar activities, as 
the returns of constantly improving and deepening them are more certain and pay off in 
the short term. The constant recourse to and further development of what is already 
known is what the literature defines as exploitative learning (Levinthal and March 1993; 
He and Wong 2004; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). Consequently, “exploitation is gained 
via local search, experiential refinement, and selection of existing routines” (Baum et al. 
2000, p. 768). While focusing on exploitative learning, exploratory learning (i.e., 
performing new activities for which new competencies must be learned) becomes less 
and less attractive (Baum et al. 2000; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). As for the latter, 
returns are more uncertain and might only be realized in the long term, if ever (March 
1991; Levinthal and March 1993). Thus, companies typically tend to continuously focus 
on exploiting existing businesses, technologies, and competencies instead of switching to 
new businesses or technologies. As a result, activity patterns become increasingly 
stabilized.  
Coordination effects. Coordination effects are rooted in adherence to organizational rules, 
guidelines, processes, procedures, norms, and values (Kaplan and Henderson 2005). 
Indeed, the more actors internalize and adopt activity-controlling guidelines, norms, and 
values, the higher the efficiency of their interactions (Kaplan and Henderson 2005). Thus, 
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according to Martinez and Jarillo (1989), coordination represents a central element of 
organizational theory, consisting of three key structural and formal mechanisms: 
Centralization; formalization and standardization; and planning, budgeting, and goal 
setting.  
First, coordination is the result of the level of centralization versus decentralization of 
decision making (Pugh et al. 1968; Martinez and Jarillo 1989), that is, improving control 
through centralizing activities and thus realizing efficiency gains. Second, coordination 
is based on the level of formalization and standardization, that is, the extent to which 
policies, rules, and procedures are defined through written documents (Pugh et al. 1968; 
Martinez and Jarillo 1989). Third, coordination is the result of planning, budgeting, and 
goal setting in order to guide and channel individuals’ activities (March and Simon 1958; 
Martinez and Jarillo 1989). Wolf and Floyd (2017) argue that planning has been identified 
as a key mechanism for integration and coordination.  
Thereby, the coordination of organizational activities provides stability and guidance for 
corporate actors. As a result, operating processes and procedures become increasingly 
streamlined and automatized and thus more efficient. On the downside, however, activity 
patterns increasingly become stabilized, which in turn implies greater difficulty in 
adapting them (Gilbert 2005). 
Expectation effects. Finally, the literature argues that expectation effects, based on the 
logic of observation, shape organizational paths (Sydow et al. 2009). Hence, observations 
of the first actor’s activities stimulate the expectations and subsequent activities of the 
second actor, in turn affecting the expectations and subsequent activities of the first actor 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
37 
(Luhmann 2012). More practically stated, expectation effects are based on people’s 
aspiration for social belonging and desire to be on the winning side (Haller and Norpoth 
1994). This phenomenon is frequently explained by the bandwagon effect, arguing that 
people trust the wisdom of the majority (Leibenstein 1950). While seeking the legitimacy 
of actions and decisions, organizational actors undertake specific activities as they expect 
others to confirm or even to do the same. In this way, they favor the winning solution, 
such as in terms of investment decisions (Haller and Norpoth 1994). As a result, one 
dominant solution emerges that increases the returns for those who wanted to be on the 
winner’s side (Pierson 2000).  
Moreover, expectation effects are grounded in the concepts of social control and 
belonging (Leibenstein 1950; O’Reilly 1989; Haller and Norpoth 1994; O’Reilly and 
Chatman 1996; Pierson 2000; Luhmann 2012), that is, informal and unwritten norms and 
social expectations in the form of common agreements among actors that constitute 
appropriate behavior and a feeling of belonging (O’Reilly 1989). As a result, expectation 
effects lead to increasingly stabilized activity patterns that might be suboptimal at a 
certain point in time but are difficult to change. 
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3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH SETTING 
Experience without theory is blind, but theory 
without experience is mere intellectual play. 
Immanuel Kant 
 
3.1. GERMAN UTILITY MARKET 
This research focuses on the specific development of six German utilities (to be referred 
under the pseudonyms Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, Epsilon, and Zeta) in the time period 
between 1999 and 2015. Thereby, the German utility market provides an ideal empirical 
research setting to study self-reinforcing mechanisms and their influence on 
organizational adaptation. After the Second World War, the market was characterized by 
a monopolistic system in which regional companies held exclusive rights for the supply 
of energy. In this phase, market participants began to shape their own developmental 
paths, which were strengthened and rigidified in subsequent years. In this context, cycles 
of change lasted up to 15 years. Clear attention was paid to enhancing energy generation 
capacities in order to secure energy supply. From 1945, domestic coal was the primary 
energy source. During the 1960s, increased focus on lowering energy prices in order to 
support the exporting German economy led to the replacement of coal by oil as the 
primary energy source. After the worldwide oil crisis in 1973, the focus of energy 
generation shifted again. Gas and nuclear power plants increasingly gained importance 
due to their high capacities and relatively low CO2 emissions compared to other energy 
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sources. Indeed, the latter in particular became an essential element of German energy 
generation in the 1990s.  
With market liberalization in 1999, the stage for the entrepreneurial actions of market 
participants was set. One former CEO of Alpha stated that “the situation at that time was 
that companies became bigger and bigger (...) and then actually everything changed 
abruptly with market liberalization.” Certainly, liberalization established the starting 
point for entirely new market conditions that all market participants entered under similar 
assumptions.  
Since the liberalization, the market has been characterized by a large number of rapid and 
revolutionary changes. The former CFO of a renewable energy project developer stressed 
that “the German energy supply market was subject to revolutionary changes based on 
the interventions of the German government turning existing market mechanisms upside 
down.” Thus, market dynamics were mainly driven by consumers becoming more 
environmentally conscious, emerging technologies of energy generation (e.g., the 
development of renewable energies), and frequently changing legal requirements in terms 
of policies and laws (e.g., the lifetime extension of nuclear power plants and the 
subsequent nuclear phase-out). 
Within the liberalized energy market, political interventions constantly increased the level 
of uncertainty for market participants, although on the other hand, politics created an 
artificially stable but (at least initially) less profitable market segment through the 
subsidization of renewable energies by guaranteeing feed-in remunerations for 20 years. 
Thus, within this highly dynamic and unpredictable energy market, the sub-segment of 
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renewable energy became even more predictable, as ordered by the administrative 
authority. 
Within this market development, the field of energy generation was especially affected 
by frequent changes in framework conditions. Traditional businesses such as coal, gas, 
and nuclear power generation became obsolete, at least for a certain period of time until 
the regulations changed again. For example, the introduction of tradable CO2 certificates 
in 2005 had put gas power plants in an advantageous position compared to other fossil 
energy sources like coal, because of the former’s lower pollution load in energy 
generation. However, owing to a rapid and ongoing price decline in CO2 certificates, 
such formerly beneficial investment assumptions for gas power generation increasingly 
became invalid, as even the most efficient gas power plants could no longer be operated 
with lower marginal costs of production than coal power plants.  
Similarly, in 2010 the decision of the German government to extend the lifetimes of 
nuclear power plants for 12 years on average favored energy suppliers that owned or held 
shares in nuclear energy generation. However, just one year later, the German 
government underwent a radical turnaround in energy policy by declaring an ultimate 
nuclear phase-out, with eight German nuclear power plants directly shut down. Besides 
renewable energies, this decision again brought other conventional energy sources like 
gas and coal to the fore. 
As a result, market participants were compelled to reallocate resources (financial 
resources, human resources, and management attention) to new businesses and 
technologies such as solar or wind energy, or even provide energy-related services, in 
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order to remain competitive and viable in the long run. Indeed, the former CEO of Alpha 
underlined that “all those investments in conventional energy generation have ultimately 
no longer paid off, so that today we are facing a situation in which all utilities have to 
come up with a new business model.” 
Accordingly, organizational adaptation to new circumstances and thus the process of 
resource (re)allocation became of critical importance, especially as investments in 
conventional energy generation typically had long investment periods of up to 20 to 30 
years, whereas profits were only realized within the final golden years of this period.  
 
3.2. MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
In order to investigate the strategic actions of the focal firms and to contextualize their 
decisions, it is important to possess an in-depth understanding of the market dynamics 
and key milestones that shaped the market development. Thus, the present section of this 
dissertation provides a detailed overview of the historical development of the German 
utility market, which on the basis of key milestones can be divided into five definable 
phases (Table 1), as described below. 
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Table 2: Phases of Market Development 
 
3.2.1. PRE-LIBERALIZATION PHASE (1945–1999) 
Following World War Two, the German energy market became of critical importance to 
the reconstruction of the German economy, and was accordingly the subject of profound 
political interventions. Due to its significance (and in spite of liberal economic policies), 
the German energy market was for decades largely state-regulated. The market was 
divided into separate supply areas for which a small number of national, regional and 
municipal energy suppliers enjoyed exclusive rights for energy supply. Hence, eight 
companies generated and distributed the majority of energy required. 
Within the early years of market development after 1945, the central condition was to 
secure energy supply while overcoming supply shortages through expanding capacities. 
Consequently, mainly domestic energy sources like coal were used for energy generation. 
Pre-liberalization phase
1945–1999
Phase I:  Liberalization & 
Energy Turnaround
1999–2004
Phase II:  Harmonization of 
Competitive Conditions
2004–2009
Phase III:  Nuclear Lifetime 
Expansion
2009–2011
Phase IV:  Second Energy 
Turnaround
2011–2015
German energy supply 
market as a key enabler of the 
reconstruction of the German 
economy after the Second 
World War
Subject of profound political 
interventions and state-
regulated over decades to 
secure energy supply
Historically evolved 
adherence to domestic energy 
sources, i.e. coal
Nuclear energy as an 
essential element of German 
energy generation in the 1990s
Liberalization set the 
conditions for entrepreneurial 
behavior against the backdrop 
of up to 50 years of market 
monopolies
Renewable Energies Act 
guaranteed feed-in 
remunerations for renewable 
energies for 20 years and 
enforced obligation to primary 
include renewable energies into 
the grid
Limitation of the period of 
validity of existing nuclear 
power plants
Amendment of the 
Renewable Energies Act set 
concrete goals for the 
expansion of renewable 
energies
Energy Economic Law 
established Federal Network 
Agency to be in charge of the 
energy grid and forced firms to 
separate their network 
operation units from their 
energy sales units
Adoption of the European 
Union Emissions Trading 
System introduced CO2 
certificates as additional 
production costs for energy 
generation
Worldwide financial crisis 
led to a continuing general 
decline in demand
Amendment of the 
Renewable Energies Act 
reduced the future feed-in 
remuneration for photovoltaic 
plants to mitigate the risk of 
over-supporting the technology
Amendment of the Atomic 
Energy Act enforced the 
lifetime expansion of nuclear 
power plants for twelve years 
on average
Market competition 
increased due to municipal 
energy suppliers increasingly 
applied for operating the 
distribution grids
Ultimate nuclear phase-out: 
Direct shut down of eight 
nuclear power plants and 
decision to shut down the 
remaining nine German plants 
until 2022
Coal and gas energy to 
compensate for the retirement 
of nuclear power and the 
variations of renewable energy 
generation; however, as a back-
up solution these power plants 
did not have the required 
operating hours to be profitable
Price decline of CO2 
certificates by up to 80 percent 
accelerated the profitability loss 
of gas power plants
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Despite significant competitive disadvantages compared to foreign coal production (e.g., 
high costs for underground mining in Germany versus opencast mining abroad), coal 
became the primary energy source. Competitive disadvantages were compensated by high 
governmental subsidies, a situation that remains true today. 
During the 1960s, security of supply (the previous key target of German energy politics) 
was replaced by growing focus on lowering energy prices in order to support the 
exporting German economy. Accordingly, oil replaced coal as the primary source of 
energy generation in the 1960s. However, the worldwide oil crisis in 1973 stimulated a 
change in perception of oil as a source of energy generation. Indeed, oil was no longer 
considered the most advantageous energy source. Instead, focus shifted toward a more 
diversified supply consisting of nuclear power as the primary source of energy generation 
due to its cost efficiency. The building of pipelines from Russia to Germany from the 
1970s resulted in gas also becoming an essential element of the German energy mix.  
However, since the 1980s, growing environmental consciousness has come to challenge 
nuclear power and the pollution load of energy generation from fossil fuels. In response, 
politicians opted to reduce CO2 emissions, but also decided to adhere to nuclear power 
as an essential element of German energy generation in the 1990s. In line with this 
increased awareness of environmental and climate protection, renewable energies have 
also been promoted by politicians.  
At the end of 1996, the European Union (EU) pushed for the liberalization of national 
energy grids while attempting to establish an internal European energy market. The major 
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reason behind this guideline was to foster overall price reductions for energy and to force 
energy companies to improve their customer service. 
 
3.2.2. PHASE I: LIBERALIZATION AND ENERGY TURNAROUND (1999–2004) 
In Germany, the EU guideline was implemented in 1998, resulting in the complete 
liberalization of the German energy market in 1999.1 The conditions for entrepreneurial 
behavior of energy companies were created through opening the market to new 
competitors. However, the entry of new market participants was constrained by the 
Associations Agreement [German: Verbaendevereinbarung] in the first place, stipulating 
that prices for the utilization of energy grids are determined by associations of network 
operators and network users. Moreover, high market entry barriers hampered competition 
at that time, these being particularly pertinent in the energy generation business due to 
the considerable investment costs required to build power plants.  
Despite these drawbacks, the liberalization represented a significant break in the 
development of market incumbents, especially against the backdrop of up to 50 years of 
market monopolies. Energy companies were suddenly confronted with price decreases 
resulting from overcapacities due to energy imports from neighboring countries. As a 
consequence, the energy sales business was no longer profitable. Following the market 
 
1 Given that market mechanisms were disabled during this pre-liberalization phase, this paper concentrates 
on the development of the German energy market and its market participants since the liberalization in 
1999. Nevertheless, an understanding of the market development before 1999 is crucial to fully 
comprehend the individual developments of the focal firms. 
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liberalization, the newly elected German government set two groundbreaking priorities 
in environmental and energy policy.  
First, in April 2000 the Renewable Energy Sources Act came into force with the key 
target of increasing the share of renewable energies in the energy supply to 60 per cent 
by the year 2035. Essential components of the Renewable Energy Sources Act were a 
feed-in remuneration for renewable energy guaranteed for 20 years, and an obligation for 
network operators to primarily include renewable energy into the grid. To this end, the 
German government created a stable and predictable sub-segment within the highly 
dynamic German energy market. Associated with this law, politicians promoted new 
technologies that were not competitive at this time, bringing about a radical change in the 
classic merit order, i.e., the ranking of available energy sources depending on their 
marginal costs of production. Starting with the lowest, energy sources with greater 
marginal costs of production will be added as long as energy demand is covered. By 
prioritizing renewable energies, politicians suspended the existing market mechanisms, 
leading to decreased profitability for conventional power plants: 
The Renewable Energy Sources Act has led to the fact that the classic merit order, 
the order in which power plants are switched on, has been completely thrown out 
of kilter and the business case for many investments in gas power plants has been 
destroyed. 
Former Manager, Internal Consulting, Beta 
Second, in June 2000 the German government agreed with German energy companies to 
limit the period of validity of existing nuclear power plants. The concrete termination of 
two existing nuclear power plants in 2002 and 2003 was also decided. A closure of 
nuclear power plants amounted to significant losses of earnings for plant operators, 
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because on the one hand, these power plants typically operate at lower marginal costs of 
production than any other source of energy generation, and on the other, the removal of 
nuclear power plants incurs significant costs for their operators (e.g., disposal costs for 
nuclear waste). In contrast, energy companies not possessing nuclear power plants 
benefited from the lifetime limitation, as their conventional power plants experienced 
greater utilization by climbing upwards in the merit order. 
 
3.2.3. PHASE II: HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS (2004–2009) 
In 2004, the first amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources Act entered into force. 
The law scheduled concrete goals and milestones for the expansion of renewable 
energies. In 2010, the share of renewable energies in the energy supply was planned to 
be 12.5 per cent, and at least 20 per cent by the year 2020. This first amendment 
accelerated the expansion of renewable energies and thus led to further shifts in the merit 
order.  
In order to create an equal playing field for all market participants, politics underwent 
two changes in the economic framework of the energy market via the second amendment 
to the Energy Economy Law [German: Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (EnWG)] in 2005, the 
removal of the Associations Agreement, and the unbundling of network operations and 
the energy sales business. By establishing the German Federal Network Agency (FNA) 
to take control of the energy grid, a governmental regulation replaced the Associations 
Agreement from 1999. Consequently, the level of influence of large energy companies 
was reduced, while competition increased. 
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The unbundling of network operations and the energy sales businesses represented 
another change in the competitive landscape that particularly applies to large utility 
companies covering the entire industry value chain. Energy companies had to separate 
their network operations and energy sales businesses in terms of customer data, 
accounting, management and legal structures, resulting in considerable negative 
synergies for the respective companies. Unbundling also increased levels of competition 
in the industry. The additional legal requirements represented a further burden to which 
market incumbents had to adjust, while lowering market entry barriers for new 
competitors. 
As a vehicle of the European climate policy, the European Union Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) entered into force in 2005 with the objective to reduce CO2 emissions 
by means of low economic costs. The system was based on tradable CO2 certificates that 
had to be bought by companies producing CO2 emissions, such as in the energy 
generation business. At the beginning of the EU ETS, CO2 certificates were allocated to 
respective companies free of charge, thereby representing a significant competitive 
advantage for energy companies covering the value-added step of energy generation from 
fossil fuels in the first step. However, the requirement to buy CO2 certificates later 
engendered additional production costs for energy generation, especially in the case of 
technologies with high pollution loads, such as coal power plants. Accordingly, the EU 
ETS weakened the merit order position for coal power plants while strengthening that of 
the more emission-efficient gas power plants.  
The worldwide financial crisis in 2007 also affected the energy industry while instigating 
a general decline in demand for the industrial sector, which was further intensified by 
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steadily growing environmental consciousness, especially in the private sector. As a 
result, energy companies were forced to cope with overcapacities in energy generation 
businesses, as well as declining prices. 
 
3.2.4. PHASE III: NUCLEAR LIFETIME EXPANSION (2009–2011) 
In 2009, a further change of government also affected German energy policy. The new 
German government passed the third amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources Act. 
The main subject of this amendment was the reduction in future feed-in remuneration for 
solar plants to mitigate the risk of excessive support for solar technology. In recent years, 
solar technology in particular has made great progress in becoming a competitive 
technology.  
Following several months of dispute, the German government also passed an amendment 
to the Atomic Energy Act in 2010, determining the lifetime expansion of nuclear power 
plants for 12 years on average. This decision put the operators of nuclear power plants in 
a superior market position, as their power plants had by far the lowest marginal costs of 
production. By contrast, this decision put the operators of conventional power plants (e.g., 
coal or gas power plants) at a disadvantage, as they would suffer losses due to a lower 
ranking in the merit order and consequent lower utilization of their power plants. This is 
particularly evident whenever the proportion of renewable energies increases, as was 
desired by law at that time. 
2010 was characterized by a renaissance of municipal utilities. Having sold their 
distribution grids to private energy companies in the 1990s, numerous cities and 
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municipalities were now interested in licenses to operate the distribution grids in order to 
generate stable and long-term income streams. This period was favorable, because in the 
following two years, over 2,000 licenses would expire. For market incumbents, the 
renaissance of municipal utilities implied another increase in competition, and in the case 
of losing licenses to those newcomers, losses of earnings contribution for contemporary 
network operators. 
 
3.2.5. PHASE IV: SECOND ENERGY TURNAROUND (2011–2015) 
Less than five months after the German government decided to expand the lifetime of 
nuclear power plants, a tsunami destroyed considerable parts of the nuclear power plant 
in Fukushima, Japan. In three out of six power plant units, a core meltdown occurred. 
Three months after this natural catastrophe, the German government underwent a radical 
turnaround in energy policy by declaring an ultimate nuclear phase-out until 2022. Eight 
German nuclear power plants were directly shut down, while the remaining nine were to 
be taken off the grid incrementally between 2015 and 2022. As a result of this radical 
change in direction, the losses of earnings contribution for operators of nuclear power 
plants ran into the billions.  
The energy market in particular is a very political market and the interventions we 
have seen in recent years, one cannot say that they have only affected some banana 
republics like somewhere in Latin America, but rather they have happened right 
here in Germany, for example the interventions we saw in nuclear energy a few 
years ago. (…) ultimately leading to a significant increase in uncertainty. 
Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation, Alpha 
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At this time, renewable energy capacities were not sufficient to compensate for the 
missing capacity from the nuclear phase-out, as the expansion of renewable energies had 
not yet become well-developed. Thus, renewable energies required a back-up solution, as 
such energy generation is characterized by a high level of volatility due to being 
dependent on environmental conditions (e.g., in times of still air, wind turbines are unable 
to generate energy). In order to compensate for the retirement of nuclear power as well 
as variations in energy generation by renewable sources, politicians adopted a program 
to accelerate the expansion of coal and gas energy. The latter is particularly suited to 
compensating for variations in renewable energy generation given its flexibility, whereas 
the former is capable of providing a stable base load supply.  
Since 2013, earnings from the conventional energy generation business steadily 
decreased due to highly subsidized renewable energies. Based on their role as a back-up 
solution for renewable energies, the utilization hours of coal and gas power plants 
continuously declined and, as consequence, most conventional power plants can no 
longer be operated at a profitable level. In its Annual Report 2011, Delta summarized the 
situation as follows: 
The current development of the energy market is having a particularly negative 
impact on the profitability of conventional energy generation. This development is 
due in particular to the ever-increasing expansion of renewable energy capacities. 
The promotion of this form of generation is regulated by the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act. According to this Act, energy from renewable sources has a feed-in 
priority over other forms of generation and a guaranteed remuneration, regardless 
of the development of prices on the energy exchange. As a result, the utilization of 
conventional power plants continues to decline while shutdowns become 
unavoidable. (...) Under the current market conditions, new investments in 
conventional power plants are not profitable. The preliminary results of currently 
available electricity price forecasts even show that it will hardly be possible to 
cover the costs of power plant operations in the next few years. 
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This development was catalyzed by declining prices for CO2 certificates by up to 80 per 
cent from 2011. At its peak, the price for one CO2 certificate was 30 to 40 euros per ton 
of CO2. At this price point, coal power plants were no longer profitable; more efficient 
gas power plants represented the preferred alternative. However, due to the price for CO2 
certificates rapidly declining to three euros, even the most efficient and modern gas power 
plants could not be operated with lower marginal costs of production than coal power 
plants.  
Nevertheless, given their relevance to the system through providing a stable energy 
supply, the regulatory authority only allowed the shutdown of these gas power plants 
following a thorough examination, implying that certain energy companies were tied to 
assets, constantly operating at a loss. 
Many utility companies in the industry are faced with the decision to close 
unprofitable power plants. (...) The government has also severely restricted the 
right of power plant operators to decommission their plants, including a 
decommissioning ban for so-called system-relevant power plants. 
Management Report 2012, Gamma 
To cope with these frequent changes and challenging market conditions, organizational 
adaptation by market participants has actually become more significant than ever.  
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4. METHODOLOGY 
I never guess. It is a capital mistake to theorize 
before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist 
facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts. 
Sherlock Holmes (Sir Arthur Conan Doyle) 
 
4.1. CASE SELECTION 
To study the influence of self-reinforcing mechanisms on organizational adaptation, a 
comparative multiple-case study approach is applied (Druckman 2005; Yin 2009). 
According to Teece (2012), case studies provide a promising avenue for research in order 
to enhance understanding of theories, and are likely to create powerful insights. Thereby, 
one major strength of case studies is that the theoretical implications they yield are likely 
to be empirically valid, as theory building and theory advancement are closely tied to 
empirical evidence (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 547). Case studies have been deemed particularly 
appropriate when knowledge about a phenomenon is rare and there exists little empirical 
substantiation (Eisenhardt 1989; Anderson et al. 1999; Creswell and Clark 2007; 
Edmondson and McManus 2007; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), as is true of research 
on path dependence (Vergne 2013). Indeed, previous research on organizational path 
dependence has explicitly requested that future research utilize a multiple-case design 
that allows for cross-case comparison and enables emphasis to be placed on the 
embeddedness of focal firms in a certain industry setting (Schreyoegg et al. 2011). 
In contrast to a single-case study approach, multiple cases enable repeated observations 
of certain phenomena in different contextual settings, augmenting levels of theoretical 
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generalizability as a result (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2009). 
According to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 27), multiple-case studies create more 
robust, generalizable, and testable theory compared to single-case study research, as the 
implications they derive are based on varied empirical evidence.  
The case studies provided in this dissertation describe the development of and discuss the 
reasons behind the particular courses of action taken by six German utility companies (to 
be referred under the pseudonyms Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, Epsilon, and Zeta). 
Certainly, case selection was guided by the intention to contrast the idiosyncratic 
development of firms with both similar and dissimilar initial resource equipment and that 
were compelled to cope with rapid and revolutionary changes in a comprehensively 
altered liberalized utility market. Thus, the cases were selected to create a diverse sample 
of focal firms in order to increase the number of possibilities for comparison and 
consequently ensure richer theory development (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and 
Corbin 1990; Danneels 2002). Indeed, case selection allowed for cross-case comparison 
in order to highlight the idiosyncratic aspects that influenced the development of any one 
of the focal firms (Miles 1979).  
The cases were divided into three groups, with each group containing two focal firms 
(Table 3). Group A contained market incumbents that possessed their own conventional 
energy generation capacities at the time of the market liberalization and found themselves 
in a state of lock-in at the end of the research time period. By contrast, groups B and C 
comprised companies that were newcomers in the utility market, only covering selected 
value-added activities at the beginning of the research time period. The companies in 
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groups B and C did not possess their own energy generation capacities at the time of the 
market liberalization. 
 
 
Table 3: Brief Overview of Focal Firms’ Development 
Company Group Resource equipmentas at 1999/ 2000 Development
Situation as 
at 2015
Alpha Group A:
'Incumbent' 
(large-scale 
MNE)
Own energy 
generation 
capacities
• Strong focus on accelerating conventional energy generation capacities (focus on coal and 
nuclear power plants)
• Strong focus on exploration business (coal extraction) to realize synergy potentials with 
conventional energy generation
• Restrained and late development of renewable energies business (development of own 
renewable energy projects)
• Late (small) steps to enter energy-related service business
• Limited financial resources available to seize alternative options
Path 
dependence/ 
lock-in
Beta Group A:
'Incumbent' 
(large-scale 
MNE)
Own energy 
generation 
capacities
• Strong focus on accelerating conventional energy generation capacities (focus on gas and 
nuclear power plants)
• Strong focus on exploration business (gas and oil extraction) to realize synergy potentials 
with conventional energy generation
• Development of large-scale renewable energy projects (mainly through acquisitions of on- 
and offshore wind farms)
• Small steps to enter energy-related service business (earlier focus on energy-related service 
business than Alpha)
• Late (restrained) refocus on less capital intensive businesses – Investments in optimizing 
existing conventional energy generation capacities until 2012
• Limited financial resources available to seize alternative options
Path 
dependence/ 
lock-in
Gamma Group B:
'Newcomer' 
(small to 
medium-sized 
regional utility 
company)
No own energy 
generation 
capacities
• Investments in developing own energy generation capacities
• Large-scale investment program in renewable energies and conventional energy generation 
(gas power plants) to compensate for volatile renewable energy generation
• Development of (energy-related) service business
• Focus on wind power within renewable energies portfolio, divestiture of foreign solar 
power businesses and extension of the value-added depth through developing own  project 
planning capabilities and capacities in wind power
• Limited financial resources available to seize alternative options – Divestitures and cost 
reduction to increase the financial scope for action
Path 
dependence/ 
lock-in
Delta Group B:
'Newcomer' 
(small to 
medium-sized 
regional utility 
company)
No own energy 
generation 
capacities
• Early investment in conventional engergy generation and development of own conventional 
energy generation capacities
• Continuous acceleration of conventional energy generation business 
• Restrained development of renewable energies business
• Failed attempts to generate alternative income streams in the energy grid business and the 
acceleration of the renewable energies business
• Late entry into energy-related service business
• Limited financial resources available to seize alternative options
Path 
dependence/ 
lock-in
Epsilon Group C:
'Newcomer' 
(small to 
medium-sized 
regional utility 
company)
No own energy 
generation 
capacities
• Development of own energy generation capacities
• Early refocus of energy generation strategy to enter the renewable energies business
• Investment into energy storage technologies and extension of the value-added depth 
through developing own project planning capabilities and capacities
• Development of (energy-related) service business
• Diversification of renewable energies portfolio
Path breaking
Zeta Group C:
'Newcomer' 
(small to 
medium-sized 
regional utility 
company)
No own energy 
generation 
capacities
• Stop constructing own conventional power plant and exclusively focus on renewable 
energy generation
• Large-scale investment program in renewable energies (including developing own project 
planning capabilities and capacities)
• Strong focus on energy grid business to generate stable income streams
• Early entry into energy-related service business and accelerated expansion
• (Preliminary) termination of renewable energy/ wind power projects due to increased 
market uncertainties
Path breaking
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Although similar to the group A companies, the focal firms in group B encapsulated path-
dependent development, leading them to strategic lock-in in 2015. Conversely, Epsilon 
and Zeta, the two focal firms in group C, were able to unlock their once entered path of 
development while reallocating resources to new technologies and business segments.  
Thus, the case selection ensured that resource equipment would not constitute the factor 
driving firm development, while highlighting the assumption that there are other 
influencing factors in the form of self-reinforcing mechanisms at play. 
 
4.2. DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection was based on various sources and types of data that could provide a rich 
and solid foundation for theory development (Eisenhardt 1989; Danneels 2002; Gibbert 
and Ruigrok 2008; Yin 2009). The data gathered covered the research time frame between 
the liberalization of the German energy market in 1999, and 2015. The first step of data 
gathering was based on the development of “a comprehensive collection of publicly 
accessible evidence,” including business and trade press articles, and annual reports 
regarding the six focal firms (Danneels 2010, p. 3). The archival data collected thus 
comprised more than 2,500 pages of evidence. 
In a second step, archival data were supplemented with primary data gathered through 
interviews, in-depth discussions, and workshops with the top-level executives and senior 
managers of each focal firm to discuss the firms’ specific development paths and identify 
the key milestones shaping them, as well as the effects and mechanisms that reinforced 
their existing resource allocation patterns. Interviews were focused in nature, i.e., semi-
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structured interviews that were open-ended, but followed a certain set of questions 
derived from the path dependence literature (Yin 2009). See Appendix 1 for a detailed 
list of interview topics.  
All interviews, in-depth discussions and workshops were conducted face-to-face or by 
telephone. Verbatim is only presented here with the title of the interviewee and the 
pseudonym of the firm in order to maintain confidentiality. Thus, each quotation may 
refer to any holder of such a title within the research time frame. Interviews lasted 
between one and two and a half hours and were recorded with permission. Recordings 
were transcribed verbatim. In total, the primary data comprised more than 51 hours of 
interactions, and more than 120 pages of interview transcripts and notes (Table 4).  
 
 
Table 4: Overview of Interviewees 
 
Company Interview Partner Interaction Type Total Time of Interaction (Hours)
Alpha Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation One interview lasting 1 hour 1.0
Former CEO One interview lasting 1 hour 1.0
Beta Former Manager, Internal Consulting One interview lasting 2 hours 2.0
Division Head, Corporate M&A One interview lasting 1 hour 1.0
Gamma CEO Three in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours each 6.0
Senior Manager, Business Development One interview lasting 1 hour 1.0
Manager, Group Controlling Three in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours each 6.0
Delta Division Head, Business Development One in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours 2.0
Senior Manager, Business Development One interview lasting 1 hour
Two in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours each
5.0
Former Senior Manager, Business Development One in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours 2.0
Epsilon CEO One interview lasting 1 hour
Two in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours each
5.0
Division Head, Transmission One interview lasting 1 hour 1.0
Zeta CEO One interview lasting 1 hour
Two in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours each
5.0
COO One in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours 2.0
Division Head, Sales & Distribution Two in-depth workshops lasting 2 hours each 4.0
Further Industry Experts CEO, Regional Energy Supplier One interview lasting 1 hour 1.0
Former CFO, Renewable Energy Project Developer One interview lasting 2.5 hours 2.5
Partner and Industry Expert, Consulting Company One interview lasting 1 hour 1.0
Senior Manager and Industry Expert, Consulting Company One interview lasting 2.5 hours 2.5
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For data accuracy reasons, the transcripts were again checked by the interviewees. Some 
of the interviewees subsequently provided further internal documents, such as decision 
proposals, meeting minutes, memos, and presentations, in order to support their 
statements. 
Furthermore, firm-specific interviews were supplemented by four interviews with C-level 
executives of German utility companies and senior-level industry experts to verify the 
firm-specific interview materials and anchor the developments of the focal firms in 
industry context. Thus, by triangulating various types of data from different sources and 
gathered through different methods, the validity of the results was increased (Jick 1979; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008; Yin 2009). Following Yin (2009), all data 
collected were documented and organized within a case study database (to increase the 
reliability and the validity of the results) using the qualitative data analysis software 
NVivo 12.  
 
4.3. DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS 
Data stemming from different sources were coded through applying typical content 
analysis procedures according to Strauss (1985) and Yan and Gray (1994). Thereby, data 
were coded into categories and subcategories in accordance with the theoretical 
framework (Yin 2009) provided by Sydow et al. (2009). The five coding categories and 
respective subcategories represented the five self-reinforcing mechanisms and their 
corresponding dimensions identified in previous research (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg 
et al. 2011; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012): (1) scale effects; 
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(2) complementary effects; (3) learning effects (exploitative learning); (4) coordination 
effects; and (5) expectation effects. These dimensions all occurred as recurring patterns 
of influential factors on the process of resource allocation of the focal firms. The 
subcategories were economies of scale and economies of scope as dimensions of scale 
effects; growth opportunities in adjacent (and interrelated) areas and shared resources in 
term of skills, competencies, and customers as dimension complementary effects; 
efficiency improvements and the exploitation of existing business areas as dimensions of 
exploitative learning (learning effects); centralization, formalization and standardization, 
and planning, budgeting, and goal setting as dimensions of coordination effects; and 
aspirations for social belonging, social expectations, legitimacy seeking, striving to be on 
the winning side, and informal and unwritten norms as five dimensions of expectation 
effects. Table 5 presents examples of data coding. 
Besides the subcategories proposed in the existing literature, further new dimensions of 
self-reinforcing mechanisms emerged during data analysis. With respect to exploitative 
learning (learning effects), for example, further dimensions that emerged during data 
analysis were the routinization of activities and the continuous improvement of existing 
competencies. A detailed description and discussion of emergent codes can be found in 
the findings section. 
Data coding was conducted by two researchers in collaboration. First, the coding 
procedure was aligned with another senior researcher, for example to decide that coding 
units should be meaningful text fragments instead of stand-alone words in order to enrich 
the qualitative analysis and to put the codes into context (Vergne and Depeyre 2016).  
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Table 5: Examples of Data Coding 
Coding Category Example Source
Scale effects   "With energy generation from coal, one can realize corresponding 
scale economies with a larger fleet of coal power plants."
Senior Manager, Group 
Controlling & M&A 
Valuation, Alpha
  "One cannot simply reduce coal production by 50 per cent from one 
day to the next, because there are correspondingly large open-cast 
mines with corresponding plans behind them, which cannot be 
adapted to the market as flexibly as, for example, gas power plants, 
where gas supply contracts can simply be canceled."
Senior Manager, Group 
Controlling & M&A 
Valuation, Alpha
Complementary effects   "So, wind is so to speak our primary source of energy generation 
now. And as a complement to this volatile form of energy generation, 
flexible, low-CO2 power plants are needed, so gas power plants are 
exactly the right thing."
Senior Manager, 
Business Development, 
Gamma
  "Horizontal integration between electricity and gas generates 
synergy and growth potentials from the convergence of the two energy 
sources, in particular through the increasingly important role of gas 
in electricity generation."
Management Report 
2004, Beta
Learning effects  
(Exploitative learning)
  "The political developments following the natural and reactor 
catastrophe in Japan show that the risk of rapid changes in energy 
policy has grown. Increased regulatory interventions in the energy 
market also bear earnings risks that are countered by consistent cost 
management."
Management Report 
2011, Delta
  "One of our core competencies simply is the construction and 
operation of large-scale power plants. This is what we can do better 
than others."
Division Head, 
Corporate M&A, Beta
Coordination effects   "We are increasingly meeting the rising demands on competitiveness 
by bundling our respective regional activities."
Management Report 
2002, Alpha
  "There is simply this ordinal system, that is, categorically whoever 
brings a better IRR, wins. We also have internal cost rates, which the 
whole company has to follow."
Senior Manager, 
Business Development, 
Gamma
  "Some decisions were based on wishful thinking rather than on 
realistic assumptions. That is, those decisions were based on 
assumptions that made them look better."
Former Manager, 
Internal Consulting, 
Beta
Expectation effects   "We felt obliged and saw it as a social duty to provide stable energy 
supply based on conventional energy generation. We are the lifeline, 
the blood circulation of Germany. We owe it to our fellow citizens, our 
neighbors, our local companies, to get the whole thing off the ground, 
because Germany needs reliable energy supply to prosper."
Former Manager, 
Internal Consulting, 
Beta
  "Those managers came from history. They build the conventional 
energy generation of Beta and were simply long-established elder 
statesmen of Beta, who felt very connected to this conventional area. 
So decisions were made that, if someone from the outside looked at it 
totally dispassionate and weighed everything up, maybe those 
decisions wouldn’t be made that way."
Former Manager, 
Internal Consulting, 
Beta
  "There was a kind of gold rush in the energy generation business. 
History has shown that you can print money with conventional power 
plants."
CEO, Epsilon
  "The increasing market pressure on energy sales will also have to 
result in drastic group-wide cost savings. Only in this way we will 
succeed in sustainably ensuring the competitiveness of our business."
Management Report 
2008, Zeta
  "Beta intensively participates in the exchange of opinions with all 
relevant social groups. We want to use our expertise to make the 
discussion of politically controversial issues more objective and to 
actively influence the conditions surrounding our activities."
Management Report 
2000, Beta
Coding Subcategory
Centralization
Planning, budgeting, and 
goal setting
Formalization and 
standardization
Shared resources (e.g. 
skills, competencies, 
customers)
Efficiency improvements
Exploiting existing 
business areas
Economies of scale
Economies of scope
Growth opportunities in 
adjacent (and interrelated) 
areas
Aspriration for social 
belonging
Being on the winning side
Informal and unwritten 
norms
Social expectations
Legitimacy seeking
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Subsequently, both primary data (i.e., transcripts and research notes) and archival data 
(i.e., management reports, decision proposals, meeting minutes, memos, and 
presentations) were independently coded. The codes were discussed afterwards with the 
other senior researcher to ensure that no relevant text fragment was omitted. Furthermore, 
codes that did not clearly describe the strengthening or leaving of a certain development 
path were deleted. This procedure helped to increase the validity and the comparability 
of the results both across firms and over time (Vergne and Depeyre 2016). 
The findings in the form of different dimensions of self-reinforcing mechanisms were 
accumulated to enrich understanding of scale, complementary, learning, coordination, 
and expectation effects. This bottom-up approach of condensing empirical findings to 
explanatory perspectives of theoretical phenomena contributes to the enhancement of 
theory (Sydow et al. 2012). 
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5. THE CASES OF GERMAN UTILITIES 
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more 
perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, 
than to take the lead in the introduction of a new 
order of things. 
Niccolo Machiavelli 
 
5.1. GROUP A: INCUMBENTS’ LOCK-IN 
Group A contains two large-scale diversified multinational utilities (MNEs) that entered 
the liberalized energy market covering the entire value chain, including own conventional 
energy generation capacities. Both Alpha and Beta possessed nuclear power plants and 
energy generation capacities from fossil fuels, i.e., gas and coal power plants. Within the 
research time period, both companies’ development was subject to stabilizing forces that 
kept them on their once entered development paths and finally led Alpha and Beta into a 
state of strategic lock-in. 
 
5.1.1. THE CASE OF ALPHA 
The case of Alpha describes the development of a large-scale multinational utility 
company. Alpha entered the liberalized energy market already covering the entire value 
chain, including own conventional energy generation capacities, in particular coal and 
nuclear power plants (the company’s core business). In the years following the market 
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liberalization, Alpha made massive investments to accelerate the expansion of its core 
business, as outlined in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4: Key Milestones in the Development of Alpha 
 
Even though the company built up renewable energy capacities, this future-oriented form 
of energy generation was always treated as by-product. Indeed, Alpha’s focus constantly 
remained on conventional energy generation, even in times when changing framework 
conditions put conventional energy generation under enormous pressure, its future 
viability being questioned. However, the company’s decisions did not lack consequences. 
Since 2011, Alpha has suffered constantly declining earnings, leading to annual deficits 
in 2013 and the years thereafter, and finally to a constantly shrinking scope of alternative 
available options. 
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Phase I (1999–2004). While over the years prior to the market liberalization Alpha had 
built up a large diversified conglomerate, immediately after the liberalization took place, 
the company took a different strategic direction to become a focused utility company. 
Thus, in the years between 1999 and 2004, Alpha recognized that in order be successful 
in the liberalized energy market, it would have to become more efficient and achieve a 
critical size in its core business of conventional energy generation by coal, gas and nuclear 
power plants and the exploration of raw materials, particularly coal and gas for its power 
plants. Thus, according to one Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation of 
Alpha, “the market in which we are active ultimately begins with the energy generation 
(…) and with the extraction of coal for our power plants.” 
In 2000, Alpha conducted a major restructuring program including efficiency 
improvement measures and divestitures of non-core businesses. According to Alpha’s 
2000/2001 Management Report,  
As part of our cost-cutting program focusing on the energy generation business, we 
are reducing our workforce by 2004. (…) efficiency-enhancing measures, including 
the modernization of our power plant portfolio. 
With the divestitures of non-core businesses, Alpha freed up financial resources, which 
were reallocated to strengthen its core business. In particular, Alpha undertook large 
investments in the expansion of its exploration business in 2001 to further intensify the 
synergies between its exploration and energy generation businesses. Moreover, in 2003 
the company implemented an investment program to modernize and enhance the 
efficiency of its existing power plant fleet. As one former CEO of Alpha explained: 
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We followed the old wisdom ‘back to the roots’: back to the core business. And then 
there was a wave of consolidation through the republic, when it was simply said 
that we have to become bigger in order to be able to play a role in the great Europe 
that is now open to us. 
In order to improve control and increase the manageability of the company, Alpha highly 
centralized its activities, but at the expense of flexibility, as would later became apparent: 
There was a new constellation with larger core businesses. At the same time, of 
course, there was also a certain degree of centralization in the organization in 
order to increase the manageability of the whole thing. 
Former CEO, Alpha 
Phase II (2004–2009). In Phase II, Alpha continued its divestiture program including, 
among the divestiture of other businesses, the sale of a solar cell producer, which the 
company would later regret. Alpha further focused on realizing synergy potentials and 
efficiency gains in its core business of energy generation by fossil fuels and nuclear power 
plants as well as in its exploration business. As a result, technological advancements and 
innovations have increasingly moved out of the spotlight. Indeed, the company 
emphasized in its 2004 Management Report that: 
Innovations are of comparatively little importance for our core business. Instead, 
efficient production processes and high security of supply are decisive for our 
competitiveness. 
The company’s strong focus on exploiting synergies through the integration of its 
businesses became particularly obvious in its 2004 Management Report, which 
emphasized that “we obtain coal from our own open-cast mines. (...) 89 percent of this 
coal was used for energy generation in our power plants.” Furthermore, the company 
highlighted in its 2005 Management Report that “we achieve further synergies through 
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horizontal integration, that is, by selling electricity and gas through one and the same 
group company.” 
However, the previously established interlinkages between the company’s businesses 
also provided strong arguments and even the need to further intensify those 
interconnections. As one Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation of 
Alpha argued: 
One cannot simply reduce coal production by 50 per cent from one day to the next, 
because there are correspondingly large open-cast mines with corresponding plans 
behind them, which cannot be adapted to the market as flexibly as, for example, gas 
power plants, where gas supply contracts can simply be canceled. 
Accordingly, Alpha further strengthened its footprint in conventional energy generation 
in the following years and invested in the expansion of its gas power plants in 2005 and 
again in 2006. 
Nevertheless, in 2007 Alpha decided to diversify its energy generation portfolio through 
entering the renewable energies business. However, the company’s focus still remained 
on its historically grown conventional energy generation business, while renewable 
energies were seen as a development – or even as a form of hype – with no real relevance 
for Germany or even for the company. Thus, according to Alpha’s former CEO, 
At the beginning one almost smiled at the situation, because the sun does not shine 
as it does in southern countries like Africa or Spain and the wind does not always 
blow, so renewable energies will not become a serious alternative. 
Thus, the decision of Alpha to enter the renewable energies business was less motivated 
by the conviction that this could be a promising and future-oriented business segment 
than by public pressure. As one Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation 
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of Alpha explained, “(...) this was certainly due to market pressure, as we have seen that 
the market expects Alpha, as one of Europe’s largest CO2 emitters, to invest in renewable 
energies.” 
As Alpha’s development was already focused on large conventional power plants even in 
the period before market liberalization, and the construction and the operation of its coal, 
gas, and nuclear power plants were regarded as the company’s appointed core 
competencies, it was hardly surprising that Alpha also initially concentrated on large 
projects when it entered the renewable energy generation market. Alpha therefore planned 
to build an offshore wind farm, which promised the generation of renewable energy 
generation capacities somewhere on the scale of conventional coal or gas power plants. 
However, Alpha was strongly driven by strict financial criteria concerning the 
profitability of investments that determined whether an investment would be pursued or 
not. Moreover, especially due to the company’s experience with conventional energy 
generation, which in the past was extremely profitable, this profitability threshold was 
high. As the comparably low (but guaranteed) profitability of renewable energies – even 
that of large-scale renewable energy projects – did not meet Alpha’s profitability 
threshold, the company ultimately decided against the construction of the offshore wind 
farm. According to one Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation, “we have 
provided resources for the construction of an offshore wind farm, but then have decided 
against this project because it has not met our profitability criteria.”  
Further, he stressed that: 
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We have clear expectations on the returns for our projects and they have to be met, 
and in the end profitability is always just one criterion, but ultimately it is also the 
decisive one. 
Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation, Alpha 
As a result, Alpha from then on was driving the expansion of conventional energy 
generation even more strongly. Shortly after the decision against constructing the 
offshore wind farm, Alpha announced a large-scale investment program in conventional 
energy generation, including the accelerated expansion of coal power plant capacities 
within the next five years. Thus, the company reallocated resources from energy 
generation by gas power plants to coal power plants, because this source of energy 
generation provided much higher potential for realizing scale economies and synergies 
arising from its own coal exploration business. As one Senior Manager, Group 
Controlling & M&A Valuation of Alpha explained, “with energy generation from coal, 
one can realize corresponding scale economies with a larger fleet of coal power plants.” 
Thus, the decision against renewable energies was also highly affected by a lack of 
synergy potentials in this form of energy generation. As one former CEO of Alpha 
explained, “with renewable energies, you do not have economies of scale at all.” 
Although Alpha recognized the growing importance of climate-friendly energy 
generation and its responsibility as one of the largest CO2 emitters, the company 
interpreted this in a completely different way. Thus, this changing context did not cause 
the company to rethink its growth offensive in conventional energy generation in order 
to concentrate on truly climate-friendly renewable energies, “which would then have been 
the adjusting screw,” according to one former CEO of Alpha. Instead, the company 
devoted itself to CO2 reduction in its existing and planned coal power plants, as 
THE CASES OF GERMAN UTILITIES 
 
 
68 
emphasized in its 2007 Management Report: “another core element of our CO2 strategy 
is to reduce emissions by modernizing our power plant fleet.” This constitutes an 
understanding from which the company has never deviated, not even until today; in fact 
it has become stronger over the years. 
Thus, Alpha’s focus remained on the development and continuous improvement of 
existing competencies and technologies instead of considering new technologies and 
forms of energy production. As mentioned in its 2008 Management Report, “in the long 
run, we can only remain competitive if we continuously develop existing technologies.”  
The high level of market dynamics, the associated growing uncertainty due to numerous 
political interventions in the general framework conditions, and the increasing importance 
of new technologies, especially in the field of renewable energy generation, were 
consistently not recognized by Alpha, or not taken seriously. Rather, Alpha’s 
understanding of the German energy market was that of a highly stable market, as it 
certainly was in the pre-liberalization period: 
Compared to other industrial sectors, however, the utilities sector is generally less 
vulnerable (…) Our investments in new power plants, grids and in gas and oil 
production show that this is the case: Energy supply is a long-term business model. 
We have to think in decades rather than years. 
Management Report 2008, Alpha 
As a consequence, Alpha’s understanding of market mechanisms created an 
overconfidence in its own market position, which was seen as being long-term enduring. 
As the company argued in its 2008 Management Report, “the European energy market 
continues to grow together. This is creating a top league of European utility companies 
to which Alpha belongs.” Thus, the decisions made in this second phase and the attitudes 
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and the (self-)understanding that have been solidified during this time have shaped the 
development of Alpha, even until now, and have maneuvered the company into an almost 
hopeless situation. 
Phase III (2009–2011). At the beginning of Phase III, Alpha recognized the growing 
importance of renewable energies and undertook an important step to further accelerate 
the expansion of this new form of climate-friendly energy generation. Whereas Beta 
already took this step in 2007, two years earlier than Alpha, the latter decided to centralize 
all activities with a connection to renewable energies within a newly established division 
in order to realize economies of scale in this sector. Thus, according to one Senior 
Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation of Alpha: 
We had renewable energies in different parts of the company (…) and that was an 
essential cornerstone of the strategy [to say], ‘OK, we have to bundle the entire 
renewable energies business in order to also achieve economies of scale.’ (...) Beta 
had already bundled its entire renewable energies business into a separate division 
one to two years before Alpha (…) and was therefore able to benefit from the 
corresponding markets earlier. 
Alpha (not only at the time, but even today) was strongly focused on its traditional 
conventional energy generation business, with which it was able to realize considerable 
synergies and scale economies. Accordingly, another reason for centralizing its 
renewable energies activities was to increase internal awareness for this new form of 
energy generation: 
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Renewable energies have had a rather subordinate role in the individual company 
divisions, because they were rather small and we have seen at this point that we 
have to place renewable energies more prominently, we have to pay more attention 
to them, because in the conventional business area we also had a whole series of 
hydroelectric power plants and the first wind power plants, but these of course 
lagged far behind conventional generation in terms of importance. And of course 
we have seen quite clearly that we have to do something about this, we have to 
centralize them, because otherwise the delicate little plant of renewable energies 
will always be in the shade of a big tree that takes the sun from it, to put it 
metaphorically. 
Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation, Alpha 
At that specific time, when Alpha had set up the necessary structures to drive the growth 
of renewable energies and had also invested in major renewable energy projects, the 
importance of such energies continued to become even stronger, while conventional 
energy generation and coal power plants in particular faced an increasingly challenging 
situation. The introduction of CO2 certificates progressively increased the price for coal 
energy generation and put a question mark over the long-term profitability of this type of 
energy generation. Thus, it would actually have been the right time to make a turnaround 
and focus on renewable energies. According to Alpha’s CEO: 
The debate had actually been going on for some time. In any case, the energy 
industry developed more and more toward decentralized energy generation, but we 
and the other large utility companies failed to draw the appropriate conclusions 
out of these developments or undertake an actual turnaround. 
Instead, Alpha ignored the warnings and opted to continue expanding its conventional 
energy generation capacities. The construction of its new coal power plant fleet 
proceeded. One Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation of Alpha 
defended this decision while stressing that “the projects that you have started to build, 
you will of course finish them.” Indeed, the advocates of renewable energy generation 
were unable to win the battle against the defenders of Alpha’s traditional core business 
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of conventional generation. As the Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A 
Valuation argued: 
At the end of the day, you have to assert yourself with your investments, so you have 
to be able to convince other people as well, because it doesn’t help if I alone am of 
the opinion that this is a good investment; you have to be able to convince others. 
Conventional energy generation is absolutely essential, especially at times when more 
and more energy is being generated by renewable sources. That was the company’s deep 
conviction, which incidentally has remained the same to this day. Furthermore, reliable 
energy generation simply cannot be achieved through renewable energies, according to 
the company’s understanding. Thus, Alpha highlighted that: 
Our environment is determined by the expectation of customers that their energy 
supply is secure and that utility companies can control the effects of strongly 
fluctuating energy prices. 
Management Report 2009, Alpha 
To meet its customers’ expectations, Alpha continued on its path and even accelerated 
the expansion of its coal exploration business, which in turn also strengthened arguments 
for the further expansion of its coal power plant fleet. 
Phase IV (2011–2015). In 2011, the German government’s decision to initiate the energy 
turnaround brought the importance of climate-friendly energy production to a new level, 
while increasing the pressure on Alpha in two ways. On the one hand, the announced 
nuclear phase-out as a consequence of the environmental catastrophe in Japan forced 
Alpha to shut down large parts of its nuclear power plant capacities, resulting in 
significant value adjustments that additionally burdened the company’s earnings. On the 
other hand, the future prospects of Alpha’s conventional energy generation business by 
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fossil fuels – in particular that of its high-emission coal power plant fleet – continued to 
deteriorate.  
Although Alpha recognized the need for climate-friendly energy generation, arguing in 
its 2011 Management Report that “only companies that take an active role will survive 
in the long term,” the company’s definition of climate-friendly energy generation 
remained focused on CO2 reduction in conventional energy generation instead of 
renewable energies. Thus, according to the company’s 2011 Management Report, “we 
are also making a contribution to climate protection by building highly efficient coal and 
gas power plants to replace high-emission old plants.” 
Thus, at the end of 2011, the inevitable happened. Alpha suffered a massive collapse in 
earnings in the conventional generation business, which could not be compensated by its 
renewable energies business due to its insufficient share of renewable capacities. To cope 
with this challenging situation, Alpha resorted to former recipes for success and 
undertook a large-scale restructuring program, primarily comprising cost reductions and 
efficiency improvement measures. In its 2012 Management Report, Alpha stressed that 
“we are countering the negative earnings trend in the energy generation business with 
efficiency-enhancing measures.” As the efforts made proved insufficient to improve the 
financial situation of the company, in 2012 Alpha even decided to reduce its renewable 
energy capacities. Thus, Alpha divested selected wind power investments and terminated 
any further investments in renewable energies:  
One cornerstone of our climate protection strategy is the expansion of electricity 
generation from renewable energies. However, we have to slow down the expansion 
here due to financial reasons. 
Management Report 2012, Alpha 
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Moreover, in 2013 Alpha exited its exploration business. The freed-up financial resources 
were reallocated to the conventional energy generation business to continue the 
construction program of new coal power plants initiated in 2007. Thus, as stated in the 
2013 Management Report, “our new power plant construction program remains the 
focus of our investment activities.” Consequently, despite ongoing pressure in the 
conventional energy generation business and growing uncertainty with respect to the 
future viability of coal power plants, Alpha still adhered to its development path and again 
undertook efficiency improvement measures to cope with the situation: 
A large part of our efficiency-enhancing measures are also aimed at making our 
generation business, which has come under pressure, more profitable and thus 
securing our long-term position as one of the leading power plant operators in 
Europe. 
Management Report 2013, Alpha 
However, even with the efficiency-enhancement measures, Alpha was only able to 
improve its financial situation in the short term. The company failed to solve its basic 
problem, which was not the profitability of its conventional power plants, but rather the 
conventional power plants themselves. Due to the significant growth of renewable energy 
capacities over the past years, conventional energy was simply no longer demanded by 
the market, at least not to the extent Alpha had originally planned. So, in 2014, Alpha 
inevitably had to shut down a considerable extent of its conventional energy generation 
capacities: 
Several conventional power plants have been shut down, especially older power 
plants, less efficient power plants, especially coal power plants, and also smaller 
power plants that can no longer keep up with their variable costs on the market. 
Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A Valuation, Alpha 
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Even though this was another indication that future prospects for conventional energy 
generation were seriously threatened, Alpha made every effort to maintain its existing 
core business. Indeed, the company highlighted in its 2014 Management Report that “we 
will concentrate on projects and measures that are necessary to maintain our business 
activities, especially for the operation of our power plants.” The growing financial 
pressure on the company was reflected in an increasingly restrictive investment policy. 
However, “every investment that goes in the direction of efficiency improvements (...) is 
still being done,” according to one Senior Manager, Group Controlling & M&A 
Valuation. 
Only at the end of 2014 and under almost unbearable pressure did the company recognize 
the need to question its existing ways of thinking and behaving. In this context, Alpha 
realized the necessity of a more open corporate culture and the reduction of hierarchical 
thinking. According to its 2014 Management Report: 
To contribute to the further development of our corporate culture: toward more 
openness and the ability to accept criticism, less hierarchical thinking, broader 
participation in decision making and stronger alignment of the individual and his 
or her organizational units with the goals of our company. 
Moreover, as opposing opinions and counterarguments were scarcely heard in the past, 
Alpha now wanted to become more open to new ideas and impulses: 
At Alpha and in the company’s environment there are many bright people who can 
help us to do this. We bring them together and give them the opportunity to explore 
business ideas without any constraints and to test promising innovations directly in 
the market. 
Management Report 2014, Alpha 
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Finally, in 2015 Alpha underwent a change in direction with its entry into the energy-
related service business. In fact, this was one of the last remaining options available to 
the company, on the one hand due to Alpha’s very restricted financial situation, and on 
the other because the business is much less capital-intensive than any form of energy 
generation. One former CEO of Alpha summarized the current situation of the company 
as follows: 
Given the history of investments made, we naturally tried to stick to it for as long 
as possible, and on the other hand, we did not have the funds available to enter into 
renewable energies on a large scale. (…) What Alpha will do is enter the less 
capital-intensive service business. Perhaps later, on a larger scale, into renewable 
energy production. But I think that the train has basically left the station, because 
in the next few years, Alpha will not have the required resources to build up the 
renewable energy capacities that will be necessary now (…) The money is simply 
not there. Alpha only has the possibility to enter the service business. (…) But that 
of course takes time and it seems to me to be the only possible alternative left. 
In conclusion, this case of Alpha has shown a company that has been able to continuously 
create new synergies between its businesses in order to become highly efficient in the 
end. However, the development has also uncovered a major weakness of the company 
associated with its focus on efficiency: its adherence to existing and historically proven 
ways of thinking and behaving, leading it to continuously prioritize existing businesses 
and technologies while not perceiving or even discounting ongoing market changes. As 
one former CEO summarized: 
The parameters may not have been so prominent that one could have made 
scenarios and said, ‘OK, if in the next five to ten years the share of renewable 
energies grows to that size, then that means the following for our conventional 
energy production possibilities.’ 
Thus, even if the changing framework conditions were recognized by the company, Alpha 
was unable to draw the necessary consequences in terms of deviating from formerly made 
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decisions. Rather, Alpha committed to its decisions and the development path it has taken 
and tried to escape this challenging situation by an ever-increasing efficiency. Thereby, 
Alpha’s highly routinized behavior and strict adherence to familiar and proven processes 
caused it to consistently neglect alternatives and ultimately put it in a situation in which 
alternative options were hardly available. As one Senior Manager, Group Controlling & 
M&A Valuation concluded, “I think that openness to change would have been crucial: 
how quickly am I able to adapt to change, and accordingly to react” to changed 
circumstances. 
 
5.1.2. THE CASE OF BETA 
Similar to Alpha, Beta is a large-scale multinational utility company, which at the time 
of the market liberalization covered the entire value chain, especially in terms of the 
exploration of raw materials and the operation of its own conventional energy generation 
capacities. Over the years, Beta has significantly increased its gas exploration business 
and its corresponding capacities in gas power generation, as shown in Figure 5. Albeit 
mainly through acquisitions rather than the construction of its own wind and solar parks, 
Beta has built up significant renewable energy capacities, even at an early stage. Beta also 
entered the energy-related services business earlier than its largest competitors. Thus, one 
would assume that at the end of the observation period, Beta would be in a more 
advantageous position than Alpha. However, this is not the case. 
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Figure 5: Key Milestones in the Development of Beta 
 
Although Beta’s flexible gas power plants were well-suited to balancing fluctuations in 
energy generation from renewable energy sources by wind or solar power, the price 
collapse for CO2 certificates significantly reduced their profitability, particularly in 
comparison to other forms of conventional energy generation, leading the company into 
an extremely challenging and financially strained situation. Furthermore, despite the fact 
that Beta had a comparably large renewable energies business that could compensate for 
losses in the conventional business, this proved insufficient. 
Phase I (1999–2004). Similar to the development of Alpha in the years immediately after 
the market liberalization, Beta was strongly focused on size and efficiency, as was 
generally considered the order of the day. While Beta became a large diversified 
conglomerate in the years prior to the liberalization, the company initiated a large-scale 
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divestiture program in 2000 to dispose its unrelated non-core businesses until 2007 while 
then growing from the core. Thus, the freed-up financial resources were continuously 
reallocated to strengthen Beta’s core business of gas extraction and conventional energy 
generation, particularly by gas and nuclear power plants. Thus, according to the 
company’s 2001 Management Report, “Beta is now exclusively concentrating on its core 
energy business and is consistently driving forward its expansion in the electricity and 
gas sectors.” In contrast to its largest competitors, Beta accelerated the expansion of its 
core business primarily through acquisitions rather than through organic growth, and was 
therefore able to quickly build up the required scale. One Division Head, Corporate M&A 
of Beta argued that “first you have to have a critical mass to be taken seriously.” 
Having emerged in a monopolistic market where there was hardly any form of 
competition and prices were almost fixed, Beta was suddenly confronted with a 
completely different situation. In its 2002 Management Report, the company emphasized 
that: 
The market environment in which Beta operates is characterized by increasingly 
intense competition. Our energy business in particular is exposed to price and sales 
risks in the liberalized energy markets. We minimize these risks through our 
ongoing cost management and restructuring measures. 
Thus, to cope with the new market dynamics, efficiency improvement measures through 
cost reductions represented the company’s preferred response. This was certainly an 
adequate mean at this time and particularly in the short term. However, as the following 
years have shown, taking measures to increase efficiency soon became the company’s 
first response to all new situations and challenges.  
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In 2003, Beta undertook further steps to expand its exploration business in order to 
increase the synergy potentials resulting from the combination of its own gas extraction 
and its gas power plant fleet.  
The expansion of the share of gas produced in-house in our procurement portfolio 
is also intended to further strengthen our position in the gas business. In doing so, 
Beta is consistently pursuing the path of integrating all stages of the value chain. 
Management Report 2003, Beta 
Thus, already during these first years within the liberalized German energy market, Beta 
solidified its path and established (what were at the time) successful patterns of action, 
from which the company would hardly deviate in the following decade. 
Phase II (2004–2009). In the beginning of Phase II, Beta continued its growth strategy 
with a clear focus on realizing synergy and growth potentials through increasing the 
interconnections of its activities along the value chain. Indeed, in its 2004 Management 
Report, Beta highlighted that: 
Horizontal integration between electricity and gas generates synergy and growth 
potentials from the convergence of the two energy sources, in particular through 
the increasingly important role of gas in electricity generation. 
While the further interlinkage of its activities provided substantial synergies and boosted 
the profitability of its businesses, it was though a pivotal milestone in its development 
that would later cost the company dearly. Thus, the synergy effects resulting from the 
combination of the businesses provided strong arguments to further expand them, which 
the company eagerly did in the upcoming years. However, Beta also undertook such a 
strategy after the market had already significantly changed, but more on that later.  
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As in late 2005, Beta faced a deteriorating situation that was particularly characterized by 
rising costs for fuel, energy procurement and emissions. The company responded by again 
resorting to proven recipes for success while investing in the further expansion of its gas 
extraction business.  
The planned entry into new gas fields and the further expansion of our upstream 
activities should contribute significantly to achieving our strategic goal of securing 
a significant share of our gas requirements from our own production in the long 
term. 
Management Report 2006, Beta 
Thus, the company was able to counteract the rising costs for raw materials while further 
accelerating the synergies with its energy generation by gas power plants, which were 
actually lower in emissions compared to coal power plants, for example. 
In 2006, Beta’s growth offensive was initially slowed down as the European Competitive 
Commission forced the company to sell energy generation capacities in Germany in order 
to avoid it attaining a dominant market position. Thus, as one former Manager, Internal 
Consulting of Beta explained: 
Beta became a pure energy company until at some point the European Competition 
Commission intervened. (…) Then it came to the situation that, among other things, 
some power plant capacities were sold. 
Beta took advantage of this situation and divested a large share of its coal power 
capacities, on the one hand because they were increasingly suffering from rising emission 
costs, and on the other hand because they offered little synergy potential with the 
company’s own exploration business. From then on, Beta primarily concentrated on gas 
power plants in order to realize further synergy potentials and economies of scale. 
However, although Beta argued in its 2006 Management Report that “economies of scale 
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(...) are essential competitive advantages in the rapidly changing energy markets,” it 
turned out that this was true only in the first place.  
Indeed, the forced reduction of conventional energy generation capacities could have 
been seen as a welcome opportunity to change direction and refocus on renewable 
energies. At the time, the latter would have been a quite reasonable alternative because 
of their guaranteed feed-in remunerations compared to the increasingly dynamic and 
uncertain field of conventional energy generation. Although Beta seized the opportunity 
to enter the renewable energies business and even accelerated growth in the following 
years, this new form of energy generation was only considered as a supplement to its 
historically grown conventional energy generation business. Even today and under 
significantly changed framework conditions, Beta’s primary focus remains on the 
conventional generation business. The chance that arose from this lucky coincidence was 
actually not grasped. 
In 2007, Beta centralized its renewable energy activities to create a powerful basis for 
future growth: as its 2007 Management Report stated, “our activities in the field of 
renewable energies and climate protection projects were centralized and are to be 
expanded worldwide.” To accelerate its expansion and to quickly build up its renewable 
energy capacities, Beta acquired shares in on- and offshore wind farms, bringing the 
company one step ahead of its competitors. Nevertheless, although Beta made a large step 
forward to increase the renewable energy share in its generation portfolio and thus 
decouple itself from the highly dynamic and uncertain market developments in the 
conventional generation business, even by the end of 2007 the company had abandoned 
its advantageous starting position.  
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Thus, at the end of 2007, Beta had completed its divestiture program, which provided the 
company with high sales proceeds. However, despite its former investments in renewable 
energies, Beta started a large-scale investment program in conventional energy generation 
at the beginning of 2008. One Division Head, Corporate M&A summarized the situation 
as follows: 
And then the money had to be spent. Then (...) a massive, that is, an incredibly 
massive investment program was started, which ended in the fact that we built a 
very large number of new power plants, particularly gas power plants, and then the 
coal power plants started to be built. 
The ever-increasing relevance of climate-friendly energy generation that was supported 
by the German government’s amendments to the Renewable Energy Sources Act and the 
introduction of CO2 certificates, which increased the production prices for high-emission 
energy generation, were further signals to reconsider the decisions made. However, Beta 
in fact felt that its prior decisions had been validated, as gas power plants were seen as 
one form of sustainable energy generation: 
As one of the world’s leading energy companies, it is our social duty to act as a 
role model in this important field [of sustainability] as well. That is why we have 
committed ourselves to reducing our specific CO2 emissions by 50 per cent between 
1990 and 2030. To achieve this, we are investing billions in highly efficient, more 
climate-friendly power plants. 
Management Report 2008, Beta 
Furthermore, after a first significant decline in earnings, Beta was by no means 
questioning the future viability of its strategy, but rather adhered to its past recipes for 
success, that is, size and efficiency. Thus, in its 2008 Management Report, the company 
argued that “size and a strong market position are an invaluable competitive advantage 
THE CASES OF GERMAN UTILITIES 
 
 
83 
in the liberalized markets and at the same time the basis for a secure energy supply.” 
Further: 
Our traditional strength is the conventional generation of energy. In this area, we 
are modernizing our power plant fleet in order to become more efficient and further 
expand our market share. 
Management Report 2008, Beta 
Indeed, as a consequence of the earnings decline, Beta tightened its investment criteria 
and guidelines, resulting in strict adherence to predefined structures, processes, and 
procedures. In its 2008 Management Report, Beta emphasized that “in all our activities 
we focus on targeted investments and acquisitions according to strict strategic and 
financial criteria.” On the one hand, this led to the improved efficiency of the company’s 
operations, but on the other hand, it progressively prevented those structures, processes 
and guidelines from being questioned. 
Phase III (2009–2011). The decline in earnings from the previous years led Beta to rely 
even more on its proven recipes for success, namely efficiency and synergies through 
economies of scale and scope. In its 2009 Management Report, Beta highlighted one of 
its guiding principles, which had symbolized the company’s development since market 
liberalization and would continue to shape its development until the present day: “The 
more efficient we are, the more competitive are we.” Even in its renewable energies 
business, Beta was focused on applying this success formula. Thus, in its 2009 
Management Report, the company emphasized that “in the future, too, it is our clear 
objective to make the use of renewable energies even more economical by exploiting 
economies of scale.” 
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In 2010, Beta expanded its renewable energy portfolio by entering into the field of solar 
power generation, in which the company had identified significant growth and synergy 
potentials: 
Large projects reduce costs and lead to economies of scale. So, after having 
successfully raised wind power to an industrial level, we are now turning to solar 
power and also expect enormous economies of scale. 
Management Report 2010, Beta 
However, Beta’s large-scale investments in building up solar power capacities in 2010 
were in fact the company’s last noteworthy investments in renewable energies. After 
2010, Beta focused even more intensively on its exploration and conventional generation 
business. Thereby, the company was guided by its core competencies, even though it was 
well-aware that the importance of renewable energies was accelerating, and that this new 
form of energy generation would play an ever more important role in the German energy 
market. Thus, according to one Division Head, Corporate M&A, “one of our core 
competencies simply is the construction and operation of large-scale power plants. This 
is what we can do better than others.” Moreover, as one former Manager, Internal 
Consulting of Beta explained: 
We thought, ‘OK, that’s us. Nobody can plan, build, operate and maintain power 
plants as well as we do, so we go in there and become the number one base load 
provider for Germany, while the others, they can all just look at our tail lights.’ 
In this context, Beta’s considerable efforts in the field of renewable energies were 
increasingly relegated to the back seat, as the company declared in its 2010 Management 
Report, “we want to focus on what we do best and where we see the greatest opportunities 
for profitable growth.” Thereby, Beta established strict criteria concerning the expected 
profitability of any future investments, and increased the formalization of its processes of 
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identifying and evaluating potential investment opportunities. According to the 
company’s 2010 Management Report: 
Our expectations regarding these investments are high. All new projects, such as 
our new offshore wind farms or new gas power plants, must generate at least 1.5 
percentage points more than the cost of capital. 
However, due to the fact that the same profitability criteria were set for renewable energy 
investments as for investments in conventional energy generation, even though the 
expected returns for conventional energy generation were based on the glory years of the 
past while the uncertain market development for coal and gas power plants was not taken 
into account, the criteria were impossible for renewable energies to meet. Thus, the 
established profitability threshold systematically excluded any further investment in 
renewable energies, especially as this threshold was increased further the following year. 
Phase IV (2011–2015). After the nuclear phase-out decision of the German government 
and the corresponding energy turnaround, the financial pressure on Beta increased, as the 
company had to make significant value adjustments to its nuclear power plants. 
Moreover, the ongoing price decline of CO2 certificates led to the reduced profitability 
of gas power plants. As the financial resources available were now very limited, Beta 
again increased the profitability threshold for any further investments: 
We are therefore relying on strict investment discipline and expect new growth 
projects, such as our planned offshore wind farms, to generate a return well above 
the cost of capital. This additional return requirement is generally 2.5 percentage 
points. 
Management Report 2011, Beta 
Thus, even though the market situation for renewable energies had become increasingly 
advantageous while a high level of uncertainty had shaped the market segment of 
THE CASES OF GERMAN UTILITIES 
 
 
86 
conventional energy generation, Beta still focused on expanding its conventional energy 
generation business. In order to calculate the profitability of conventional power plants, 
the company was blinded by the historical profitability of this type of energy generation, 
the achievement of which is almost implausible in any future scenario. As one former 
Manager, Internal Consulting admitted: 
Some decisions were based on wishful thinking rather than on realistic 
assumptions. That is, those decisions were based on assumptions that made them 
look better. 
Although scenarios were formulated that also included a growing market share of energy 
generated by renewable sources, which would continuously increase the pressure on 
conventional energy generation, bad-case scenarios for Beta’s gas and coal power plants 
were simply not believed or were even described as wrong or dubious.  
Those are all assumptions on which the scenarios are based, and so every single 
point is vulnerable, and good news that you tell them is something that everyone 
wants to hear, but no one wants to hear bad news. As a consequence, they say, ‘But 
this assumption is not true and what about that and so on.’ 
Division Head, Corporate M&A, Beta 
At the time, one coal power plant was still under construction whose expected 
profitability was under review. However, despite the changing framework conditions for 
conventional energy generation and the increasing uncertainty with respect to this form 
of energy generation, the review came to have no consequences: the construction of the 
power plant was completed. As one former Manager, Internal Consulting emphasized: 
At the time when the construction of the power plant was nearly completed, it had 
already become apparent that the power plant would not be profitable, but it was 
somehow pulled through anyway. 
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In retrospect, this would also have been an obvious possibility to take a new direction, 
but Beta at this point was unable to restrain from its path. As one Division Head, 
Corporate M&A of Beta explained, “once you have taken a certain direction, it is 
relatively difficult to say ‘What I have been doing for the last few years was all wrong.’” 
Further, referencing the situation, he claimed: 
It would have been theoretically profitable according to the old plan, but due to the 
changes in the energy market with the massive expansion in renewable energies 
and the fact that prices had fallen, this power plant would not have covered its 
variable costs. (…) But now the thing is, what are they going to do with it? Well, a 
coal power plant, once it’s under construction, then the thing is, yes, we wouldn’t 
build it again, but (...) we can also finish it. So normally they would never turn away 
when they say we’re almost finished, but we’re closing the building anyway. 
Division Head, Corporate M&A, Beta 
In 2012, the framework conditions for conventional power plants still did not improve. 
Nevertheless, Beta made the decision to undertake further investments in its conventional 
energy generation business to improve the efficiency of its existing power plants and to 
further accelerate the expansion of its gas power plant capacities. As stated in its 2012 
Management Report,  
We are making significant investments in maintaining and expanding our 
conventional energy generation and gas infrastructure. In the coming year, we will 
invest in the expansion, replacement, and maintenance of power generation from 
coal, gas, and nuclear power. This includes, among other things, new fossil fuel 
power plant construction projects. 
Thereby, ongoing changes in the market were either not perceived or were discounted as 
irrelevant, according to one Division Head, Corporate M&A: 
Only when you know that this is definitely the case, because everything has changed 
and there is no going back, then you actually have to act immediately, otherwise 
you have to show a certain stability. 
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A ray of hope emerged at the end of 2012, as Beta decided to enter the field of energy-
related services. Beta’s strategic motivation was to become more independent from the 
regulated energy generation business and to develop a further revenue stream beyond its 
core business, which was under significant pressure. Thus, “Beta was trying to establish 
energy management systems with various large corporations in order to escape from the 
regulated market,” according to one former Manager, Internal Consulting. The company 
highlighted its strategic focus in its 2012 Management Report, stating that: 
To make strategic co-investments in new companies with innovative business 
models or products in the future in order to integrate them into Beta’s business. 
These are not purely financial investments, but rather strategic investments, with 
the aim of being pioneers in renewable, decentralized and other revolutionary 
energy solutions. 
However, already in 2013, the pressure on Beta’s energy generation business further 
increased. The company had to make additional significant value adjustments that again 
compromised its financial situation and diminished its scope for new investments in more 
future-oriented areas. Beta was forced to initiate another major restructuring program of 
its conventional generation business, including fundamental cost reductions and 
efficiency improvement efforts.  
Accordingly, our strategic focus is on the radical restructuring of the conventional 
generation business. This includes the cost-optimal alignment of all activities. (…) 
The unsatisfactory earnings contribution of our generation division (…) shows that 
there is an urgent need for action in this area. In this area, we will reduce costs and 
increase efficiency even more rigorously than before. 
Management Report 2013, Beta 
One part of Beta’s restructuring program was an unprejudiced review of the economic 
viability of each individual power plant with the aim of shutting down all non-profitable 
power plants. However, even though a large number of gas power plants were 
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that no longer met the profitability criteria and should therefore have been shut down, the 
Federal Network Agency (FNA) rejected Beta’s requests. The respective power plants 
were considered by the FNA to be systematically relevant. As a consequence, Beta was 
tied to loss-making assets, exacerbating the situation: 
So, there are several gas power plants that Beta has registered with the Federal 
Network Agency to be mothballed, but the agency says, ‘Sorry, you cannot shut 
them down yet.’ So, you are now married to loss-making assets. 
Former Manager, Internal Consulting, Beta 
Nevertheless, Beta believed that the company was still well-positioned in a new energy 
world and should further focus on its existing core business of conventional energy 
generation. Thus, as written in the company’s 2014 Management Report: 
This new energy world will grow more dynamically (…) In addition, the traditional 
energy world will continue to exist and offer attractive opportunities to well-
positioned energy companies. In the long term, it will remain indispensable for 
maintaining security of supply, so that there is no way around adequate 
remuneration for the provision of the necessary conventional power plants. (…) 
Through its focused positioning and consistent alignment, Beta can retain and 
further develop its key existing strengths and advantages. 
According to one former Manager, Internal Consulting of the company, “the thinking at 
that time was, ‘OK, now we hold our breath for a moment and after three years this will 
be over’”. However, the outcome was different. In 2015, Beta found itself in a situation 
characterized by an extremely limited number of alternative options available and a lack 
of necessary financial resources to undertake any significant changes. Thus, one former 
Manager, Internal Consulting summarized that “they [the company] just have very little 
breath air left at the moment.” 
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In conclusion, the case of Beta provides a classic example on how a company’s 
development path may be solidified over nearly two decades and how available 
opportunities to change the development direction may be repeatedly refused by a 
continuous focus on existing businesses and competencies. Thus, despite Beta’s early 
entry into the renewable energies business – as well as its later entry into the energy-
related service business – the company’s efforts to define a new strategic direction 
ultimately failed, as they were not pursued with the necessary intensity. Thus, the focus 
of the investments made by Beta remained at the core business of conventional energy 
generation. Even in a situation in which the company faced an ever-increasing financial 
pressure resulting from an obviously suffering core business, Beta was unable to perceive 
the eroding demand for its highly efficient, conventionally generated energy.  
Instead of questioning the decisions it made, Beta blamed politics for its seemingly 
intractable situation: “We must also take into consideration that Beta will continue to face 
high financial pressures in the coming years. This is the result of political decisions” 
(2012 Management Report). In reality, Beta’s own actions and omissions were the actual 
causes of its tense situation. Indeed, besides others it was mainly two factors that kept 
Beta on the same development trajectory. On the one hand, it was Beta’s excessive focus 
on size and efficiency that repeatedly drove out more innovative solutions and new 
technologies, as returns on improving existing businesses, technologies, and 
competencies were more certain and closer in time: “One also often falls back on things 
that one knows. The risk is also lower,” as one Division Head, Corporate M&A of Beta 
summarized. Thus, particularly when confronted with change, Beta repeatedly resorted 
to its formerly proven recipes for success. On the other hand, it was Beta’s failure to 
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perceive or acknowledge the changing circumstances due to its overconfidence in its own 
strength and market position that led it to repeatedly dismiss counterarguments or changes 
as irrelevant. This proved particularly problematic when the company ignored the 
increasing market uncertainty for conventional energy generation and the growing 
importance of renewable energies. One Division Head, Corporate M&A stated this issue 
concisely as follows: 
There was always someone who told you that there would be a crash or something 
else, but those were no serious assessments. So, it was unpredictable in the end that 
renewable energies were promoted to such a great extent. 
 
5.2. GROUP B: NEWCOMERS’ LOCK-IN 
Group B contains two small to medium-sized regional utilities (Gamma and Delta) that 
entered the liberalized energy market without their own energy generation capacities, 
whether conventional or renewable. Similar to Alpha and Beta, the development of the 
two companies in group B was affected by stabilizing dynamics that prevented them from 
entering new development paths. Rather, both focal firms stuck to their once entered path 
of development, leading them into a strategic lock-in.  
 
5.2.1. THE CASE OF GAMMA 
Compared to the abovementioned cases of Alpha and Beta, Gamma is a small to medium-
sized regional utility company. While at the time of the market liberalization in 1999 
Gamma did not possess any conventional or renewable energy generation capacities, it 
THE CASES OF GERMAN UTILITIES 
 
 
92 
soon undertook large-scale investments in both forms of energy generation – 
conventional power plants and renewable energies – as outlined in Figure 6. Gamma was 
one of the pioneer firms investing in the field of renewable energies. Accordingly, one 
might assume that Gamma belongs to the winners of the market transformation. However, 
there was one major issue with Gamma’s remarkably large investments in renewable 
energies. 
 
 
Figure 6: Key Milestones in the Development of Gamma 
 
Gamma applied the competencies it learned in the conventional energy business to new 
energy generation technologies and thereby mainly focused on those forms of renewable 
energy that are able to produce large capacities of energy, that is, offshore wind farms. 
Although Gamma was one of the first to invest in the construction of offshore wind farms, 
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their construction period – and particularly considering the state of the technology at the 
time – was so time-consuming that even by 2015 they had not been completed. Thus, 
despite Gamma’s large investments in renewable energy capacities, the capacities the 
company had built up at the end of Phase IV were not sufficient to compensate for the 
losses of the company’s gas power plants. Thus, Gamma suffered significant losses. 
Phase I (1999–2004). In Phase I, Gamma quickly recognized that the new liberalized 
energy market would soon be dominated by large-scale market participants. Thus, in 2000 
it entered into cooperation with other small to medium-sized regional utility companies 
in order to realize scale economies. While following this path of becoming a larger utility 
company, Gamma even merged with another medium-sized energy supplier in 2002. As 
stated in Gamma’s 2002 Management Report, “the merger will create important synergy 
effects.” 
Gamma’s focus on size and on achieving scale economies decisively guided its fate in 
the following years. Indeed, these criteria had a major influence on Gamma’s early 
decision to enter the energy generation business and to build up its own energy generation 
capacities. As the CEO of Gamma argued: 
At the time shortly after the market liberalization, size was the key driver in the 
development of nearly all market participants. Our large-scale investment program 
in coal and gas power was also truly motivated by size and thus by achieving 
economies of scale. 
Phase II (2004–2009). In the second phase after the liberalization of the German energy 
market, Gamma intensified its expansion of energy generation capacities. Thereby, 
Gamma undertook large-scale investments in the development of its own generation 
capacities. What is noteworthy at this point is that Gamma not only focused on 
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conventional energy generation, which still was the dominant form of energy generation 
at that time, but rather recognized the increasing importance and future potential of 
renewable energies. Thus, driven by a political aspiration to strengthen its position against 
multinational utility companies, Gamma accelerated the expansion of its energy 
generation capacities. One Senior Manager, Business Development of Gamma explained 
the situation as follows: 
Then, there was a mood in the political arena that one should do something against 
the Big Four [i.e., the four largest German utility companies]. And for this reason, 
generation capacities were built up, especially by municipal companies. (...) And 
in this context, however, we placed the emphasis on renewable energies. 
Thus, Gamma initiated a large-scale investment program in renewable energies that began 
with an investment in a major offshore wind power project in 2006 and included further 
investments over the next five years. Gamma’s focus on such a major project was again 
driven by the company’s emphasis on size and on achieving economies of scale. 
Accordingly, one Manager, Group Controlling of Gamma stressed that: 
Our major wind energy project with which we have entered the renewable energies 
business was driven by the expertise that we had already acquired in developing 
large-scale conventional power generation projects. 
Indeed, the framework conditions for renewable energies were highly beneficial, as 
politics had created a stable and plannable sub-segment within the energy generation 
market. Therefore, remunerations were guaranteed for renewable energies, while in the 
conventional energy generation business, frequent political interventions created dynamic 
and uncertain framework conditions. 
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Purely renewable energies have been relieved of risks, in so far as they have 
received guaranteed purchase prices. In other words, the investments could have 
been very well-calculated. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Gamma 
Nevertheless, besides renewable energies, Gamma still adhered to conventional energy 
generation, in particular to gas power plants. Certainly, the company argued that modern 
gas power plants were a necessary and environmentally friendly complementary source 
of energy generation to renewable energies. 
So, wind is so to speak our primary source of energy generation now. And as a 
complement to this volatile form of energy generation, flexible, low-CO2 power 
plants are needed, so gas power plants are exactly the right thing. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Gamma 
In 2007, Gamma divested unprofitable and non-strategically investments and reinvested 
the freed-up financial resources in its energy generation business. Gamma provided 
substantial financial resources to further accelerate its investment program in climate-
friendly energy generation. However, the company’s interpretation of climate-friendly 
energy generation was broadly formulated. For Gamma, climate-friendly energy 
generation did not exclusively include renewable energies, but also gas power plants that 
were seen as a future-oriented source of energy generation. As written in the company’s 
2007 Management Report,  
Access to generation capacities will increasingly become a key issue for the future 
of the energy supply industry (…). In this context, Gamma will place its strategic 
focus on modern power plant technology in view of its corporate responsibility for 
the climate and the environment. 
Moreover, as a consequence,  
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At least two thirds of our budget went to gas power plants, because we knew that 
flexibility would be important in the future. In other words, flexibility means no 
lengthy ramp-up of power plants. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Gamma 
The investment decisions were highly driven by economic criteria: “There is simply this 
ordinal system, that is, categorically whoever brings a better IRR, wins. We also have 
internal cost rates, which the whole company has to follow” (Senior Manager, Business 
Development of Gamma). Moreover, as the CEO of Gamma highlighted, “based on the 
expected ROI and IRR, [conventional] generation was identified as a lucrative business 
area.” Thus, in this context, only large-scale energy generation projects – either 
renewable or conventional – were taken into consideration, while decentralized and 
small-scale renewable energy projects tended to be neglected, with far-reaching 
consequences. 
Already in 2008, the situation for conventional energy generation became more and more 
difficult, particularly due to the increasing proportion of renewable energies that entered 
the market and as a consequence, led to the decreasing profitability of conventional power 
plants. Instead of concentrating on its renewable energies business – which in retrospect 
would have been much more advantageous – Gamma tried to actively influence the 
political debate in favor of conventional energy generation, but with only moderate 
success: 
The political discourse with respect to the decisive issues of the energy industry is 
set at both the European and the national level. This is why we have organized 
ourselves jointly in a cooperation of the leading municipal utilities. Together we 
represent about ten per cent of the German energy market and we make our voice 
heard at the federal level on important energy policy issues. 
Management Report 2008, Gamma 
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Phase III (2009–2011). In Phase III, Gamma further continued its investment program to 
boost its energy generation capacities. In the field of renewable energies, Gamma invested 
in a decentralized wind project as well as a large-scale onshore wind farm. However, 
Gamma also undertook another major investment in conventional energy generation to 
build a new gas power plant. Similar to its former investments in conventional energy 
generation, Gamma argued that this gas power plant would be a necessary supplement to 
its renewable energy generation: 
We are currently constructing a gas turbine plant that will feed electricity into the 
grid as so-called balancing power, which can compensate for fluctuations in energy 
production from the wind or the sun within a few minutes. This is a necessary 
additional supplement to renewable energies. Plants of this type are the real 
bridges to renewable energies. 
Management Report 2010, Gamma 
However, as this gas power plant could only be commissioned in 2012 at the earliest, the 
investment soon became a massive burden for the company. 
Phase IV (2011–2015). Shortly after the core meltdown in the nuclear power plant in 
Fukushima, the German government made the decision to initiate an energy turnaround, 
including a nuclear phase-out and a focus on renewable energies. In this context, Gamma 
initially felt that its strategy had been confirmed. According to one Senior Manager, 
Business Development of Gamma: 
It has been said that we are counting on the energy turnaround and that these gas 
power plants are now being used as a complementary energy generation 
technology to the volatile energy generation from renewable energies. 
However, due to a constantly increasing proportion of renewable energies and an ongoing 
price erosion for emission certificates, the situation for conventional energies became 
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increasingly challenging. Therefore, particularly gas power plants suffered profitability 
declines. For Gamma, the question arose of whether the construction of the gas power 
plant that was initiated in 2010 should now be continued under these changed premises? 
However, despite the increasing dynamic and the growing uncertainty in the German 
energy market, particularly with respect to the future of fossil fueled power plants, 
Gamma decided to complete the construction of its gas power plant. No credence was 
given to the negative investment cases for gas power plants. As one Manager, Group 
Controlling highlighted, “the way of thinking at that time was that conventional power 
plants have always paid off in the past and this would not be any different this time 
either.”  
Indeed, shortly after the decision was made, the situation again deteriorated for Gamma. 
The profitability of gas power plants further declined, while the earnings generated from 
the renewable energies business could not compensate for the losses in the conventional 
generation business, particularly as the commissioning of the major offshore wind farm 
was repeatedly delayed. Gamma increasingly came under pressure, but still adhered to its 
two-track strategy in the energy generation business. Gamma did not recognize the need 
to pull the ripcord in the conventional generation business. Instead, to cope with the 
situation, Gamma focused on further efficiency improvements and cost reductions in its 
conventional energy generation business: 
The altered framework conditions and the price development on the electricity 
market as well as the sharp price decrease of emission certificates have a 
significant impact on the profitability of investments already made and on long-
term contracts. Gamma is meeting these challenges by consistently tapping 
efficiency improvement and cost-cutting potential. 
Management Report 2012, Gamma 
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To accelerate the expansion of decentralized wind projects – the only remaining profitable 
business at the time – Gamma acquired a wind project developer that provided 
preferential access to new locations for the installation of wind turbines. As one Senior 
Manager, Business Development of Gamma explained: 
We have decided not only to generate our own wind energy, so to speak, but also 
to project it ourselves for the expansion. In the meantime, we have now expanded 
the depth of added value and have our own project planning team, which will 
gradually increase our capacities in the future. 
This investment was strategically important as it provided a basis for future growth in the 
decentralized renewable energy production, but retrospectively, it came too late. The 
acquisition of the project developer would have required continuous subsequent 
investments in order to deploy its competencies, as the Senior Manager, Business 
Development of Gamma further elaborated: 
In other words, when it comes to investments, the question is, where have we 
already built up structures that constantly need lubricants, so we basically have a 
wind project developer here that creates value, but of course it always needs capital 
in order to put all the wind turbines here (…), so the budgets that remain go in that 
direction. 
However, Gamma was already in a distinctly tense situation at that time, in which the 
necessary financial resources were no longer available. As a consequence, the company 
was not able to make any further investments in wind projects. 
In 2013, Gamma’s problems with its conventional energy generation capacities once 
again intensified: “The gas power plants are our problem children at the moment so to 
speak, as they cannot operate economically” (Senior Manager, Business Development). 
After repeated delays, the construction of Gamma’s new gas power plant was now 
completed. Whereas in 2011 the company had been determined to complete the 
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construction, it now had to pay dearly for its decision. According to one Senior Manager, 
Business Development:  
So, the decision has been made, the power plant was built and already at the time 
of the commissioning it became clear that the power plant (…) could not be 
operated economically, neither today nor in the future. 
Again, Gamma had to make massive value adjustments, which significantly burdened the 
company’s earnings, as outlined in the company’s 2013 Management Report: 
Value adjustments of this magnitude are always very burdensome for companies. 
For us in particular, as an almost 100 per cent municipal company, such value 
adjustments are extremely hard to cope with. 
As a consequence, Gamma divested unprofitable assets to free up financial resources, and 
conducted efficiency improvement measures in all business segments: 
Measures to increase efficiency were defined in all business segments, for example 
by (…) streamlining the product and asset portfolios through divesting unprofitable 
assets and lowering internal service levels. 
Management Report 2013, Gamma 
However, as those measures were no longer sufficient to improve the financial situation, 
Gamma was forced to undertake a large-scale restructuring program in 2014, even 
including the divestiture of profitable renewable energy projects. As this was one of the 
few options remaining for Gamma, the company then entered the less capital-intensive 
business of energy-related services. Thus, as one Manager, Group Controlling claimed, 
“only in 2014, we decided to develop the energy-related services business segment.” 
Finally, another delay in the commissioning of Gamma’s offshore wind farm again hit 
the company hard and resulted in a double-digit millions loss at the end of the year 2014. 
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Thus, in conclusion, the decisions made over the years led Gamma into a challenging 
situation at the end of the observation period, in which little scope for action was left. The 
company recognized that in the area of renewable energies, there was an overly strong 
concentration of resources within a single investment – an offshore wind farm – a mistake 
that the company was determined not to repeat. Instead, Gamma committed to focus on 
diversification rather than on achieving synergy potentials and cost degression, at least in 
the renewable energies business. According to one Senior Manager, Business 
Development of Gamma:  
With our major [renewable energy] project a strong concentration of resources 
took place. At the moment we are also saying that we do not want to have another 
offshore wind project of this size due to diversification, so that you can be somewhat 
variable in your portfolio, that is, the composition of your assets. 
However, with respect to conventional energy generation, in which an even stronger 
concentration of resources in gas power plants has taken place, the company does not 
accept its former over-emphasis on achieving synergy potentials and cost degression. 
Rather, Gamma is accusing politicians of making economically and ecologically 
inappropriate decisions: 
But at the moment the state is misusing its power or its power to shape things to 
such an extent that it is even punishing companies that have built their assets [that 
is, their conventional power plants] for bottleneck situations. We have provided 
something useful for the general public. So, this is absolutely absurd. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Gamma 
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5.2.2. THE CASE OF DELTA 
Like Gamma, Delta is a small to medium-sized regional utility company. At the time of 
the market liberalization in 1999, Delta did not possess any energy generation capacities, 
neither conventional power plants nor renewable energy. However, as Figure 7 outlines, 
the development of Delta in the years after the market liberalization was particularly 
characterized by large investments in building up its own conventional energy generation 
capacities. Thereby, Delta mainly focused on coal power plants, which soon became the 
company’s major source of energy generation, but ultimately also its major weakness and 
Achilles’ heel due to a significant decrease in productivity. 
 
 
Figure 7: Key Milestones in the Development of Delta 
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Phase I (1999–2004). In Phase I, soon after the market liberalization, Delta declared in 
its 2000 Management Report that “our future vision is to generate a growing part of our 
sales with services for other companies.” Whereas in retrospect, following those plans 
would have marked a true success story in the German energy market, unfortunately 
Delta’s target could never be accomplished. Instead, Delta took a fundamentally different 
development. Thus, the years between 1999 and 2004 were characterized by major 
initiatives that have shaped the development of Delta even until today. 
Due to the market liberalization, energy companies that had grown up in a nearly 
monopolistic market environment were suddenly confronted with significant price 
decreases. To cope with this new situation, Delta entered into alliances and cooperation 
with other small to medium-sized regional utility companies in order to expand. 
According to one Senior Manager, Business Development, “relatively early on, we tried 
to develop ourselves further through cooperation.” Thus, alliances and cooperation were 
mainly focused on energy procurement and trading in the first stage. Furthermore, Delta 
sought to become more efficient in its entire processes, which were still shaped by the 
pre-liberalization era. As stated in Delta’s Management Report 2001,  
Due to the further liberalization of the energy markets, the market environment will 
continue to be characterized by price and sales risks. These market risks are 
countered by consistent cost management. 
Consequently, this efficiency focus soon found its way into Delta’s DNA and drove the 
development of the company with respect to its subsequent decisions, even today.  
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Phase II (2004–2009). In 2005, Delta made a far-reaching step while entering its path of 
conventional energy generation. Specifically, Delta’s large investment in a gas power 
plant was not only driven by its management, but also by its shareholder: 
After all, we are in municipal hands, that is, we are politically driven. And at the 
time, the wish of the politicians was clearly formulated: Go into conventional 
generation! 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Delta 
Nevertheless, Delta’s management was also convinced that investing in conventional 
energy generation would provide a great opportunity for the company to move forward, 
as it would reduce its purchasing costs as long as the development of conventional power 
plants remained as stable as it had in previous decades. Thus, the management argued 
that: 
For a medium-sized municipal utility like us, it was clear that in the long run, we 
would not get out of the ‘stranglehold’ and if we did not want to be and become 
completely dependent, we would have to have our own generation capacities: that 
was the idea at the time. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Delta 
Furthermore, Delta’s management was impressed by the success stories of market 
incumbents (i.e., multinational utilities like Alpha and Beta) and wanted to emulate those 
(at the time) prosperous companies. One Senior Manager, Business Development 
explained the situation as follows:  
The motivation of the colleagues who decided [to invest in conventional energy 
generation] at that time was mainly driven by the fact that they wanted to get a slice 
of the cake themselves. 
At the time Delta entered the conventional energy generation business, the company was 
already planning to further expand in the upcoming years. Therefore, the company 
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established strict processes and procedures that standardized the evaluation of investment 
opportunities and streamlined the process of selecting profitable investments. As claimed 
in its Management Report 2005, “Delta applies a strict guideline for the implementation 
and assessment of the profitability of investments.” Again, through the adoption of 
standardized processes and binding investment criteria, Delta was able to achieve further 
efficiency gains.  
In 2007, Delta recognized an investment opportunity that promised significant returns, 
and which became the company’s ticket to enter the renewable energies business. The 
company undertook a large investment in an offshore wind farm, to be built by a 
cooperation of multiple small and medium-sized utility companies. Crucially, however, 
Delta at that time was less focused on entering the renewable energies business. Rather, 
the company’s focus was on high expected returns on the one hand – as one Senior 
Manager, Business Development of Delta explained, “expected returns on investment 
dominate very strongly” – and on gaining access to significant energy generation 
capacities on the other. The latter in particular drove Delta’s development in the following 
years. 
Although in its 2001 Management Report, Delta had already recognized the growing 
importance of renewable energies – stating that “due to the high minimum remuneration, 
the dynamic market growth of renewable energies should continue at least until 2010” –
and despite its large-scale investment in the offshore wind farm, particularly in 2008, the 
company discounted the accelerated and ongoing market shift toward decentralized 
renewable energies. As one Senior Manager, Business Development of Delta highlighted, 
“no, there have been no signals, not at all.” He further stated that, at the time, “the energy 
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industry was totally boring, everything runs on one track and always goes in one direction 
only. So, I really believe that probably nobody foresaw that 10 years ago.” Delta was 
focused on building up large energy generation capacities, widely regarded as easiest to 
achieve via coal and gas power plants. 
As a consequence, Delta invested in a coal power plant in 2008. The investment decision 
was mainly driven by three factors that had guided the company’s investment decisions 
in previous years: Economies of scale, existing competencies, and again, a strict 
profitability threshold for its investments. Thus, instead of focusing on increasingly 
important decentralized forms of energy generation, Delta aimed to achieve scale 
economies and cost degression in the energy generation business.  
We were focused on large-scale power plants with high energy generation 
capacities. As we have to serve a great number of customers, we cannot generate 
the energy required by using a few wind turbines. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Delta 
Moreover, the company decided to concentrate on activities in which it already had 
competencies and expertise. Thus, as one Senior Manager, Business Development of 
Delta concluded: 
The criterion of investing in conventional energies, because there is a certain 
amount of expertise in this area, also played a role, but it has to be said that the 
overall level of expertise in renewable energies was simply not that high. 
Finally, due to the company’s strict and binding investment criteria, alternative forms of 
energy generation were hardly taken into consideration. Indeed, one Senior Manager, 
Business Development of Delta argued that “at that time, we could not have foreseen that 
we would be able to meet the expected returns by investing in renewable energies.” 
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Emerging counterarguments highlighting the manifold alterations of the framework 
conditions for the conventional energy generation business, for example the introduction 
of CO2 certificates and the various amendments to the Renewable Energy Sources Act, 
all at the expense of conventional energies and in favor of renewable energies, were 
simply suppressed. 
Nobody dared to say that renewable energies would at some point push so 
massively into the market that they would completely destroy the wholesale prices 
for electricity. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Delta 
Phase III (2009–2011). In Phase III, the situation became more and more dynamic. In 
particular, the future of conventional energy generation became increasingly uncertain 
due to a growing proportion of renewable energy capacities in the market. Nevertheless, 
Delta still believed in its planning scenarios regarding its conventional power plants. 
Certainly, one Senior Manager, Business Development at Delta acknowledged that “you 
can’t simply say, ‘all or nothing,’ but you have to make certain assumptions and it is 
clear that some of those assumptions were certainly too optimistic.” The company thereby 
largely ignored the fact that investments in conventional power plants are oriented toward 
the long term, and particularly in a market characterized by a high level of dynamism and 
uncertainty, they could not be reliably planned. In retrospect, the consequence should 
have been to make realistic assumptions about the future of energy generation taking into 
consideration the high level uncertainty instead of understanding assumptions as 
objective knowledge. Thus, Delta should have turned away from the protracted 
development of large conventional generation capacities and instead focused on 
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decentralized energy generation through renewable energies, for which the framework 
conditions were stable and could have been realized more quickly. 
Although Delta made efforts to gain a foothold in decentralized renewable energy 
generation, the company was repeatedly slowed down both internally and externally. On 
the one hand, Delta’s formalized and standardized evaluation processes regularly 
precluded many investment opportunities even at an early stage as they did not meet the 
expected investment criteria. Thus, in its 2009 Management Report the company 
emphasized: 
These risks are minimized by extensive preventive measures, including an always 
careful and strategy-based examination and selection of relevant projects, 
comprehensive investment and project controlling, and strict compliance with 
investment guidelines. 
On the other hand, various attempts to install wind power plants failed due to a lack of 
public acceptance. One Senior Manager, Business Development of Delta described the 
situation as follows: 
Well, we had once planned to invest in wind energy in our supply area, but that was 
beaten us round the heads. So, the fact that there is not a single large wind energy 
producer here is due to the proverbial headwind. (…) I think when you leave the 
cities, people don’t want that [wind turbines] because it spoils the landscape. The 
argument is, ‘You don’t have to fill up that little bit of green that we have here,’ 
thus, nobody wants it on their doorstep. 
As a consequence, Delta again turned away from further investments in renewable 
energies, and instead accelerated the expansion of its conventional energy generation 
capacities. In cooperation with other municipal utility companies, Delta acquired a 
majority stake in one of the largest fossil fuel-based energy producers in Germany in 
2010. As the company highlighted in its 2010 Management Report,  
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The consortium will thus become the largest municipal generation platform in the 
conventional energy sector in Germany. The acquisition thus not only serves to 
strengthen the business of the municipal utility partners within the consortium, but 
also secures them access to their own, high-performance generation capacities. The 
consortium aims to further accelerate ecological expansion and transformation. 
This includes investments in the (...) construction of more environmentally friendly 
gas and steam power plants. 
Phase IV (2011–2015). In Phase IV, soon after the acquisition of the conventional energy 
producer, the construction of a new coal power plant was initiated. Moreover, Delta 
invested large amounts in modernizing its own gas power plant. However, due to the 
nuclear accident in Japan and the following nuclear phase-out in Germany, the economic 
conditions for conventional generation again dramatically changed. Renewable energies 
soon became the preferred form of energy generation, while conventional power plants 
were relegated to a mere back-up solution. As a consequence, Delta had to make 
significant value adjustments in its conventional power plants, putting the company under 
massive financial pressure.  
However, instead of pulling the emergency breaks, Delta stuck to its proven recipes for 
success while arguing that: 
A nationwide electricity supply based on existing renewable energy plants alone 
cannot be guaranteed at present. Conventional power plants are extremely 
important for the security of energy supply, especially in times of bottlenecks or 
when renewable energy plants fail to generate electricity. 
Management Report 2012, Delta 
Rather than questioning the future viability of conventional energy generation, the 
company thus focused on efficiency improvements at its gas and coal power plants. As 
stated in its 2012 Management Report: 
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The political developments following the natural and reactor catastrophe in Japan 
show that the risk of rapid changes in energy policy has grown. Increased 
regulatory interventions in the energy market also bear earnings risks that are 
countered by consistent cost management. 
As Delta suffered from a financially tense situation in 2013, limiting its options, it was 
forced to move into less capital-intensive business areas. Thus, the company entered the 
energy-related services business. However, given that key competitors had already 
entered this promising business area (and with a clear strategic focus) many years before, 
this step represented just a small ray of hope for Delta. 
Any further investments in conventional energy generation were terminated, but with 
respect to its existing generation capacities, Delta still believed in the future prosperity of 
its conventional power plants and therefore again resorted to efficiency improvement 
measures to cope with this challenging situation. According to its 2014 Management 
Report: 
The framework conditions for coal power plants remain a challenge, especially due 
to the rapid expansion and the feed-in priority of renewable energies. Delta is well-
positioned through efficient power plant operations (…). In order to avoid losing 
attractiveness despite the difficult framework conditions for the entire energy 
industry in Germany, Delta will further optimize its generation portfolio and 
diversify it. For this purpose, the company will use all opportunities to ensure that 
existing power plant capacities will continue to be operated economically in the 
future. 
To free up financial resources and generate cash, Delta was compelled to divest selected 
conventional energy generation investments in 2014. In order to compensate for the losses 
in its conventional energy business, Delta attempted to realize further wind energy 
projects and therefore entered into cooperation with a regional wind project developer. 
However, at the time it was becoming harder and harder to find appropriate locations. 
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Delta then suffered another setback. After repeated delays in commissioning, it was 
realized in 2015 that the offshore wind farm in which the company had already invested 
in 2007 and that had been regarded as Delta’s sheet anchor could not be completed. This 
had a further considerable impact on the company’s financial situation as it was no longer 
possible to compensate for the losses it had experienced in the conventional generation 
business. Instead, further value adjustments had to be made, even for this formerly 
auspicious renewable energy project. 
In conclusion, Delta’s decisions in the years since the market liberalization have led the 
company into a challenging situation at the end of the observation period. One Senior 
Manager, Business Development of Delta claimed, “we entered – as we have to admit 
today – too massively into conventional energy generation.” Consequently, Delta on the 
one hand must deal with productivity losses at its conventional energy generation units, 
and on the other lacks the necessary financial resources to correct its previous decisions. 
As one Senior Manager, Business Development of Delta explained: 
We do have massive issues with so many of our projects and of course, the money 
is not as easy to spend as it was five years ago. (…) We are talking about major 
projects in conventional energy generation. You can see in the newspapers every 
day that the power plant market is no fun at all at the moment. Because we said 
‘Yes, we’ll take that with us’ in so many places at the time, we have a lot of problems 
now: most things are just not as much fun right now. 
Thus, the range of available options is clearly limited for Delta. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that there is no potential for organizational adaptation. Rather, the 
major issue is that Delta seems to be afraid of repeating past failures. Delta wants to learn 
from these lessons, in turn preventing it from grasping available opportunities and hence 
undertaking strategic change. 
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The knowledge gained in the past has a massive influence on today’s investment 
decisions. On the one hand, of course, there is considerably less money, because 
we have to fight massively against the issues arising from our conventional energy 
generation projects. Our investment guidelines have become stricter and our 
Supervisory Board has become much more cautious. This means that the 
Supervisory Board also rejects projects that it considers safe, for example (…) an 
onshore wind project. Then it says, ‘First of all, make sure you get the other projects 
back on track.’ Although it has to be said that it would be smart to invest in this 
field right now, our Supervisory Board has become very restrictive. 
Senior Manager, Business Development, Delta 
 
5.3. GROUP C: UNLOCKING A DEVELOPMENT PATH 
Similar to group B, group C contains two small to medium-sized regional utilities that 
entered the liberalized energy market without energy generation capacities. However, 
conversely to Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta, Epsilon and Zeta were able to overcome 
the influence of stabilizing dynamics and unlocked their once entered development paths. 
Both focal firms successfully reallocated resources to new businesses and technologies 
despite the strong economic, organizational and social forces at play. 
 
5.3.1. THE CASE OF EPSILON 
In line with the aforementioned cases of Gamma and Delta, Epsilon is a small to medium-
sized regional utility company that at the time of the market liberalization did not possess 
any energy generation capacities, neither conventional nor renewable energy. Although 
Epsilon soon began to build up its own capacities in conventional energy generation and 
even accelerated the expansion of its conventional energy generation business in the 
following years, it perceived an ongoing shift in the framework conditions for this form 
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of energy generation. Consequently, it undertook a major strategic realignment toward 
renewable energies, which eventually became the focus of its generation strategy. 
Moreover, as Epsilon perceived further changes in the framework conditions for 
renewable energies almost three years later, the company again adapted its strategy to 
become a service-oriented utility company. Figure 8 outlines the key milestones in the 
development of Epsilon since the market liberalization in 1999. 
 
 
Figure 8: Key Milestones in the Development of Epsilon 
 
Thus, in contrast to the cases of Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta, Epsilon has proved its 
ability to undertake organizational adaptation and to alter its development path, even in a 
context in which there were strong arguments to continue with the former strategy. 
Having divested its critical assets in conventional energy generation at an early stage and 
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constantly developed new profitable and future-oriented business areas, Epsilon is now 
in a much more comfortable situation than its counterparts. Accordingly, Epsilon is 
clearly one of the winners of this market development. 
Phase I (1999–2004). In Phase I, after the market liberalization took place and forced the 
market participants to become entrepreneurial, Epsilon soon broke with established ways 
of thinking and acting like a monopolistic energy supplier by refocusing on the 
development of additional value-added business areas. Thus, according to the company’s 
2001 Management Report, “growth opportunities as a network operator primarily lie in 
product market segments such as building land development and energy contracting.” 
Furthermore, “the intensified development and marketing of network products should 
help us to develop additional value-added areas.” 
In 2002, Epsilon entered into alliances and cooperation with other small to medium-sized 
regional utility companies. Although such a strategy of alliances and cooperation was 
pursued by many regional utility companies at the time, Epsilon’s followed a different 
logic. Specifically, Epsilon was not primarily focused on increasing its size and achieving 
scale economies, but rather on realizing synergy potentials due to shared resources and 
competencies between partners. Indeed, according to the company’ 2002 Management 
Report, “the alliance enables its partners to generate synergy effects in the fields of 
accounting, information technology and customer service (call center).” 
In this context, Epsilon undertook another important step with a major influence on the 
company’s further development in the liberalized energy market. Instead of centralizing 
activities and thereby improving control, Epsilon decentralized its activities while putting 
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a strong emphasis on flexibility, even in an early phase of the liberalized energy market, 
in which nearly all market participants regarded size and control as key success factors. 
Thus, in contrast to the prevailing opinion, Epsilon stressed that: 
This is a further step on the way to becoming a company group that meets the 
demands of competition with powerful, flexible organizational units that are 
focused on their respective core business. 
Management Report 2002, Epsilon 
In 2003, a further factor emerged that helped Epsilon to achieve success thereafter. At an 
early stage and with a clearly strategic motivation, Epsilon began evaluating its 
investments with respect to their coherence and consistency with the company’s strategic 
direction. Thus, in its 2003 Management Report, Epsilon declared that: 
Within the framework of evaluating the individual shareholdings, the Executive 
Board is of the opinion that a further shareholding in those companies is not part 
of the strategic business areas, and has offered the co-shareholders the shares for 
sale. 
In this way, perceiving changes in the market and flexibly acting on them quickly became 
key drivers and success factors for Epsilon’s further development in an increasingly 
uncertain and ambiguous market environment – up to now. 
Phase II (2004–2009). In Phase II, Epsilon continued its search for adjacent and valuable 
business areas, a strategy already initiated in 2001. Then in 2005, the company made a 
decisive step by entering the conventional energy generation business. Thereby, Epsilon 
followed the prevalent opinion of nearly the entire industry, deciding to build its own coal 
power plant: 
  
THE CASES OF GERMAN UTILITIES 
 
 
116 
Utility companies are well-advised to invest in the energy generation business in 
addition to energy grid operations. Our planned coal power plant is therefore much 
more than just a reasonable option. For strategic reasons, it is essential to pay the 
greatest attention to our own energy generation. 
Management Report 2005, Epsilon 
According to the CEO, “there was a kind of gold rush in the energy generation business. 
History has shown that you can print money with conventional power plants.” In its 2005 
Management Report, Epsilon further argued that “the planned construction of a new coal 
power plant should also secure our district heating supply from cogeneration production 
in future.” 
In the following years, Epsilon continued to place a strong emphasis on conventional 
energy generation and thus made further investments in this area. As documented in the 
company’s 2007 Management Report: 
We continue to attach great importance to municipal conventional energy 
generation (…). For this reason, we have increased our stake in an operator of 
conventional power plants. 
Although at the end of 2007, conventional energy generation undoubtedly remained the 
preferred form of energy generation among most of the market participants, Epsilon’s 
confidence in conventional energy generation was slowly eroding, as the company’s 
supervisory board changed its position with respect to the construction of Epsilon’s new 
coal power plant. 
Surprisingly for us, the city council has fundamentally revised its position on the 
construction of a coal power plant and is now opposed to its construction by a very 
narrow majority, after the project has been supported by a clear majority since 
2006. 
Management Report 2007, Epsilon 
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In retrospect, this was a lucky coincidence, even though, Epsilon did not completely give 
up this form of energy generation at this point. 
Given that the level of market dynamism and uncertainty significantly increased in the 
German energy market due to political interventions, changing consumer behavior, and 
particularly technological advancement in the field of renewable energies, Epsilon 
established the necessary structures and processes to enable the company to perceive 
these ongoing changes and act on them, that is, to maintain its flexibility and adaptability. 
Indeed, in its 2008 Management Report, the company stressed that: 
Every employee is obligated to communicate identified risks to the respective 
manager. Appropriate mechanisms are in place to ensure that the information is 
passed on to the management. 
Management Report 2008, Epsilon 
These efforts should bear fruit in the future. 
Phase III (2009–2011). The years between 2009 and 2011 had a significant impact on 
Epsilon’s development, as in these years, the company turned its energy generation 
strategy by 180 degrees. Moreover, again luck played a certain role. As an effect of the 
worldwide financial crisis in 2008, one of the mandated banks withdrew from financing 
Epsilon’s power plant due to an adaptation of its internal lending guidelines. As Epsilon 
stressed in its 2008 Management Report: 
Due to the effects of the financial market crisis, one of the mandated banks withdrew 
from financing the coal power plant project. The withdrawal was based on the 
bank’s new internal guidelines not to finance any major long-term construction 
projects. Although the profitability of the project is also confirmed by the concerned 
bank, Epsilon has decided to suspend the project before entering the second 
construction phase. 
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At this point it would have been advantageous to search for other financing partners and 
continue along the path of conventional energy generation, especially as this coal power 
plant was already under construction and would have been highly profitable, at least at 
the time. Moreover, Epsilon had already gained a foothold in the conventional energy 
business through building up necessary structures and competencies. However, Epsilon 
ceased the construction and took the opportunity to enter the renewable energies business 
in 2009. 
In 2010, Epsilon capitalized on its earlier efforts to identify market changes and 
developments by recognizing that the future prospects of conventional energy generation 
had become increasingly uncertain and scarcely predictable, whereas the development of 
renewable energies was highly predictable due to guaranteed feed-in remunerations. 
Thus, its 2010 Management Report stated that: 
Currently, there is no sufficiently reliable information available on the future role 
of coal power plants in the German energy industry. In view of this still uncertain 
role of coal power plants for the future of German energy supply according to the 
German government’s energy concept, Epsilon considered it expedient to put the 
project on hold. 
Thus, the company undertook a strategic realignment, including the divestiture of its 
entire conventional energy generation capacities and a focus on renewable energies. To 
accelerate growth in solar energy, Epsilon established a new company with a clear focus 
on this renewable energy segment. At the same time, Epsilon acquired several wind 
turbines to strengthen its footprint in the wind power business and to further the 
company’s transformation. 
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Phase IV (2011–2015). In 2011, Epsilon reinforced its position in the renewable energies 
business again by investing in the development of energy storage solutions in order to 
balance fluctuating energy production from renewable sources like the sun or the wind, 
and by undertaking large-scale investment to accelerate the expansion of its renewable 
energy capacities. However, Epsilon’s expansion of renewable energy capacities 
decelerated in 2012, particularly due to a decrease in available locations for wind turbines. 
Thus, to gain early access to new potential wind turbine locations and to further develop 
its competencies in this future-oriented business area, the company acquired a wind 
project developer. As one Division Head, Transmission of Epsilon explained:  
In the field of renewable energies, we had reached growth limits, which made it 
increasingly difficult to further expand our renewable energy capacities. The 
acquisition of a wind project developer was therefore a logical next step to 
accelerate growth in this segment and to expand our competencies. 
In the context of this acquisition, Epsilon focused its energy generation strategy on wind 
power, which also led to the decision to terminate any further investments in solar energy 
due to perceived changes in feed-in remunerations for this form of renewable energy. 
The business model of our renewable energies business is essentially based on the 
stable framework conditions of the Renewable Energy Sources Act. However, due 
to the further reductions in feed-in compensations for solar energy introduced by 
the German government, our renewable energies business will no longer realize 
any further solar power plants apart from those projects that have already started, 
so that future activities in this area will focus on the operation or leasing of existing 
plants. 
Management Report 2012, Epsilon 
In particular, the decision to terminate any future solar power investments highlighted 
how Epsilon did not blindly believe in formerly established scenarios for decision 
making, but rather had appropriate structures and mechanisms in place to perceive 
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changes in the economic environment and evaluate market opportunities and threats, 
which it could then translate into concrete actions. Epsilon also continuously reviewed its 
assumptions with respect to the development of conventional energy generation, and 
thereby came to the conclusion in 2012 that the market still did not provide sufficient 
incentives for further investments in this form of energy generation. Thus, the 2012 
Management Report of Epsilon states that: 
The current market environment does not yet offer sufficient economic incentives 
for the construction of a further gas and steam power plant for peak and medium 
load. Further market and political developments are being monitored. The ongoing 
in-depth evaluations of the economic viability of the project and financing models 
will be continued. 
Management Report 2012, Epsilon 
On the basis of Epsilon’s acquisition of the wind project developer and the continuous 
development of its capacities and competencies in wind power, further intensifying the 
expansion of wind power projects to utilize its capacities and competencies in this 
segment would have been an advantageous path to pursue. However, having early 
perceived ongoing changes in the remuneration policies for wind power that would impair 
the future profitability of those investments, Epsilon made the decision in 2013/2014 to 
also preliminarily terminate any further investments in this area of renewable energy. 
Indeed, Epsilon’s CEO argued that: 
At that time, there were numerous indicators suggesting that we should further 
expand our renewable energy capacities, not only based on our previous 
acquisition of the wind project developer. However, we also perceived signals from 
politicians that there would be changes in renewable energy compensation policies 
in the near future. 
Again, Epsilon underwent another strategic change in focus. The company now sought to 
monetarize its existing investments in renewable energies while continuing to strengthen 
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the highly promising energy-related service business (which the company had developed 
over the past years), as well as pursuing new valuable business areas in order to 
continuously stay one step ahead of the competition. 
To summarize the case of Epsilon, in the years since the market liberalization in 1999, 
the company frequently proved its ability to cope with market changes. Although luck 
played a role in the company’s development, Epsilon nonetheless repeatedly 
demonstrated a continuous ability to act with necessary foresight, pay attention to even 
weak signals, and ensure that it had adequate structures and monitoring mechanisms in 
place to perceive those signals and take appropriate actions. Thereby, Epsilon’s decisions 
to withdraw from conventional energy generation and later to even withdraw from 
renewable energy generation highlighted how the company would constantly evaluate 
and adjust its decision making assumptions, instead of doing what it had always done. 
Moreover, Epsilon at any point had a wide scope of opportunities available, because it 
continuously and proactively created new alternative options instead of fading out options 
and concentrating only on the obvious. 
 
5.3.2. THE CASE OF ZETA 
Similar to Epsilon, Zeta is a small to medium-sized regional utility company that did not 
possess energy generation capacities on entering the liberalized German energy market. 
Although Zeta also built up its own energy generation capacities, the company 
exclusively focused on renewable energies. Thus, in contrast to the abovementioned cases 
of Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and even Epsilon, Zeta never entered the field of 
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conventional energy generation. In retrospect, one must say that this was fortunate, the 
company once having concrete plans to do so.  
Thus, instead of following the moves of the majority of market participants, the company 
stands out in the liberalized German energy market for its distinctive and foresighted 
strategic decisions. Figure 9 presents an overview of the key milestones in the 
development of Zeta.  
 
 
Figure 9: Key Milestones in the Development of Zeta 
 
Phase I (1999–2004). In the early years after the market liberalization, Zeta was primarily 
focused on realizing synergy potentials based on size and on achieving efficiency gains. 
Under the given circumstances at the time and particularly with respect to significant 
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prices decreases, it was a reasonable step to enter into alliances and cooperation with 
other small to medium-sized regional utility companies. Thus, by bundling purchasing 
volumes, Zeta was able to counteract the decline in energy prices. While further pursuing 
its growth strategy, Zeta concluded the acquisition of another German regional energy 
supplier in 2001. Thereby, the acquisition was motivated by realizing further synergy 
potentials besides energy procurement, for example in the energy sales business and in 
administrative functions. 
In the same year, Zeta took a step that for the first time exemplified its future orientation. 
Thus, in a situation that was characterized by market consolidation and by market 
participants almost exclusively concentrating on rapid growth in their existing business 
areas, Zeta entered into cooperation with a leading fuel cell producer to further advance 
its energy storage technologies. 
Phase II (2004–2009). In Phase II, Zeta further intensified its growth endeavors through 
alliances and cooperation with other regional energy suppliers and municipal utilities, on 
the one hand to demonstrate its ties to the region and on the other to continue its growth 
and to achieve a critical size. As the company’s 2007 Management Report stated:  
In structural terms, the energy sector will be subject to massive consolidation 
trends in the upcoming years. Only by joining forces into larger units will local and 
regional utilities reach the critical mass within which economies of scale can be 
achieved that in turn are required to create and maintain profitability. 
Thereby, one major aim of the company at that time was to realize further synergy 
potentials through shared services. 
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As a concrete effect of this strategy, first cooperation possibilities were developed 
in the year under review with neighboring utilities with at least partial municipal 
ownership. The primary objective was to pool resources and thus generate synergy 
effects, primarily in the areas of network management and shared services. 
Management Report 2007, Zeta 
To cope with the significant energy price declines and the market pressure on energy 
sales, and thus to maintain its competitiveness in an increasingly dynamic energy market, 
Zeta undertook a large-scale cost reduction program in 2008. Indeed, its 2008 
Management Report stated that: 
The increasing market pressure on energy sales will also result in drastic company-
wide cost savings. Only in this way we will succeed in sustainably ensuring the 
competitiveness of our business. 
Moreover, again the company strived to realize further cost reductions through 
intensifying its efforts to continue growth.  
Therefore, through strategic cooperation and mergers we are striving to achieve 
the critical size and the associated cost degression that will secure Zeta the best 
possible long-term business prospects. 
Management Report 2008, Zeta 
However, at the end of 2008, Zeta’s growth effort increasingly reached its natural limits, 
and thus it became more and more difficult to find new cooperation and especially 
appropriate takeover candidates. As a consequence, Zeta decisively took the next logical 
step by deciding to enter the energy generation business on its own. Although renewable 
energies had gained increasing importance at that time, driven by a further amendment to 
the Renewable Energy Sources Act and the introduction of CO2 certificates, which 
increased the production costs for conventional energy generation, Zeta originally 
planned to enter the conventional energy generation business. Even though the company 
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had already acquired corresponding properties for the construction of a gas power plant, 
the plans could (fortunately) not be realized, as the CEO of Zeta explained: 
We actually planned to build a gas power plant. However, this could not be realized 
for other reasons. Looking back now, we are happy today, because all these power 
plants are not really blessed in terms of profitability. (...) I believe that this is 
sometimes also coupled with a certain amount of luck. 
Although fortune is one thing, what you make of it is something else. Zeta made the best 
of the situation. Indeed, it took the opportunity to become even more prepared for the 
upcoming uncertainties in the German energy market. Thus, what really drove the 
company’s development in the following years was its willingness to accept the high level 
of market dynamism and uncertainty. Zeta established the appropriate structures and 
processes to early perceive ongoing market changes and to continuously create strategic 
options in order to quickly adapt to changing circumstances. This attitude had already 
become part of Zeta’s DNA in 2008 and significantly affects the company’s behavior 
even today. In its 2008 Management Report, the company highlighted: 
The forecast report makes it clear that the future of the energy market is fraught 
with numerous unknowns. In this regard, Zeta’s success will depend more than ever 
on responding promptly and appropriately to changes in the underlying conditions. 
In addition to the availability of strategic options and corresponding operational 
implementation plans, this requires in particular the willingness to adapt systems 
and processes over and over. 
This also resulted in a general orientation of the company toward accepting uncertainties 
and ambiguities in decision making instead of understanding old assumptions regarding 
future development as objective knowledge that should not be amended. Thus, according 
to the company’s 2008 Management Report: 
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The present management report illustrates the extent to which companies in the 
energy market are currently facing and will continue to face significant changes in 
the legal and structural framework conditions that are difficult to predict. 
Accordingly, forecasts of business developments should be seen less as the result of 
objective knowledge and more as a mirror image of numerous subjective and 
premise-driven assumptions. 
Accordingly, Zeta continuously strived to create strategic options, especially seeking 
stable development options in an increasingly uncertain and unpredictable market 
environment. 
Phase III (2009–2011). As an alternative to conventional energy generation, Zeta also 
advanced options for entering the renewable energies business. Thus, the company 
continued with its strategy to become an energy generator, but from now on focused on 
renewable energy sources. 
Nevertheless, it was a conscious decision to invest in conventional power plant 
capacities, and that is how it turned out. As an alternative, renewable energies were 
repeatedly assessed and examined, and when one option was not possible, the other 
was implemented. 
CEO, Zeta 
However, the CEO also admitted that “the fact that we did not possess any energy 
generation capacities at that point certainly influenced our decision in favor of renewable 
energies.” After certain initial investments in renewable energies, in particular in solar 
power plants, Zeta centralized its renewable energy activities within a new business unit 
in 2010 in order to establish a basis for accelerated future growth. Thus, Zeta’s CEO 
emphasized that: 
We have also combined every activity that has to do with renewable energies – 
today extended by storage technologies – in a new, spun-off business unit to 
concentrate responsibilities and provide the basis for accelerated growth. 
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As in 2010, market dynamism and hence the level of uncertainty further increased, 
leading Zeta to revise its strategy process to strategically prioritize and address future 
growth potentials while putting a greater emphasis on flexibility. This later became a key 
success factor in this rapidly changing environment. 
In 2010, it was actually clear that we had to manage the strategy process differently 
from in the years before. (...) We recognized that, on the one hand, the industry has 
changed and continues to change, and that this change is more than serious (...) It 
ultimately leads to the need to deal with priorities and to create clarity with respect 
to the allocation of resources, about what should we do in the future and in an 
intensified manner, and what we had better not do. 
CEO, Zeta 
As Zeta perceived an ongoing market shift from centralized energy generation by large-
scale coal, gas, and nuclear power plants toward more piecemeal decentralized energy 
generation by renewable energy sources, the company strategically defined renewable 
energies as a key area for future resource allocation. This decision to focus on renewable 
energies and on wind power in particular was followed by a large-scale investment 
program to strengthen the company’s position in the renewable energies business.  
We made the decision to focus on renewable energies as early as the end of 2010 
(…) and thus, long before the political decisions to undertake an energy turnaround 
were made. In other words, we had already recognized the signs. 
CEO, Zeta 
Thus, to further accelerate growth in the area of wind power, Zeta entered into 
cooperation with a leading wind project developer, which enabled the company to gain 
early access to appropriate locations for the construction of new wind turbines. 
Phase IV (2011–2015). In Phase IV, after the nuclear accident in Fukushima and the 
German government’s subsequent nuclear phase-out decision, sustainable energy 
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generation gained another development boost. In this context, Zeta felt confirmed in its 
development and continued its strategy to further accelerate the expansion of its wind 
power capacities. 
However, even at that time, when Zeta’s strategy seemed more promising than ever, the 
company was engaged in a constant search for valuable growth opportunities, as 
highlighted in its 2011 Management Report: “At the same time and in accordance with 
our growth strategy, we must proactively identify and develop existing market niches as 
well as new, valuable business areas.” Thus, the energy-related service business was 
identified as having significant future growth potential, which in fact became the 
company’s new core business just one year later. Thereby, Zeta entered the energy-related 
service business with a strategic and future-oriented focus, rather than this being 
compelled, as was the case of many of the company’s counterparts, for which the service 
business was more or less their last resort. This strategic move brought Zeta one step 
ahead of the competition. In addition to the field of energy efficiency solutions, for 
example, “one aspect of the future-oriented alignment of our company in 2011 was the 
targeted expansion of our involvement in the field of electric mobility,” according to 
Zeta’s 2011 Management Report. 
In 2011, Zeta perceived signals that the upcoming amendment to the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act, which was passed by the German government in 2012, would include 
reductions in feed-in remunerations for solar power. As a consequence, the company 
questioned the profitability assumptions regarding its solar power plants that were at the 
planning and development stage at the time, and projected that the expected returns for 
these investments would not be sufficient. Thus, Zeta refused to be blinded by its previous 
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success and made the incisive decision to terminate several projects even before 
commissioning. According to the company’s 2011 Management Report: 
Although numerous valuable projects have been realized in the solar energy 
segment, in 2011 several projects had to be terminated before commissioning owing 
to insufficient expected returns due to the reductions in feed-in remunerations 
under the imminent amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources Act. 
Furthermore, in 2012 Zeta again reduced its investments in solar power, as stated in its 
2012 Management Report, “due to the reductions in feed-in remunerations for solar 
power, the respective investment budget was not fully deployed.” In these ways, it was 
apparent that the company did not uncritically believe in earlier established scenarios for 
decision making, but rather constantly questioned planning assumptions against the 
background of changing framework conditions. 
Moreover, Zeta perceived changing circumstances in the area of wind power at an early 
stage and was also not afraid of decelerating its planned investments in the field of 
renewable energies. Indeed, this represented a remarkable step, as there were strong 
arguments in favor of accelerating the expansion of its wind power capacities, especially 
given its existing competencies in this area as a consequence of its cooperation with the 
wind project developer only two years before. In its 2012 Management Report, Zeta 
stressed that: 
With the commissioning of our new wind farm, we will reduce the high annual 
investments in renewable energies. The main reason for this is the increasing 
uncertainty regarding the economic framework conditions set by politics, in 
particular with respect to the remunerations under the Renewable Energy Sources 
Act. 
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Thus, as even the framework conditions for new investments in the field of renewable 
energy became increasingly uncertain and hard to predict, Zeta moved its focus from 
renewable energy production to the area of energy-related services. 
The past years in the energy market have shown that statements about future 
developments are subject to considerable uncertainty. This is due not least to the 
socio-political context in which our core business areas are embedded. In addition 
to economic factors, it is primarily the political environment that is the decisive 
determinant of our corporate success. We are taking this insight as an opportunity 
to henceforth focus on activities that lie outside our [former] core business activities 
[of renewable energies]. 
Management Report 2012, Zeta 
In order to further move away from the original business of energy generation toward the 
more future-oriented energy-related service business, Zeta sold shares in its renewable 
energy projects to further promote its strategic adaptation to becoming a service provider. 
According to Zeta’s CEO: 
We ourselves are operators of wind power and solar power plants, we are advisors 
in this area, and evaluate and support customers who plan to install such plants 
themselves. 
With the sale of the shares, Zeta was able to free up financial resources, which were 
immediately reinvested to strengthen its new core business. Thereby, Zeta took further 
initiatives to develop new profitable growth areas in the service business in order to 
become more independent from the constraints and the uncertain development of the 
energy (generation) market.  
Today we are actually about to take the next step, to say that we have current 
service providers who do the operational management of one wind farm or another, 
and we want to include that into our company. (...) and we also want to make 
ourselves a bit more independent. Thus, it is the classic sense of expanding our own 
business area into adjacent business areas. 
CEO, Zeta 
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As in 2014, Zeta perceived ongoing alterations in the remunerations for renewable 
energies that would initiate a further decrease in profitability, hence the company decided 
to terminate (at least preliminarily) any further investments in renewable energies.  
In 2014, no further projects were initiated in the solar power segment due to 
reductions in remunerations based on the Renewable Energy Sources Act. No 
further projects were realized in the wind power segment either. 
Management Report 2014, Zeta 
As the CEO of Zeta explained further: 
For all these reasons, we have decided that our investments have been completed 
for the time. We now view the coming years somewhat more cautiously, perhaps 
even more cautiously than the original valuations of those investments. At the 
moment, we are in an evaluation phase to say that in the next one to three years our 
investments will be assessed on the basis of practical tests. 
Indeed, in 2015 Zeta successfully completed another strategic adaptation: it developed 
from an energy sales and distribution company to a producer of renewable energies and 
finally to a provider of energy-related services.  
We will continue to accelerate the topic of energy-related services and will develop 
additional innovative products in 2015 to support our core business and present 
ourselves as an energy service provider. 
Management Report 2015, Zeta 
In conclusion, Zeta’s development over the years since the market liberalization 
exemplified how it was able to continuously undertake necessary strategic adaptations 
even before it was forced to do so, and thus it always stayed one step ahead of the 
competition. Three factors in particular drove Zeta’s success in a highly dynamic and 
uncertain market. First, instead of uncritically following routines in terms of familiar 
processes and resorting to historically proven recipes for success, Zeta’s decisions 
repeatedly highlighted a proactive questioning and adaptation of actions to changing 
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conditions. That is it say, it refused to do something because it had always done so or it 
had been successful with such actions in the past; rather, it continuously evaluated and 
amended its actions. Indeed, the CEO of Zeta emphasized that: 
It’s all about questioning – ‘Why is this project, this measure, this activity 
advantageous?’ – and then prioritizing and pushing those relevant projects 
forward; and on the other hand, it’s about simply leaving things aside – ‘That’s 
what I’ve always wanted to do’ – because one simply does many things in the usual 
way and perhaps doesn’t even think about whether this still has any relevance in a 
changed market. 
Second, the basis for Zeta’s capacity to perceive ongoing market changes and alterations 
of the framework conditions for its investment decisions were put in place in 2008 by 
accepting dynamism and uncertainty as continuing characteristics of the energy market 
since the liberalization. Zeta established appropriate and flexible structures, processes and 
mechanisms to recognize and act on such changing circumstances. To ensure the 
permeability of information, Zeta attached great importance to communication, that is, 
not dismissing opposing opinions as false or dubious or even suppressing 
counterarguments, but rather encouraging everyone within the organization to 
communicate his or her perceived developments and changes. Thus, Zeta’s CEO stressed 
that “although this hierarchical structure formally exists, because it is necessary from an 
organizational point of view, there is a lot more communication today.” Third, Zeta 
avoided following strict and binding investment criteria and guidelines, and instead 
continuously challenged existing investment assumptions behind the changing 
circumstances, so that standardized profitability thresholds did not systematically exclude 
strategically important investments. As the CEO of Zeta argued: 
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[In retrospect, companies] have frequently been handicapped by return 
expectations that were either unrealistically high or represented an obstacle for 
entering a certain market segment. (...) based on the understanding that an 
investment may only be made if a certain level of return on the investment can be 
achieved. 
In fact, Zeta repeatedly promoted strategic options, affording it more room for maneuver 
in order to act on changed circumstances and to seize new market opportunities, as for 
example in renewable energies and later in the energy-related service business. 
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6. FINDINGS  
Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be 
understood. 
Marie Curie 
 
6.1. OCCURRENCE OF SELF-REINFORCING MECHANISMS 
Existing literature in the field of organizational path dependence has identified five 
distinct self-reinforcing mechanisms that promote the development of organizational 
paths through stabilizing organizational processes (Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Schreyoegg 
and Sydow 2012), thereby reducing the range of development options available to an 
organization (Koch 2011, p. 338). These self-reinforcing mechanisms are scale, 
complementary, learning, coordination, and expectation effects (Sydow et al. 2009; 
Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). 
However, the case studies of Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, Epsilon, and Zeta have unveiled 
that instead of focusing on the self-reinforcing effects themselves, it is essential to 
understand their underlying modes of action, as in practice, these effects appear in 
different dimensions and manifestations. Figure 10 provides an overview of the case 
study findings.  
Looking deeper into the self-reinforcing mechanisms’ modes of action, one can observe 
21 different dimensions of self-reinforcing mechanisms, out of which seven new 
dimensions emerged during the analysis. Furthermore, 47 different manifestations of the 
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self-reinforcing mechanisms were identified that provide insights into how these 
stabilizing processes unfold in practice.  
 
 
Figure 10: Overview of Findings 
 
The dimensions and the manifestations of the self-reinforcing mechanisms that were 
identified and uncovered in the case studies are discussed below. Examples of each 
manifestation are provided in order to highlight how these stabilizing processes work in 
practice.  
 
5 Self-reinforcing mechanisms 
(i.e. scale, complementary, learning, coordination, and 
expectation effects) that promote the development of 
organizational paths
21 dimensions of self-reinforcing mechanisms
(e.g. economies of scale, economies of scope etc.) out of which 
7 new dimensions emerged during analysis
47 manifestations of self-reinforcing mechanisms
showing how those mechanisms appear in practice (e.g. 
strengthening the core business to achieve a critical mass etc.)
307 indications of self-reinforcing mechanisms
showing in detail how those mechanisms unveiled in practice
Partly new
New
Starting point
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6.1.1. SCALE EFFECTS 
The literature has identified two dimensions of scale effects: economies of scale and 
economies of scope (Panzar and Willig 1981, 1977; Rumelt 1982). Both dimensions of 
scale effects could be found in the development of the firms considered in this 
investigation, in various manifestations. Table 6 provides an overview of the dimensions 
and the manifestations of the scale effects that appeared in the case studies.  
 
 
Table 6: Dimensions and Manifestations of Scale Effects 
 
Economies of scale appeared as the focal firms strengthened their core business of 
conventional energy generation in order to achieve critical mass. Other manifestations of 
economies of scale were detected as firms strived to realize synergy potentials and cost 
degression in their energy generation business, through increasing their energy generation 
Dimension of 
Scale Effects Example Source
Economies of 
scale
  "In structural terms, the energy sector will be subject to massive 
consolidation trends in the upcoming years. Only by joining forces 
into larger units will local and regional utilities reach the critical 
mass within which economies of scale can be achieved that in turn are 
required to create and maintain profitability."
Management Report 
2007, Zeta
  "(...) the use of economies of scale should systematically enhance 
synergies and economic potentials in the operation of conventional 
energy generation plants."
Management Report 
2010, Beta
  "The acquisitions will enable us to leverage additional volume effects 
in purchasing raw materials. Therefore, we combine procurement 
volumes. (...) The procurement volume of natural gas that we use both 
for the heating market and in electricity generation."
Management Report 
2002, Alpha
Economies of 
scope
  "The planned construction of a new coal power plant at the existing 
location should also secure our district heating supply from 
cogeneration production in future."
Management Report 
2005, Epsilon
  "Alpha obtains coal from its own open-cast mines. (...) 89 percent of 
this coal was used for energy generation in our power plants."
Management Report 
2004, Alpha
Realizing synergy potentials and cost 
degression in the production business 
(energy generation)
Manifestation
Strengthening the core business to 
achieve a critical mass (in the 
conventional energy generation 
business)
Realizing synergy potentials and cost 
degression in raw material procurement
Realizing synergy potentials through 
combination of electricity and heat 
generation
Realizing synergy potentials through 
own raw material extraction for energy 
generation
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capacities, or in the procurement or extraction of raw materials. Economies of scope could 
be found in two different manifestations: as firms strived to realize synergy potentials 
through a combination of electricity and heat generation in order to achieve a relative 
decrease in the cost per unit; or through establishing or expanding their own raw material 
extraction for subsequent energy generation, for example through expanding coal 
extraction capacities for later use in their coal power plants. 
 
6.1.2. COMPLEMENTARY EFFECTS 
According to the literature, complementary effects may appear in two different 
dimensions. While striving to realize synergies arising from the interaction of business 
units (Prahalad and Hamel 1990), firms take growth opportunities in adjacent (and 
interrelated) areas (Pierson 2000; Sydow et al. 2009) or share resources in terms of skills, 
competencies, or customers (Pehrsson 2006). In the cases presented above, both 
dimensions of complementary effects could be observed. Thereby, complementary 
effects occur in different manifestations. In Table 7, an overview of the dimensions and 
the manifestations of the complementary effects that appeared in the case studies is 
provided.  
With respect to the first dimension of complementary effects, i.e., growth opportunities 
in adjacent areas, one could observe the focal firms expanding their businesses into 
adjacent business areas, for instance: offering energy-related services or energy efficiency 
solutions, or becoming e-mobility providers; expanding their value-added depth in the 
renewable energies business, particularly through the acquisitions of wind project 
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developers; expanding their value-added depth toward the exploration of raw materials; 
or expanding their value-added breadth through accessing complementary forms of 
energy generation, like the renewable energies business.  
 
 
Table 7: Dimensions and Manifestations of Complementary Effects 
 
The second dimension of complementary effects, i.e., shared resources between two or 
more business units, could be found by the focal firms striving to realize synergy and 
growth potentials in sales through joint customer groups, for instance: selling electricity 
Dimension of 
Complementary 
Effects
Example Source
Growth 
opportunities in 
adjacent areas
  "Today we are actually about to take the next step, to say that we 
have current service providers who do the operational management of 
one wind farm or another, and we want to include that into our 
company. (...) and we also want to make ourselves a bit more 
independent. Thus, it is the classic sense of expanding our own 
business area into adjacent business areas."
CEO, Zeta
  "In the field of renewable energies we had reached growth limits, 
which made it increasingly difficult to further expand our renewable 
energy capacities. The acquisition of a wind project developer was 
therefore a logical next step to accelerate growth in this segment."
Division Head, 
Transmission, Epsilon
  "The business involving the liquefaction, shipping and regasification 
of natural gas will become increasingly important for gas supply in 
Europe in the future. We are therefore working on entering this 
market."
Management Report 
2006, Alpha
  "It has been said that we are counting on the energy turnaround and 
that these gas power plants are now being used as a complementary 
energy generation technology to the volatile energy generation from 
renewable energies."
Senior Manager, 
Business Development, 
Gamma
Shared resources   "We achieve further synergies through horizontal integration, that is, 
by selling electricity and gas through one and the same group 
company."
Management Report 
2005, Alpha
  "As a concrete effect of this strategy, first cooperation possibilities 
were developed in the year under review with neighboring utilities 
with at least partial municipal ownership. The primary objective was 
to pool resources and thus generate synergy effects, primarily in the 
areas of network management and shared services."
Management Report 
2007, Zeta
  "The bundling of our R&D measures enables us to make more 
effective use of know-how and resources. Additional synergies can be 
leveraged by more closely interlocking projects in which several 
divisions are involved."
Management Report 
2003, Alpha
Realizing synergy and growth 
potentials through a shared knowledge 
base
Realizing synergy and growth 
potentials through the joint use of 
services (i.e., shared services)
Expanding the value-added depth in the 
renewable energies business (through 
the acquisition of a wind project 
developer)
Manifestation
Expanding the business into adjacent 
business areas (e.g. energy-related 
services, energy efficiency solutions, 
e-mobility)
Expanding the value-added depth 
through exploration of raw materials
Expanding the value-added breadth 
through complementary forms of 
energy generation
Realizing synergy and growth 
potentials in sales through joint 
customer groups
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and heat products; through the joint use of services, such as in terms of shared billing 
systems; or finally, through a shared knowledge base.  
 
6.1.3. LEARNING EFFECTS 
According to the literature, there are two dimensions of learning effects that stimulate 
companies to pursue a once entered path of development. Given their natural proclivity 
toward exploitative learning, firms typically focus on achieving efficiency improvements 
and on exploiting existing business areas, as the returns gained from preexisting activities 
are more certain and closer in time (March 1991; Levinthal and March 1993). Besides the 
two dimensions of learning effects mentioned in previous literature, two further 
dimensions emerged during the analysis: the continuous improvement of existing 
competencies, and the routinization of activities. In the case studies presented above, 
these dimensions of learning effects occurred in multiple manifestations while 
influencing the development paths of the focal firms. Table 8 provides an overview of the 
four dimensions of the learning effects that emerged, alongside examples of how they 
occurred in practice.  
Efficiency improvements occurred as firms strived to realize cost reduction potentials, 
improved the efficiency levels of conventional power plants by reducing the inputs of raw 
materials required for energy generation (i.e., coal or gas consumption), or optimized 
existing activities and processes in order to become more efficient. While attempting to 
exploit existing business areas, the focal firms were found to focus on proven 
technologies of conventional energy generation by expanding their coal, gas, or nuclear 
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energy generation capacities, modernizing existing conventional power plants in order to 
reduce CO2 emissions and thus comply with climate protection requirements, or 
maintaining existing conventional power plants in order to extend their lifetime.  
 
 
Table 8: Dimensions and Manifestations of Learning Effects 
 
Similarly, the new dimensions of learning effects occurred in various manifestations. The 
case studies revealed the focal firms focusing on continuously strengthening their existing 
competencies and further developing existing technologies instead of learning new 
Dimension of 
Learning Effects Example Source
  "Due to the further liberalization of the energy markets, the market 
environment will continue to be characterized by price and sales risks. 
These market risks are countered by consistent cost management."
Management Report 
2001, Delta
  "With respect to the high share of coal-fired power plants in our 
electricity generation portfolio, the introduction of an emissions tax is 
another major environmental risk. We are countering this risk with 
efficiency-enhancing measures, including the modernization of our 
power plant portfolio."
Management Report 
2000-2001, Alpha
  "Accordingly, our strategic focus is on the radical restructuring of 
the conventional generation business. This includes the cost-optimal 
alignment of all activities."
Management Report 
2013, Beta
Exploiting existing 
business areas
  "We thought, ‘OK, that’s us. Nobody can plan, build, operate and 
maintain power plants as well as we do, so we go in there and 
become the number one base load provider for Germany, while the 
others, they can all just look at our tail lights.’"
Former Manager, 
Internal Consulting, 
Beta
  "We are also making a contribution to climate protection by building 
highly efficient coal and gas power plants to replace high-emission 
old plants."
Management Report 
2011, Alpha
  "We are making significant investments in maintaining and 
expanding our conventional energy generation and gas infrastructure. 
In the coming year, we will invest in the expansion, replacement, and 
maintenance of power generation from coal, gas, and nuclear power. 
This includes, among other things, new fossil fuel power plant 
construction projects."
Management Report 
2012, Beta
  "Through its focused positioning and consistent alignment, Beta can 
retain and further develop its key existing strengths and advantages."
Management Report 
2014, Beta
  "In the long-run, we can only remain competitive if we continuously 
develop existing technologies."
Management Report 
2008, Alpha
NEW:  Routinization 
of activities
  "I think that openness to change would have been crucial: how 
quickly am I able to adapt to change, and accordingly to react [to 
changed circumstances]."
Senior Manager, Group 
Controlling & M&A 
Valuation, Alpha
NEW:  Improvement 
of existing 
competencies
Efficiency 
improvements
Modernizing existing conventional 
power plants to reduce CO2 emissions
Maintaining existing conventional 
power plants to extend their lifetime
Strengthening existing competencies
Further developing existing 
competencies and technologies
Adhering to familiar and proven 
processes
Manifestation
Realizing cost reduction potentials
Improving efficiency levels of 
conventional power plants
Optimizing existing activities and 
processes 
Exploiting existing competencies by 
focusing on proven technologies of 
conventional energy generation
FINDINGS 
 
 
141 
competencies or switching to new technologies. Moreover, with respect to the 
routinization of activities, the case studies unveiled the firms’ adherence to familiar as 
well as historically proven activities and processes.  
 
6.1.4. COORDINATION EFFECTS 
Coordination effects lie at the heart of organizational functioning (Sydow et al. 2009). 
Thus, these effects are built on efficient and foreseeable interactions among actors as they 
follow organizational rules and guidelines (Sydow et al. 2009). According to Martinez 
and Jarillo (1989), coordination consists of three dimensions: centralization; 
formalization and standardization; and planning, budgeting, and goal setting. However, 
the case studies unveiled formal authority as an additional dimension. Thereby, those four 
dimensions of coordination effects occurred in different manifestations. Table 9 outlines 
the dimensions and the manifestations of coordination effects and illustrates how they 
appeared in the case studies. 
With respect to centralization, that is, the first dimension of coordination effects, the focal 
firms were seen to centralize their activities in order to improve their level of control or 
to realize synergy potentials arising from the combination of formerly small businesses 
to large-scale business units. Also observable were the centralization endeavors of the 
focal firms, being motivated to increase internal perceptions of company divisions and 
technologies that did not receive the necessary attention within their decentralized 
structures, such as through bundling all renewable energy activities.  
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Table 9: Dimensions and Manifestations of Coordination Effects 
 
Formalization and standardization could be observed in terms of corporate actors strictly 
following rules and standardized processes and procedures, and in particular, following 
strict and binding investment criteria and guidelines. Planning, budgeting, and goal 
setting as a third dimension of coordination effects could be observed in the following 
Dimension of 
Coordination Effects Example Source
Centralization   "There was a new constellation with larger core businesses. At the 
same time, of course, there was also a certain degree of centralization 
in the organization in order to increase the manageability of the whole 
thing."
Former CEO, Alpha
  "For example, the program aims to bundle activities with high 
standardization potential in separate units in order to benefit from 
synergy and bundling effects."
Management Report 
2011, Beta
  "Renewable energies have had a rather subordinate role in the 
individual company divisions, because they were rather small and we 
have seen at this point that we have to place renewable energies more 
prominently, we have to pay more attention to them, because in the 
conventional business area we also had a whole series of 
hydroelectric power plants and the first wind power plants, but these 
of course lagged far behind conventional generation in terms of 
importance. And of course we have seen quite clearly that we have to 
do something about this, we have to centralize them, because 
otherwise the delicate little plant of renewable energies will always be 
in the shade of a big tree that takes the sun from it, to put it 
metaphorically."
Senior Manager, Group 
Controlling & M&A 
Valuation, Alpha
Formalization and 
standardization
  "That would actually have been the point where someone should 
have said, we’re doing something stupid, everybody holds your 
horse. (…) But instead, our M&A division had their own guidelines, 
they said, we are in charge of selling that business unit and obtaining 
the highest price possible and that's already enough work to do – we 
can't deal with whether or not this is the right strategic decision."
Former Manager, 
Internal Consulting, 
Beta
  "We will only consider acquisitions if our financial criteria are met. 
Thereby, the most important threshold is the internal rate of return, 
which must at least equal the cost of capital plus a premium."
Management Report 
2008, Alpha
Planning, budgeting, 
and goal setting
  "The parameters may not have been so prominent that one could 
have made scenarios and said, ‘OK, if in the next five to ten years the 
share of renewable energies grows to that size, then that means the 
following for our conventional energy production possibilities.’"
Former CEO, Alpha
  "You can’t simply say, ‘all or nothing,’ but you have to make certain 
assumptions and it is clear that some of those assumptions were 
certainly too optimistic."
Senior Manager, 
Business Development, 
Delta
NEW:  Formal 
authority
  "The structure of Beta is characterized by a clear allocation of roles 
and responsibilities within the association of all group companies and 
divisions."
Management Report 
2011, Beta
  "And then the CEO can decide, because it mustn't be an automatism, 
whether he or she gives more weight to certain things or whether he 
or she says that we don't believe in the scenario, so we leave that out."
Division Head, 
Corporate M&A, Beta
Manifestation
Improving control through centralizing 
activities
Realizing synergy potentials through 
centralizing activities
Strictly following rules and 
standardized processes and procedures
Increasing the internal perception of 
company divisions and technologies
Assigning clear decision-making 
authority at the top level
Following strict and binding investment 
criteria and guidelines
Believing in once established scenarios 
for decision-making
Establishing hierarchical structures and 
clear roles and responsibilities
Understanding assumptions as 
objective knowledge
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two manifestations. On the one hand, the focal firms seemed to believe in formerly 
established scenarios as the basis for their decision making, regardless of any changes to 
the framework conditions. On the other hand, it was repeatedly observed that the firms 
understood assumptions as objective knowledge instead of perceiving them as subjective 
and premise-driven assumptions. Finally, the new dimension of coordination effects, i.e., 
formal authority, appeared in practice as focal firms established strictly hierarchical 
structures while allocating clearly distinguishable roles and responsibilities, and assigned 
clear decision-making authorities at the top level. 
 
6.1.5. EXPECTATION EFFECTS 
Existing literature on path dependence, and in particular on self-reinforcing mechanisms, 
discusses five dimensions of expectation effects that result in increasingly stabilized 
activity patterns that are difficult to change (Leibenstein 1950; O’Reilly 1989; Haller and 
Norpoth 1994; O’Reilly and Chatman 1996; Pierson 2000; Luhmann 2012). The 
dimensions of expectation effects that influence firms’ actions are social expectations, 
aspirations for social belonging, the pursuit to end up on the winning side, informal and 
unwritten norms, and seeking to legitimize decisions. In the case studies, these five 
dimensions of expectation effects could be found in different manifestations.  
In addition to these dimensions of expectation effects, already identified in existing 
literature in the field of path dependence research, the case studies unveiled further 
dimensions of expectation effects that are grounded in the phenomenon of groupthink 
(Janis 1971, 1972). In the abovementioned case studies, four symptoms of groupthink 
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(Janis 1971, pp. 85–88; Montanari and Moorhead 1989, pp. 210–211) could be identified, 
which in turn promoted observable defects in the focal firms’ decision-making processes 
and consequently resulted in poor-quality decisions. 
First, one could observe focal firms being blinded by an illusion of invulnerability that 
created excessive optimism and encouraged them to take extreme risks. Second, one 
could observe collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings, which might 
have otherwise led the focal firms to reconsider their assumptions before recommitting to 
past policy decisions. Third, the case studies revealed direct pressure on corporate actors 
who express strong arguments against any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or 
commitments, making clear that such dissent is contrary to what is expected of loyal 
group members. Fourth, one could observe corporate actors’ self-censorship of deviations 
from the group consensus, reflected in these actors’ inclination to minimize the 
importance of her or his doubts and counterarguments. Table 10 provides an overview of 
the dimensions of expectation effects and illustrates how different manifestations 
appeared in practice.  
With respect to social expectations, one could observe the focal firms arguing to fulfill a 
social mission or duty, that is, to secure their energy supply. Similarly, the focal firms 
strived to fulfill their stakeholders’ and public expectations. The second dimension of 
expectation effects, i.e., the aspiration for social belonging, was particularly reflected in 
corporate actors’ commitment to their firms’ historically grown core business of 
conventional energy generation. Another dimension of this form of expectation effects 
was the firms’ pursuit to be on the winning side, which manifested itself in the focal firms 
following the moves of other market participants, or even the predominant opinion of the 
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energy industry, which could be seen for example in the utility companies’ gold rush in 
the conventional power generation business. 
 
 
Table 10: Dimensions and Manifestations of Expectation Effects  
Dimension of 
Expectation Effects Example Source
Social expectations   "As one of the world’s leading energy companies, it is our social 
duty to act as a role model in this important field [of sustainability] as 
well. That is why we have committed ourselves to reducing our 
specific CO2 emissions by 50 per cent between 1990 and 2030. To 
achieve this, we are investing billions in highly efficient, more climate-
friendly power plants."
Management Report 
2008, Alpha
  "Our environment is determined by the expectation of customers that 
their energy supply is secure and that utility companies can control 
the effects of strongly fluctuating energy prices."
Management Report 
2009, Alpha
Aspiration for social 
belonging
  "The conventional generation unit is in fact a very special kind of 
people. The conventional generation unit is just really original 
German, they sit in their own building and have operated 
conventional generation there, everyone spoke German, all men, and 
have been doing so for 30 years."
Former Manager, 
Internal Consulting, 
Beta
Being on the winning 
side
  "The motivation of the colleagues who decided [to invest into 
conventional energy generation] at that time was mainly driven by the 
fact that they wanted to get a slice of the cake themselves."
Senior Manager, 
Business Development, 
Delta
  "Utility companies are well-advised to invest in the energy 
generation business in addition to energy grid operations. Our 
planned coal power plant is therefore much more than just a 
reasonable option. For strategic reasons, it is essential to pay the 
greatest attention to our own energy generation."
Management Report 
2005, Epsilon
Informal and 
unwritten norms
  "A nationwide electricity supply based on existing renewable energy 
plants alone cannot be guaranteed at present. Conventional power 
plants are extremely important for the security of energy supply, 
especially in times of bottlenecks or when renewable energy plants fail 
to generate electricity."
Management Report 
2012, Delta
  "Access to generation capacities will increasingly become a key issue 
for the future of the energy supply industry, especially against the 
background of the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy and the need 
to renew conventional power plants. In this context, Gamma will place 
its strategic focus on modern power plant technology in view of its 
corporate responsibility for the climate and the environment."
Management Report 
2007, Gamma
  "At the time when the construction of the power plant was nearly 
completed, it had already become apparent that the power plant 
would not be profitable, but it was somehow pulled through anyway."
Former Manager, 
Internal Consulting, 
Beta
Legitimacy seeking   "The political discourse with respect to the decisive issues of the 
energy industry is set at both the European and the national level. 
This is why we have organized ourselves jointly in a cooperation of 
the leading municipal utilities. Together we represent about ten per 
cent of the German energy market and we make our voice heard at the 
federal level on important energy policy issues."
Management Report 
2008, Gamma
  "At the end of the day, you have to assert yourself with your 
investments, so you have to be able to convince other people as well, 
because it doesn’t help if I alone am of the opinion that this is a good 
investment; you have to be able to convince others."
Senior Manager, Group 
Controlling & M&A 
Valuation, Alpha
  "As part of the planned construction of new power plants, we offered 
our municipal customers the opportunity to participate in the 
construction of one of the new coal power plants."
Management Report 
2006, Alpha
Aspiring for social belonging to 
historically grown core business of 
conventional energy generation
Following other market participants’ 
moves
Following the industry’s opinion
Believing in historically proven ‚recipes 
for success’ (e.g. conventional energy 
generation, economies of scale, 
efficiency improvements)
Manifestation
Fulfilling a social mission or duty to 
secure energy supply
Fulfilling stakeholders‘ expectations 
(e.g. population, shareholder)
Assuming responsibility for the 
economy, climate and environment and 
for customers
Completing activities that have once 
begun (i.e., construction of power 
plants)
Actively influencing the political debate 
on conventional energy generation
Seeking for internal acceptance 
regarding investment decisions
Seeking for stakeholders' acceptance
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Table 10: Dimensions and Manifestations of Expectation Effects (continued) 
 
Informal and unwritten norms could be observed in the case studies through firms 
repeatedly believing in and resorting to their historically proven recipes for success when 
confronted with change, such as conventional energy generation despite the growing 
importance of renewable energies, economies of scale despite the growing importance of 
decentralized energy generation, or efficiency improvements in certain businesses despite 
them no longer being very profitable. Other manifestations of informal and unwritten 
norms appeared as the focal firms argued to assume responsibility for the economy, for 
the climate, for the environment and for their customers, as well as in their continuation 
Dimension of 
Expectation Effects Example Source
NEW:  Illusion of 
invulnerability
  "This puts us in an excellent position to meet the new challenges of a 
changing European market environment. We are well on the way to 
realizing our vision of becoming the world's leading power and gas 
company."
Management Report 
2007, Beta
  "The European energy market continues to grow together. This is 
creating a top league of European utility companies to which Alpha 
belongs."
Management Report 
2008, Alpha
NEW:  Collective 
rationalization
  "The debate had actually been going on for some time. In any case, 
the energy industry developed more and more toward decentralized 
energy generation, but we and the other large utility companies failed 
to draw the appropriate conclusions out of these developments or 
undertake an actual turnaround."
Former CEO, Alpha
NEW:  Pressure on 
deviations from 
group consensus
  "The problem is that these analyses and scenarios are so 
complicated, even the calculation models alone, they include all the 
power plants in Europe and energy grids and so on and they include 
merit orders and so on and then they calculate stochastic failures of 
power plants with respect to sun and wind hours and increases in 
installed sun and wind power and the development of energy demand 
and so on and so forth. Those are all assumptions on which the 
scenarios are based, and so every single point is vulnerable, and 
good news that you tell them is something that everyone wants to 
hear, but no one wants to hear bad news. As a consequence, they say, 
‘But this assumption is not true and what about that and so on.’"
Division Head, 
Corporate M&A, Beta
  "The majority shareholder wanted to increase its influence in the 
company’s development and in this context, forced a repurchase of 
shares. Although there was resistance from the management, but 
finally, this repurchase of shares took place. (...) So there was a 
board of directors who was somewhat averse to repurchasing shares 
and he were replaced."
Senior Manager, 
Business Development, 
Gamma
NEW:  Self-
censorship of 
deviations from 
group consensus
  "Nobody dared to say that renewable energies would at some point 
push so massively into the market that they would completely destroy 
the wholesale prices for electricity."
Senior Manager, 
Business Development, 
Delta
Manifestation
Dismissing opposing opinions as being 
false or denouncing them as being 
dubious
Downgrading dissents
Being excessively optimistic (regarding 
the own situation)
Suppressing counterarguments
Feeling like being the competence 
leader and part of an elite
Discounting warnings and weak signals 
as being not relevant
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of once started processes, regardless of their future viability. Thus, one could observe 
firms completing previously started activities, for example the construction of power 
plants despite recognizing that they will never be profitable due to changes to key 
assumptions. 
Legitimacy seeking represents the fifth dimension of expectation effects. In practice, 
legitimacy seeking took place through focal firms actively influencing the political debate 
on conventional energy generation in order to improve the framework conditions for their 
power plants, established by political decisions. Moreover, one could observe top-level 
managers seeking internal acceptance with respect to their investment decisions. Finally, 
one could see the focal firms seeking stakeholders’ acceptance by involving them in their 
investments. For example, municipalities were involved in the construction of wind 
turbines, thereby gaining the opportunity to participate in profits in order to agree on their 
construction. 
The new dimensions of expectation effects could also be found in various manifestations. 
For instance, the focal firms’ illusion of invulnerability manifested itself as firms being 
excessively optimistic with respect to their current situation, even within radically 
changing and uncertain market conditions. Moreover, this illusion of invulnerability came 
to light as firms held a self-conception of being systematically relevant while arguing that 
energy supply would be impossible without them. It could also be seen in terms of firms 
holding the impression that they were the competence leaders and formed part of an elite, 
encouraging them to continue their once entered path of development. Collective efforts 
to rationalize appeared in cases of focal firms repeatedly overlooking warnings and weak 
signals, regarding them as irrelevant. Another aspect of groupthink and thus an additional 
FINDINGS 
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new dimension of expectation effects was the pressure applied to deviations from group 
consensus. In practice, this dimension could be found in focal firms dismissing opposing 
opinions as false or denouncing them as dubious, or even downgrading dissents. Finally, 
corporate actors’ self-censorship of deviations from the group consensus could be seen in 
terms of employees suppressing their counterarguments in order to avoid attracting 
attention, for example. 
 
6.2. REINFORCING DEVELOPMENT PATHS: NOT NECESSARILY 
In total, the six case studies unveiled more than 300 incidents of self-reinforcing effects 
that occurred in the various dimensions and manifestations outlined above. Table 11 
provides an overview of the self-reinforcing effects in their diverse dimensions and 
manifestations among the focal firms, and highlights their influence on the firms’ 
development paths. 
In each of the case studies presented, self-reinforcing effects could be observed that drove 
the focal firms to continue pursuing their once entered path of development, whether in 
the conventional energy business (266 incidents) or in the non-conventional energy 
business (40 incidents), i.e., the renewable energies or energy-related service business. In 
these ways, self-reinforcing effects impelled the firms to adhere to their development 
paths while narrowing the scope of appropriate alternatives available. This was 
particularly true for scale and coordination effects in all of their dimensions and 
manifestations. As a consequence, the potential for organizational adaptation was 
considerably diminished.  
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Table 11: Influence of Self-Reinforcing Effects on Development Paths  
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Table 11: Influence of Self-Reinforcing Effects on Development Paths (continued)  
Se
lf-
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
D
im
en
sio
n
M
an
ife
sta
tio
n
A
lp
ha
Be
ta
G
am
m
a
D
elt
a
Ep
sil
on
Ze
ta
St
ric
tly
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
ru
les
 an
d 
sta
nd
ar
di
ze
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s a
nd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s
Co
nv
. (
2)
Co
nv
. (
3)
–
Co
nv
. (
4)
–
–
Fo
llo
w
in
g 
str
ict
 an
d 
bi
nd
in
g 
in
ve
stm
en
t c
rit
er
ia 
an
d 
gu
id
eli
ne
s
Co
nv
. (
6)
Co
nv
. (
3)
Co
nv
. (
3)
Co
nv
. (
3)
–
–
Be
lie
vi
ng
 in
 o
nc
e e
sta
bl
ish
ed
 sc
en
ar
io
s f
or
 d
ec
isi
on
-m
ak
in
g
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
–
U
nd
er
sta
nd
in
g 
as
su
m
pt
io
ns
 as
 o
bj
ec
tiv
e k
no
w
led
ge
–
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
Es
tab
lis
hi
ng
 h
ier
ar
ch
ica
l s
tru
ctu
re
s a
nd
 cl
ea
r r
ol
es
 an
d 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s
–
Co
nv
. (
2)
–
–
–
–
A
ss
ig
ni
ng
 cl
ea
r d
ec
isi
on
-m
ak
in
g 
au
th
or
ity
 at
 th
e t
op
 le
ve
l
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
5)
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
Fu
lfi
lli
ng
 a 
so
cia
l m
iss
io
n 
or
 d
ut
y 
to
 se
cu
re
 en
er
gy
 su
pp
ly
–
Co
nv
. (
3)
–
–
–
–
Fu
lfi
lli
ng
 st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
‘ e
xp
ec
tat
io
ns
 (e
.g
. p
op
ul
ati
on
, s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
)
Co
nv
. (
1)
 &
 
ne
w
 p
at
h 
(1
)
–
–
–
–
N
on
-c
on
v.
 (1
)
A
sp
ira
tio
n 
fo
r s
oc
ial
 
be
lo
ng
in
g
A
sp
iri
ng
 fo
r s
oc
ial
 b
elo
ng
in
g 
to
 h
ist
or
ica
lly
 g
ro
w
n 
co
re
 b
us
in
es
s o
f 
co
nv
en
tio
na
l e
ne
rg
y 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
–
Co
nv
. (
2)
–
–
–
–
Fo
llo
w
in
g 
ot
he
r m
ar
ke
t p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts’
 m
ov
es
–
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
Co
nv
. (
2)
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
Fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
e i
nd
us
try
’s
 o
pi
ni
on
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
–
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
Be
lie
vi
ng
 in
 h
ist
or
ica
lly
 p
ro
ve
n 
‚re
cip
es
 fo
r s
uc
ce
ss
’ (
e.g
. 
co
nv
en
tio
na
l e
ne
rg
y 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n,
 ec
on
om
ies
 o
f s
ca
le,
 ef
fic
ien
cy
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts)
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
4)
Co
nv
. (
3)
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
Co
nv
. (
1)
A
ss
um
in
g 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r t
he
 ec
on
om
y,
 cl
im
ate
 an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
an
d 
fo
r c
us
to
m
er
s
Co
nv
. (
3)
Co
nv
. (
2)
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
Co
m
pl
eti
ng
 ac
tiv
iti
es
 th
at 
ha
ve
 o
nc
e b
eg
un
 (i
.e.
, c
on
str
uc
tio
n 
of
 
po
w
er
 p
lan
ts)
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
3)
–
–
–
–
A
cti
ve
ly
 in
flu
en
cin
g 
th
e p
ol
iti
ca
l d
eb
ate
 w
ith
 o
n 
co
nv
en
tio
na
l e
ne
rg
y 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
–
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
–
Se
ek
in
g 
fo
r i
nt
er
na
l a
cc
ep
tan
ce
 re
ga
rd
in
g 
in
ve
stm
en
t d
ec
isi
on
s
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
–
–
–
Se
ek
in
g 
fo
r s
tak
eh
ol
de
rs
' a
cc
ep
tan
ce
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
2)
Co
nv
. (
1)
 &
no
n-
co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
2)
–
N
on
-c
on
v.
 (2
)
Be
in
g 
ex
ce
ss
iv
ely
 o
pt
im
ist
ic 
(re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e o
w
n 
sit
ua
tio
n)
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
4)
–
–
–
–
Fe
eli
ng
 li
ke
 b
ein
g 
th
e c
om
pe
ten
ce
 le
ad
er
 an
d 
pa
rt 
of
 an
 el
ite
Co
nv
. (
2)
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
–
–
N
EW
:  
Co
lle
cti
ve
 
ra
tio
na
liz
ati
on
D
isc
ou
nt
in
g 
w
ar
ni
ng
s a
nd
 w
ea
k 
sig
na
ls 
as
 b
ein
g 
no
t r
ele
va
nt
Co
nv
. (
3)
Co
nv
. (
5)
Co
nv
. (
2)
Co
nv
. (
7)
–
–
D
ism
iss
in
g 
op
po
sin
g 
op
in
io
ns
 as
 b
ein
g 
fa
lse
 o
r d
en
ou
nc
in
g 
th
em
 as
 
be
in
g 
du
bi
ou
s
–
Co
nv
. (
3)
–
–
–
–
D
ow
ng
ra
di
ng
 d
iss
en
ts
–
–
Co
nv
. (
2)
–
–
–
N
EW
:  
Se
lf-
ce
ns
or
sh
ip
 
of
 d
ev
iat
io
ns
 fr
om
 
gr
ou
p 
co
ns
en
su
s
Su
pp
re
ss
in
g 
co
un
ter
ar
gu
m
en
ts
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
2)
Co
nv
. (
1)
Co
nv
. (
1)
–
–
Co
nv
. =
 R
ein
fo
rc
in
g 
th
e c
on
ve
nt
io
na
l p
ath
;  
N
on
-c
on
v.
 =
 R
ein
fo
rc
in
g 
th
e n
on
-c
on
ve
nt
io
na
l p
ath
 (e
.g
. r
en
ew
ab
le 
en
er
gi
es
, s
er
vi
ce
s)
;  
N
ew
 p
at
h
 =
 In
iti
ati
ng
 a 
ne
w
 p
ath
;  
(x
x)
 N
um
be
r o
f i
nc
id
en
ts
Co
or
di
na
tio
n 
ef
fe
cts
 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
Ex
pe
cta
tio
n 
ef
fe
cts
So
cia
l e
xp
ec
tat
io
ns
Be
in
g 
on
 th
e w
in
ni
ng
 
sid
e
In
fo
rm
al 
an
d 
un
w
rit
ten
 
no
rm
s
Le
gi
tim
ac
y 
se
ek
in
g
N
EW
:  
Ill
us
io
n 
of
 
in
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
N
EW
:  
Pr
es
su
re
 o
n 
de
vi
ati
on
s f
ro
m
 g
ro
up
 
co
ns
en
su
s
Fo
rm
ali
za
tio
n 
an
d 
sta
nd
ar
di
za
tio
n
Pl
an
ni
ng
, b
ud
ge
tin
g,
 
an
d 
go
al 
se
tti
ng
N
EW
:  
Fo
rm
al 
au
th
or
ity
FINDINGS 
 
 
151 
However, the cases also unveiled three exceptions to this limiting influence of self-
reinforcing effects on the firms’ potential for organizational adaptation. Indeed, one could 
observe certain effects that actually widened the scope of beneficial alternatives available 
to the firms, enabling them to enter new development paths as a result. Concretely, such 
widening effects were found in certain dimensions and manifestations of complementary, 
learning, and expectation effects. 
The firms’ search for growth opportunities in adjacent business areas (the first dimension 
of complementary effects) was found to have a widening effect on the scope of 
alternatives at Beta, Gamma, Delta, Epsilon, and Zeta. As a consequence, it stimulated 
all of the abovementioned focal firms – whether through force or through a chosen 
strategy – to enter the energy-related service business, in addition to their existing 
development paths.  
Whereas learning effects in all dimensions and manifestations were observed to narrow 
the scope of alternatives available to the focal firms, reinforcing their adherence to either 
conventional or non-conventional paths, at Gamma the exploitation of existing 
competencies was found to rather widen the scope of alternatives. Thus, the company 
applied the competencies it had built up in the conventional energy business to renewable 
energies, motivating it to establish an additional development path parallel to that which 
already existed. 
Similarly, expectation effects exclusively appeared to have limiting effects on the firms’ 
abilities to undertake organizational adaptation. Thus, in both their various existing and 
new dimensions (i.e., the symptoms of groupthink), such effects had a stabilizing effect 
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on the firms’ activity patterns, thereby reinforcing their adherence to existing 
development paths. However, at Alpha one could also observe a widening influence of 
social expectations (the first dimension of expectation effects) on the scope of alternatives 
available to the company, even in a state of path dependence. In particular, the presence 
of social expectations drove the company to undertake its initial investments in renewable 
energy generation, which would probably not have happened at this point in time without 
public pressure. Hence, social expectations motivated Alpha to establish another 
development path besides its already existing conventional path. 
Accordingly, even though self-reinforcing effects predominantly induced the focal firms 
to adhere to their once entered path and thereby continuously reduced the scope of 
alternative options, the abovementioned exceptions emphasized that this was not 
necessarily the case. Rather these exceptions indicated that the self-reinforcing 
mechanisms’ influence on the firms’ development paths might have also depended on the 
context in which the decisions were made. 
 
6.3. COMPANY DIFFERENCES 
This analysis of the focal firms’ development under the influence of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms has brought to light significant differences among the groups of companies 
and the companies themselves with respect to both the frequency and the intensity with 
which those stabilizing mechanisms occurred. Thus, differences in the appearance of self-
reinforcing effects led to variations in the firms’ adherence to their development paths, in 
particular with respect to the field of energy generation.   
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Figure 11: Comparison of Energy Generation Paths 
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Accordingly, Figure 11 highlights the focal firms’ development paths within the energy 
generation business. 
Group A. By far the largest number of self-reinforcing mechanisms that reinforced the 
conventional energy paths of companies could be found among the group A firms. As 
both firms in group A are multinational listed utilities with more comprehensive annual 
reports than their group B and C counterparts, this finding had been expected. However, 
the development of Alpha and Beta highlighted a significant influence of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms, particularly of scale, learning, coordination, and expectation effects. 
Especially in Phases I and II, one could observe economies of scale and scope and 
learning effects in terms of efficiency improvements in the firms’ conventional power 
plants as key drivers of their path-dependent development. In the later stages of 
development, coordination and expectation effects increasingly came into play, driving 
these firms’ development.  
Although both companies established a second path while investing in renewable energies 
from 2006 (Phase II), self-reinforcing mechanisms repeatedly initiated them to focus 
more on conventional energy as their major development path. Thus, they apparently 
continued pursuing their once entered path of conventional energy generation, even as 
more favorable alternatives (i.e., renewable energies) became available that would have 
provided stable income streams due to guaranteed feed-in remunerations. What is 
particularly interesting here is that scale effects in the dimensions of economies of scale 
and economies of scope also drove Alpha’s and Beta’s paths in the renewable energies 
business, even though as business experts often stressed that the potential for achieving 
economic synergies in this industry is very limited. Accordingly, these companies’ 
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tendencies to repeatedly replicate prior (successful) patterns of resource allocation 
became particularly obvious.  
Already at the end of Phase III but even more obviously at the end of the observation 
period, both focal firms Alpha and Beta faced significant profitability decreases with their 
prior investments in conventional energy generation while lacking the financial resources 
required to undertake the necessary strategic changes and correct prior failures. Although 
Alpha and Beta (as well as Gamma and Delta) entered the renewable energy path earlier 
than the group C firms Epsilon and Zeta, their renewable energy capacities were 
insufficient to compensate for the losses from their conventional power plants. Even 
worse, the respective focal firms were tied to their loss-making assets, as the German 
Federal Network Agency did not permit the shutdown of their coal and gas power plants, 
because they provide a systematically relevant back-up solution for the volatile 
production of renewable energies. Alpha and Beta were thus in a situation of strategic 
lock-in. 
Group B. Like Alpha and Beta, Gamma and Delta ended up in a situation of strategic 
lock-in. In the years following the market liberalization, both focal firms heavily invested 
in building up large-scale conventional energy generation capacities, to which they 
became tied when the market drastically changed. This was especially pertinent 
considering their major renewable energy investments – the construction of an offshore 
wind farm – which should have accounted for a large proportion of their renewable 
energies capacity, could not be completed even until the end of the observation period or 
was even stopped early. 
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In both cases, scale and learning effects drove the companies’ development, especially in 
the early phases, and hence shaped a path that both companies were unable to abandon. 
Indeed, Gamma and Delta repeatedly resorted to their historically proven recipes for 
success whenever they were confronted with change. As the German energy market 
became increasingly dynamic and uncertain, coordination and expectation effects became 
more and more apparent and further solidified these companies’ paths. Gamma and Delta 
either did not perceive the ongoing changes in the framework conditions for their 
conventional energy generation business, or dismissed them as irrelevant, even when it 
became increasingly obvious that conventional energy generation was heading down a 
dead-end road. 
What became particularly evident in the cases of Gamma and Delta, as well as Alpha and 
Beta, was that strategic options, for example the opportunity to enter the more future-
oriented energy-related service business, were repeatedly faded out until no or very few 
alternatives were available. 
Group C. By contrast, what really drove the development of Epsilon and Zeta, at least 
from the second half of Phase II, was that both companies continuously created new 
alternative options. Moreover, opportunities as well as existing businesses were 
constantly evaluated with respect to their future viability in an increasingly dynamic and 
uncertain market, and both Epsilon and Zeta were not afraid to refrain from existing and 
at the time profitable business areas. 
Thus, whereas the group A and group B firms still adhere to the same path of conventional 
energy generation today, the group C firms were able to abandon their conventional 
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energy generation paths in the early years of Phase III, and despite strong arguments 
supporting the continuation of this business segment. Thus, Epsilon and Zeta overcame 
self-reinforcing mechanisms and switched to the path of renewable energies, which soon 
became much more profitable and future-oriented. 
Epsilon’s and Zeta’s second change in strategic direction was even more remarkable. In 
the second half of Phase IV, both companies again perceived ongoing changes in the 
development of the German energy market, this time with respect to renewable energy 
generation. As a consequence, both companies switched their focus to the energy-related 
services business while terminating any further investments in the renewable energies 
business, which at that time was their core business. Thereby, both firms were again able 
to overcome self-reinforcing mechanisms that provided a strong motivation to adhere to 
their renewable energy paths. For example, both companies established the necessary 
structures, processes, and competencies that were required to be successful in this market 
segment. Thus, the development of Epsilon and Zeta emphasized their ability to overcome 
strong influencing factors and to undertake organizational adaptation, even within a state 
of path dependence. 
 
6.4. THE INFLUENCE OF LUCK 
Besides the abovementioned self-reinforcing mechanisms that influenced the focal firms’ 
development paths, the cases highlighted another influencing factor on the firms’ 
development that might be designated as luck. Indeed, luck could be observed in the 
development of Beta as well as Epsilon and Zeta. 
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In the case of Beta, the company had to reduce its German conventional energy generation 
capacities due to a decision of the European Competition Commission, as was already 
apparent in the early stages of Phase II (2006). In retrospect, this could have been a lucky 
coincidence for Beta, because at the time, market development in the conventional energy 
generation business had become more and more dynamic and uncertain, while on the 
other hand, renewable energies had increasingly become a reasonable investment 
alternative, particularly due to guaranteed feed-in remunerations for solar and wind 
power.  
Indeed, Beta took this opportunity to enter the renewable energies business, later 
accompanied by large-scale investments in on- and offshore wind farms. However, the 
company did not undertake strategic change. Renewable energies were always only 
considered as a supplement to conventional energy generation, as the company’s major 
focus remained on its traditional core business of conventional energy generation. Thus, 
despite this opportunity, Beta ended up in a financially tense situation due to its 
overemphasis on conventional energy generation. 
Conversely to Beta, which entered the renewable energies business but has not refrained 
from its conventional energy generation business, both Epsilon and Zeta used lucky 
coincidences to realign themselves and to embark on a new developmental direction. 
Driven by self-reinforcing mechanisms, Epsilon intended to further increase its 
conventional energy generation capacities and therefore planned to build a new coal 
power plant in 2005. However, as a consequence of the financial crisis, one of the 
mandated banks adapted its internal lending guidelines and withdrew from financing 
Epsilon’s power plant at the end of Phase II (2008). Although there were strong incentives 
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to continue this conventional energy generation project – including other less risk-averse 
banks if necessary – Epsilon decided to suspend the project before entering its second 
construction phase. Instead of further strengthening its conventional energy generation 
business, the company entered the renewable energies business. In 2010, Epsilon even 
divested its entire conventional energy generation capacities to focus exclusively on 
renewable energies. In retrospect, the withdrawal of this mandated bank was fortunate for 
Epsilon, as in the following phases, conventional power plants increasingly became a 
curse for their owners, while renewable energies became a blessing. Thus, through 
entering and further developing the path of renewable energies and breaking with the 
conventional path, Epsilon today finds itself in a superior situation compared to the group 
A and group B firms.  
Zeta’s situation was similar. In 2008, the company decided to enter the energy generation 
business in order to strengthen its core business. Thus, Zeta acquired corresponding 
properties on which a gas power plant was to be built. However, the construction of this 
gas power plant could not be realized “for other reasons,” according to the company’s 
CEO. Given that in the following years the profitability of conventional energy generation 
dramatically decreased, this proved a lucky escape for Zeta. Crucially, the company also 
made effective decisions. Indeed, it continued with its strategy to enter the energy 
generation business, but instead of entering the conventional energy generation path, it 
focused on renewable energies. Certainly, at the beginning of Phase III, Zeta undertook 
major investments in renewable energies to strengthen its footprint in this type of energy 
generation, which in turn confirmed its development path. 
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6.5. OVERCOMING SELF-REINFORCING EFFECTS 
Although the companies’ development paths were subject to self-reinforcing mechanisms 
in different dimensions, manifestations, and intensities, one could observe Alpha, 
Gamma, and particularly both group C firms Epsilon and Zeta being able to consciously 
overcome the stabilizing influences of self-reinforcing mechanisms. Epsilon and Zeta 
were even able to break their development paths twice while focusing on new, more 
future-oriented businesses. Table 12 highlights the particular actions taken by Alpha, 
Gamma, Epsilon and Zeta in order to overcome self-reinforcing effects.  
In the case of Alpha, one could observe the company overcoming learning, coordination, 
and expectation effects in three specific ways. First, instead of further improving the 
efficiency levels of its conventional power plants, as Alpha did over the years, the 
company decided in 2012 to shut down all coal power plants that no longer met the 
company’s efficiency standards. In this way, Alpha was able to overcome one dimension 
of learning effects, affording it a little more air to breathe in terms of financial resources.  
Second, whereas over the years the company was driven by a highly centralized process 
of decision making, in 2014 Alpha faced the necessity to reduce hierarchical thinking and 
develop critical faculties in order to become more flexible to market changes. Thus, Alpha 
successfully overcame a coordination effect in the new dimension of formal authority.  
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Table 12: Overcoming Self-Reinforcing Effects  
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Table 12: Overcoming Self-Reinforcing Effects (continued)  
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Third, in the same year, Alpha perceived the necessity to become more amenable to new 
ideas and impulses, even though they might challenge predominant ways of thinking, for 
example with respect to Alpha’s conventional energy generation business. Thus, instead 
of further exerting pressure on divergent opinions, it decided to listen to and discuss new 
ideas without ideologically initiated prohibitions. Thereby, Alpha was able to overcome 
one new dimension of expectation effects, i.e., one symptom of groupthink. 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that Alpha’s particular actions to overcome self-
reinforcing effects were driven more by a pressure to change than by a strategic purpose. 
Moreover, those actions only took place in Phase IV and thus it was actually too late for 
Alpha to free itself from a situation of strategic lock-in. 
Similarly, the case of Gamma highlighted a company being able to overcome scale 
effects. Over the years, Gamma’s energy generation strategy was mainly focused on gas 
power plants and offshore wind farms, which produce large quantities of energy and are 
hence much more profitable than single wind turbines. However, at the end of Phase IV 
(2014), the company shifted its focus toward flexibility and risk reduction at the expense 
of profitability, enabling it to overcome scale effects in the form of economies of scale. 
Instead of further striving to realize synergy potentials and cost degression through larger 
energy generation units, Gamma decided to diversify its energy generation portfolio in 
order to become more flexible and to reduce the risks arising from focusing on single 
energy generation sources. Nevertheless, as this shift in energy generation only occurred 
in 2014, it was also too late for Gamma to free itself from a situation of strategic lock-in. 
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Whereas in the abovementioned cases of Alpha and Gamma, the companies were able to 
overcome the stabilizing influences of self-reinforcing effects but continued to adhere to 
the same development paths, the cases of Epsilon and Zeta illustrated an ability not only 
to overcome self-reinforcing mechanisms but also to break existing development paths 
while entering new paths. Moreover, for Alpha and Gamma, overcoming self-reinforcing 
mechanisms could only be observed in Phase IV. Thus, it was mainly increased external 
pressure that stimulated Alpha and Gamma to change their existing patterns: they simply 
had to change. By contrast, at Epsilon and Zeta, one could observe actions to overcome 
self-reinforcing mechanisms throughout the entire period of observation, i.e., from Phase 
I to Phase IV.  
At Epsilon, one could observe the company undertaking actions to overcome 
complementary and coordination effects as well as expectation effects in different 
dimensions. First, as early as Phase I (2003) Epsilon began challenging existing 
investments instead of further expanding its business scope into adjacent and 
complementary business areas. With this particular action, Epsilon not only overcame 
complementary effects in terms of realizing growth opportunities in adjacent areas, but 
protected itself from building up interdependencies that would limit its flexibility in the 
future.  
Second, while one could observe coordination effects in the form of centralizing activities 
at all focal firms, in Phase I (2002) Epsilon decentralized activities in favor of flexibility 
and agility. Thus, the company sacrificed a certain amount of control and influence over 
the activities of its divisions, but the flexibility gained helped it to continually realign 
itself in later phases. Third, Epsilon was able to overcome the self-reinforcing 
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mechanisms of planning, budgeting, and goal setting, constituting another dimension of 
coordination effects. Instead of blindly believing in previously established scenarios for 
decision making, as could be observed particularly at Alpha and Gamma, Epsilon 
consciously challenged existing investment scenarios and took into account changing 
assumptions, with respect to potential investments in both conventional and renewable 
energies. Although Epsilon thus lost a certain degree of stability for planning and decision 
making, these actions helped the company to shift the focus of its entire energy generation 
strategy twice. Due to significant legal and political changes at the end of Phase III and 
hence constantly changing assumptions in its investment scenarios, Epsilon decided to 
adhere to its earlier decision to leave the conventional energy generation business. 
Similarly, in 2012 Epsilon opted to reduce its expansion speed in the renewable energies 
field of solar energy, for which it perceived ongoing changes in feed-in remunerations, 
which would result in a profitability decrease.  
Fourth, Epsilon was able to overcome aspects of groupthink, representing new 
dimensions of expectation effects. Epsilon perceived even weak signals that suggested 
ongoing changes in the market, and quickly acted on them. Whereas this dimension of 
expectation effects particularly influenced the development of the group A and group B 
firms, where one could observe the companies deeming warnings and weak signals as 
irrelevant and thus recommitting to past activity patterns, Epsilon (and Zeta) were able to 
constantly reconsider their decisions and activities in the face of perceived change. This 
became particularly obvious in 2010 (Phase III), when Epsilon undertook a strategic 
realignment toward renewable energies while turning away from conventional energy 
generation. In 2013/2014 (Phase IV), Epsilon’s capability to overcome this dimension of 
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expectation effects became even more evident, as the company perceived signals that the 
profitability of renewable energies might decrease and, as a result, decelerated the further 
expansion of its renewable energy capacities. 
Fifth and similar to Alpha, Epsilon was able to overcome another expectation effect that 
occurred as an additional new dimension of groupthink. Whereas other focal firms 
exerted pressure on deviations from group consensus through dismissing opposing 
opinions as false or dubious in order to avoid having to reconsider their behavioral 
patterns, Epsilon engaged its employees to report perceived market changes and 
threatening developments. With this particular action, Epsilon laid an important 
foundation for becoming open-minded to new ideas and impulses, and thus became more 
flexible and adaptable in later stages of its development. 
Similar to the development of Epsilon, one could observe Zeta undertaking particular 
actions to overcome learning, coordination, and expectation effects in various dimensions 
throughout Phases II to IV. First, Zeta was able to overcome one new dimension of 
learning effects, that is, the routinization of activities. Thus, instead of adhering to 
familiar and historically proven processes and activity patterns, which may have been 
deemed favorable for reasons of stability and efficiency, Zeta proactively and 
continuously challenged existing routines. Thus, Zeta not only became capable of 
challenging but also of adjusting its behavioral patterns. Consequently, it became able to 
change, even when confronted with stabilizing mechanisms in the form of the self-
reinforcing effects at play. 
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Second, Zeta was capable of overcoming formalization and standardization as one 
dimension of coordination effects. In contrast to the cases of Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and 
Delta – focal firms that followed strict and binding investment criteria and guidelines that 
excluded renewable energies and the energy-related service business from consideration 
due to insufficient expected returns – Zeta continuously challenged existing investment 
criteria in order to avoid excluding strategically relevant investments a priori. This 
became particularly obvious in 2011 (Phase IV), when Zeta entered a new path with the 
energy-related services business. 
Third, Zeta successfully overcame another dimension of coordination effects, that is, 
planning, budgeting, and goal setting, in two different manifestations. On the one hand, 
the company consciously challenged existing investment scenarios as the basis for 
investment decisions instead of blindly believing in previously established scenarios for 
decision making. This came into effect in 2012 (Phase IV), when Zeta did not exhaust its 
investment budget for solar power due to perceived ongoing changes in the framework 
conditions for this form of renewable energy. As a consequence, within its renewable 
energies business, Zeta reallocated resources from solar to wind power as a more 
profitable source of renewable energy generation. On the other hand, rather than 
understanding assumptions within its planning scenarios as objective knowledge, as could 
be observed in the cases of Beta and Delta, Zeta was fully aware that planning 
assumptions are the result of various subjective evaluations and are thus subject to 
change. Accordingly, the company accepted uncertainties and ambiguities within the 
decision-making process instead of defaulting to historic tendencies. Both actions enabled 
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Zeta to overcome the stabilizing influences of self-reinforcing effects and enter new 
developmental directions. 
Fourth, the particular actions taken by Zeta allowed the company to overcome a 
coordination effect in the new dimension of formal authority. Thus, the company 
recognized the need to reduce hierarchical thinking and develop critical faculties. In 
contrast to the development of Beta, for example, which even in 2011 further intensified 
hierarchical structures and assigned clear decision-making authority at the top level, Zeta 
decentralized its decision-making process in 2012 (Phase IV). In this way, it became more 
flexible to quickly capture emerging market opportunities. 
Finally, Zeta was able to overcome collective rationalization, a new dimension of 
expectation effects. Thus, Zeta was capable of perceiving weak signals in the 
development of the energy market and transforming them into concrete actions. 
Conversely to the group A and group B firms, which were all subject to such stabilizing 
forces and thereby discounted warnings and weak signals as irrelevant while continuously 
recommitting to past activity patterns, at Zeta one could observe the company 
continuously reconsidering its assumptions and proactively initiating adaptations. Zeta’s 
overcoming of these expectation effects became particularly obvious in three incidents, 
which had a strong influence on the company’s development. 
In 2010 (Phase III), Zeta undertook a large-scale investment program to accelerate the 
expansion of renewable energies, recognizing that the German energy market was 
significantly changing from centralized to decentralized energy generation. At the 
beginning of Phase IV, the company’s capability to overcome the stabilizing forces of 
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expectation effects became even more evident. Thus, in 2011 Zeta acknowledged that the 
energy market’s future development would be subject to considerable uncertainties that 
would render it difficult for the company to sustain long-term prosperity. Even in the field 
of renewable energies, Zeta noticed signals that the framework conditions for solar power 
were about to change. As a consequence, Zeta shifted its focus in renewable energy 
generation toward wind power in the first place. However, three years later, the company 
also recognized changing framework conditions in the area of wind power, encouraging 
it to completely shift its focus toward activities outside its core business, in particular 
toward the energy-related services business. As Zeta had already built up its own project 
planning capacities for wind power projects, it would have been seen as highly beneficial 
to stick to the strategy of further expanding its wind power capacities. However, Zeta 
resisted such short-term benefits, and consciously overcame the influence of self-
reinforcing effects. The company thus broke its renewable energy path while entering a 
new path in the energy-related services business. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
It doesn’t matter how beautiful your theory is, it 
doesn’t matter how smart you are. If it doesn’t agree 
with experiment, it’s wrong. 
Richard P. Feynman 
 
7.1. SELF-REINFORCING MECHANISMS: WHAT ARE THEY? 
The literature on organizational path dependence has identified five distinct self-
reinforcing mechanisms as the driving forces of organizational persistence through 
stabilizing and automatizing the collective activity patterns of the organization (Sydow et 
al. 2009). According to previous research, these self-reinforcing mechanisms are scale, 
complementary, learning, coordination, and expectation effects (Sydow et al. 2009; 
Apajalahti and Lovio 2012). The literature has argued that these effects unnoticeably gain 
control of the developmental process and thus shape companies’ development paths 
(Schreyoegg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Schreyoegg and Sydow 
2012). Therefore, self-reinforcing mechanisms impede organizational adaptation and 
stimulate companies to adhere to a once entered path of development. 
However, the findings presented in this dissertation suggest a reconsideration of some of 
the key theoretical assumptions of self-reinforcing mechanisms and hence the theory of 
organizational path dependence as proposed by Sydow et al. (2009). This is particularly 
true with respect to three perspectives: the underlying dynamics of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms; the limiting effect on the scope of alternatives; and finally and foremost, the 
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influence of managerial agency. Figure 12 highlights the critical assumptions that are 
challenged by the qualitative findings of this dissertation.  
 
 
Figure 12: Reconsidering Key Theoretical Assumptions 
 
The implications of the respective findings on the theory of path dependence and the 
concept of self-reinforcing mechanisms are discussed in the following sub-chapters.  
 
  
Understanding the underlying 
dynamics of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms, i.e., the dimensions of 
those stabilizing effects and their 
influence on firms’ development 
paths
Understanding self-reinforcing 
mechanisms to have a limiting but 
also to have a widening effect on 
the scope of alternatives, even 
within the state of path dependence
Understanding self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in a less deterministic 
manner while highlighting the 
influence of managerial agency
• Self-reinforcing effects were found to occur in 
various dimensions and manifestations 
• New dimensions of self-reinforcing effects were 
identified that had a significant influence on the 
firms’ development paths
• Self-reinforcing effects were identified that limit the 
scope of alternatives and thus, lead to organizational 
paths becoming rigidified 
• Self-reinforcing effects were identified that rather 
initiate path breaking through broadening the view
• It has been shown that self-reinforcing effects can 
be overcome, even without the occurrence of 
external influences or shocks
• Even in case self-reinforcing mechanisms were 
present, it has been demonstrated that managers still 
have an influence on the company development
• It has also been shown that even in a state of path 
dependence, managers were able to actively break 
an existing path of development while entering a 
new path
Key Theoretical Assumptions Case Study Findings Theoretical Reconsiderations
Five self-reinforcing mechanism 
were identified that establish 
organizational paths (Sydow et al. 
2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; 
Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; 
Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012)
Self-reinforcing mechanisms 
narrow the range of available 
options as strategic options are not 
noticed or excluded by purpose; 
thus, those effects leads to the 
formation and and stabilization of 
an organizational development path 
(Koch 2011; Sydow et al. 2009)
Self-reinforcing mechanisms 
increasingly and unnoticeably gain 
control while stabilizing and 
automatizing the collective activity 
patterns of the organization; 
thereby, they work behind the back 
of individual agents and can thus 
hardly be overcome (Schreyoegg 
and Sydow 2012; Sydow et al. 
2009)
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7.1.1. THE UNDERLYING DYNAMICS OF SELF-REINFORCING MECHANISMS 
According to previous literature in the field of organizational path dependence, five self-
reinforcing mechanisms can be distinguished that force organizations to adhere to a once 
entered path of development (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Apajalahti and 
Lovio 2012; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). However, 20 years after Sydow et al.'s (2009) 
seminal work on organizational path dependence and despite an accumulation of case 
studies on path dependence (Vergne 2013), a clear understanding of the self-reinforcing 
mechanisms underlying the constitution of organizational path dependence remains 
lacking (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Vergne and Durand 2010; Vergne 
2013). Consequently, unpacking these self-reinforcing mechanisms in practice (Sydow et 
al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011) is necessary in order to develop a clear conception of 
which components of these driving dynamics are at play in impeding organizational 
adaptation, keeping organizations on a once entered development path as a result (Vergne 
and Durand 2010).  
Hence, taking a deep dive into these mechanisms’ modes of action in order to establish 
an understanding of the underlying dynamics of self-reinforcing mechanisms has become 
a priority to advance research on organizational path dependence. To this end, the 
findings presented in this dissertation enhance understanding of the underlying dynamics 
of self-reinforcing mechanisms. Existing literature in the field has focused on self-
reinforcing mechanisms from a superordinate perspective while distinguishing between 
scale, complementary, learning, coordination, and expectation effects (Sydow et al. 2009; 
Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). 
Thereby, existing literature has already uncovered certain underlying dimensions of these 
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self-reinforcing effects as explained above. However, during the case analyses presented 
here, further dimensions of learning, coordination, and particularly of expectation effects 
emerged that increase understanding of how such mechanisms prevent organizational 
adaptation and keep firms on once entered development paths. Table 13 outlines both the 
existing and the new dimensions of self-reinforcing effects. 
 
 
Table 13: Existing versus New Dimensions of Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms 
 
Thus, besides efficiency improvements and a focus on exploiting existing business areas, 
learning effects also become visible as companies focus on continuously improving 
existing competencies instead of learning new ones. This first new dimension of learning 
effects additionally arises from an inherent tendency toward exploitative learning at the 
Self-reinforcing 
Mechanism Existing Dimensions New Dimensions
Scale effects • Economies of scale
• Economies of scope
–
Complementary effects • Growth opportunities in adjacent areas
• Shared resources
–
Learning effects • Efficiency improvements
• Exploiting existing business areas
• Improvement of existing competencies, i.e., strengthening existing 
competencies, or further developing existing competencies and 
technologies
• Routinization of activities, i.e. adhering to familiar and proven 
processes
Coordination effects • Centralization
• Formalization and stanardization
• Planning, budgeting, and goal setting
• Formal authority, i.e., establishing hierarchical structures and clear 
roles and responsibilities, or assigning clear decision-making 
authority at the top level
Expectation effects • Social expectations
• Aspiration for social belonging
• Being on the winning side
• Informal and unwritten norms
• Legitimacy seeking
• Illusion of invulnerability, i.e., being excessively optimistic 
(regarding the own situation), or feeding like being the competence 
leader and part of an elite
• Collective rationalization, i.e., discounting warnings and weak 
signals as being not relevant
• Pressure on deviations from group consensus, i.e., dismissing 
opposing opinions as being false or denouncing them as being 
dubious, or even downgrading dissents
• Self-censorship of deviations from group consensus, i.e., 
suppressing counterarguments
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expense of exploratory learning (March 1991; Levinthal and March 1993; Raisch and 
Birkinshaw 2008; Raisch et al. 2009). Accordingly, the emphasis on exploitation through 
the improvement of competencies in existing processes and procedures increasingly 
renders experimentation with new procedures less attractive (Levitt and March 1988; 
March 1991). A second dimension of learning effects that became evident during the case 
analyses is the routinization of activities. Thereby, adhering to existing routines in terms 
of familiar and historically proven processes represents another element deeply rooted in 
the exploitation tendencies of an organization (Baum et al. 2000; Raisch and Birkinshaw 
2008). 
With respect to coordination effects, the findings presented in this dissertation suggest 
the addition of a new dimension to the existing understanding of this self-reinforcing 
effect. Thus, besides centralization, formalization and standardization, and planning, 
budgeting and goal setting, researchers are advised to consider formal authority as a 
fourth underlying dimension of coordination effects that was found to play a critical role 
in adhering these organizations to their once entered path of development. This 
suggestion is in line with respective literature on coordination stating that formal authority 
represents one key formal mechanism of coordination that determines whether decision-
making authorities are located at higher or lower level hierarchical structures (Pugh et al. 
1968; Martinez and Jarillo 1989). 
Finally, the findings presented in this dissertation suggest complementing the underlying 
dimensions of expectation effects with the symptoms of groupthink (Janis 1972, 1971; 
Montanari and Moorhead 1986, 1989). According to the literature, groupthink in the 
context of decision making describes the presence of certain antecedent conditions that 
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increase the likelihood of people making poor-quality decisions due to the attitudes and 
the behaviors they develop by following a certain group (Janis 1971, 1972). The 
occurrence of groupthink can be identified via certain symptoms that in turn promote 
observable defects in decision-making processes and are likely to result in poor-quality 
decisions (Moorhead and Montanari 1986). Previous studies by Janis (1971, 1972) and 
Moorhead and Montanari (1986, 1989) have identified eight symptoms of groupthink, 
with the case studies presented here bringing to light four that limited the focal firms’ 
ability to undergo organizational adaptation, thereby keeping them on their once entered 
development paths. These four symptoms were: First, an illusion of invulnerability that 
created excessive optimism regarding a company’s own situation as well as a self-
conception of being competence leaders and part of an elite; second, collective efforts to 
rationalize that resulted in dismissing warnings and weak signals as irrelevant; third, 
direct pressure on deviations from group consensus, that is, dismissing opposing opinions 
as being false, denouncing them as being dubious, or even downgrading dissents; and 
fourth, self-censorship of deviations from group consensus that resulted in employees 
suppressing their doubts and counterarguments, which would possibly have led to path-
breaking behavior.  
The remaining four symptoms of groupthink could not be identified in the development 
of the six focal firms. These dimensions are: An unquestioned belief in the group’s 
inherent morality, which inclines members to ignore the ethical and moral consequences 
of decisions; stereotyped views of enemy leaders as too evil to warrant genuine attempts 
to negotiate, or as too weak or stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made to 
defeat their purposes; a shared illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming 
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to the majority view (partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations, augmented by 
the false assumption that silence means consent); and finally, the emergence of self-
appointed mindguards, that is, members who protect the group from adverse information 
that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and the morality of 
their decisions (Janis 1971, pp. 85–88; Montanari and Moorhead 1989, pp. 210–211).  
Nevertheless, not finding evidence for the presence of these remaining dimensions of 
groupthink does not necessary imply that they did not have an influence on the focal 
firms’ development. Rather, groupthink symptoms represent feelings, beliefs, or 
behaviors among group members, and thus the most appropriate way to measure the 
phenomenon is to ask the group members themselves (Esser 1998). Moreover, according 
to Park (1990), the phenomenon of groupthink can scarcely be assessed by an outside 
observer. Therefore, in order to identify the remaining four dimensions of groupthink, a 
different methodological approach would have to be applied, particularly including 
observations. Thus, it might constitute a promising avenue for future research to focus on 
the influence of expectation effects on firms’ development paths. 
In order to develop a profound understanding of self-reinforcing mechanisms’ modes of 
action and how they impede organizational adaptation, the findings presented in this 
dissertation clearly suggest a more detailed perspective on the underlying dimensions of 
scale, complementary, learning, coordination, and expectation effects, thereby 
broadening the perspective with respect to the various dimensions that shape such self-
reinforcing mechanisms. Accordingly, this dissertation suggests reconsidering the level 
of analysis.   
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7.1.2. WIDENING THE SCOPE OF ALTERNATIVES 
The literature argues that in the state of path dependence, self-reinforcing mechanisms 
have a stabilizing effect on the collective activity patterns of an organization while 
adhering it to a particular development path (Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and Durand 
2011). Thus, it has been argued that self-reinforcing mechanisms constantly narrow the 
range of available alternative options, as they are not perceived due to a focus on existing 
paths, or they are not taken into consideration, i.e., they are excluded on purpose (Sydow 
et al. 2009; Koch 2011). Consequently, such behavior results in a state of strategic lock-
in that is characterized by a drastically reduced range of available options (Koch 2011). 
On the one hand, the majority of self-reinforcing mechanisms could be identified to limit 
the scope of alternative options and thus render organizational paths more rigid. These 
qualitative findings are in line with previous literature on organizational path dependence 
(Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012) and provide substantial empirical 
evidence for the stabilizing effects of self-reinforcing mechanisms, while filling a 
research gap in the path dependence literature recently identified by Vergne (2013).  
However, on the other hand, the findings presented in this dissertation also indicate that 
self-reinforcing mechanisms do not necessarily limit the scope of alternatives available 
to firms, even where those included in this study were already found to be operating in a 
state of path dependence. Table 14 provides an overview of the respective 
complementary, learning, and expectation effects and their dimensions and 
manifestations that enabled the focal firms to access new paths.   
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Table 14: Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms Widening the Scope of Alternatives 
 
First, in contrast to previous literature, this dissertation has identified complementary 
effects in the dimension of organizations searching for growth opportunities in adjacent 
areas to have a positive effect on the focal firms’ ability to break collective activity 
patterns. Rather than narrowing the scope of alternatives, this dimension of 
complementary effects actually facilitated the focal firms’ search for adjacent areas and 
allowed them to enter new development paths. This widening effect on the scope of 
alternatives could be observed even in the group A (except for Alpha) and group B firms. 
In all cases in which this dimension and manifestation of complementary effects 
appeared, firms entering an additional path of energy-related services could be observed. 
As the case studies have demonstrated, the presence of this dimension of complementary 
effects provided a motivation for diversification (Pehrsson 2006). Thus, this specific type 
of complementary effect resulted in the expansion of the business scope into adjacent 
Limiting Effect Both Limiting and Widening Effect Widening Effect
Complementary 
effects
Growth 
opportunities in 
adjacent areas
Expanding the business into 
adjacent business areas
– – Beta, 
Gamma & Delta, 
and Epsilon & 
Zeta
Learning effects Exploiting existing 
business areas
Exploiting existing 
competencies by focusing on 
proven technologies of 
conventional energy 
generation
Alpha & Beta, 
and  Delta
Gamma –
Expectation 
effects
Social expectations Fulfilling stakeholders‘ 
expectations (e.g. population, 
shareholder)
– Alpha –
Effect on the Scope of Alternatives
ManifestationDimensionSelf-reinforcing Mechanism
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business areas (Stimpert and Duhaime 1997) through empowering the firms to identify 
and perceive new market opportunities. 
Second, the case study findings provide evidence for learning effects in the form of 
exploiting existing competencies to have a reinforcing effect on the focal firms’ existing 
development paths, as learning new competencies becomes increasingly unattractive 
(Baum et al. 2000; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). This effect could be observed at Alpha, 
Beta, Gamma and Delta. Nevertheless, at Gamma, the presence of this dimension of 
learning effects also initiated the company to enter a new development path. Gamma 
applied its existing competencies in conventional energy generation to the field of 
renewable energies. Accordingly, focusing on existing competencies in certain business 
areas not only encourages firms to further focus on the same business areas, but also to 
identify new business areas in which those competencies can be applied. 
Third, expectation effects in the form of social expectations were found to have a 
stabilizing influence on the focal firms’ activity patterns and thus reinforced their 
development paths. Therefore, the findings support previous literature arguing that social 
expectations constitute appropriate behavior (O’Reilly 1989), which as a consequence 
leads to increasingly stabilized activity patterns that become more and more difficult to 
reverse. One could particularly observe social expectations in terms of fulfilling 
stakeholders’ expectations to have a limiting effect on the scope of alternatives in the case 
of Alpha. This company thus justified its decision to accelerate its conventional energy 
generation capacities by its customers’ expectations of secured energy supply, which 
according to its understanding could only be guaranteed by the use of conventional power 
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plants. As a result, alternative options that might have been more advantageous in the 
long term were overlooked. 
However, social expectations also appeared to have a widening effect on the scope of 
alternatives and even in a state of path dependence, challenging the understanding of 
expectation effects put forward by previous literature on organizational path dependence 
(Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). In fact, the widening effect of this 
type of expectation effect could also be observed in the case of Alpha. Although the 
company still adhered to its path of conventional energy generation, the presence of 
certain market expectations also drove it to invest in renewable energy generation, and 
hence to establish another development path that it continues to follow today. In this 
context, the limiting character of self-reinforcing mechanisms in the form of expectation 
effects was reversed, while empowering the focal firm to seize new market opportunities 
in the field of renewable energies.  
Accordingly, the findings presented in this dissertation with respect to the widening effect 
of certain self-reinforcing mechanisms on the firms’ development suggest a 
reconsideration of the influencing factors at play. Self-reinforcing mechanisms do not 
necessarily reinforce development paths. Rather, they should be understood as either 
narrowing or widening the scope of alternatives available to a firm, even within a state of 
path dependence, but depending on the particular context in which they appear.  
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7.1.3. THE INFLUENCE OF MANAGERIAL AGENCY 
The findings of this dissertation, in particular with respect to the focal firms Alpha, Beta, 
Gamma, and Delta, strongly substantiate the classic theory of organizational path 
dependence established by Sydow et al. (2009). Thus, one could observe the 
abovementioned focal firms adhering to a path of development driven by the influence of 
self-reinforcing mechanisms (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). Thereby, 
self-reinforcing effects in the gestalt of scale, complementary, learning, coordination, and 
expectation effects led to an increase in profitability and operating efficiency in the first 
place (Levinthal and March 1993; Gilbert 2005; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012), and thus 
induced a replication of those successful activity patterns, which increasingly became 
stabilized and automatized (Sydow et al. 2009). As a consequence, the firms’ 
development paths became more and more rigid as the firms stuck to the same activity 
patterns. This phenomenon provides strong evidence for the argumentation of 
Schreyoegg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007, p. 916), arguing that such activity patterns “become 
fixed to the constellations in which they proved to be successful.” 
Taking coordination effects in the dimension of formalization and standardization as an 
example, one could observe Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta following strict and binding 
investment criteria and guidelines that excluded almost all potential investment areas 
from consideration, except conventional energy generation. Under the given 
circumstances at the time, profitability targets could simply not be met with investments 
in renewable energies, energy-related services, or even other potential investment areas 
beyond conventional energy generation. Setting this profitability threshold for every new 
investment rendered the focal firms highly efficient in terms of both decision making and 
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resource allocation. As a consequence, the focal firms invested in conventional energy 
generation, which represented a highly profitable business segment, even up to the point 
at which renewable energies increasingly gained importance.  
As the market began to change, these formerly successful investments increasingly 
suffered negative outcomes in terms of decreasing profitability and operating profits. 
However, the focal firms became less and less able to change their activity patterns, as 
the unintended dynamics of self-reinforcing mechanisms unconsciously controlled and 
stabilized their organizational processes (Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Schreyoegg and Sydow 
2012). That is, the decreasing profitability of conventional power plants did not stimulate 
the focal firms to reconsider their investment criteria, but rather to raise the profitability 
threshold for future investments, as their financial situations became more and more 
tense. Consequently, the companies’ persistence in adhering to the same activities 
narrowed the scope of alternatives available and led them into a state of strategic lock-in 
(Koch 2011). 
While referring to the abovementioned example, as renewable energies became an 
indispensable source of energy generation, again accelerated by political decisions at the 
end of Phase II, the profitability thresholds of the focal firms still disqualified investments 
in renewable energies. Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta did not recognize that the high 
profitability targets from past decades were simply no longer applicable, particularly not 
with investments in conventional power plants. The companies nevertheless relied on 
historically proven investment returns achieved via conventional energy generation that 
had met the profitability threshold, and as a consequence, further invested in conventional 
energy generation. Thereby, changing market requirements were not taken into 
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consideration, while their development paths became increasingly stabilized. As market 
change accelerated and conventional power plants were no longer profitable, the focal 
firms were tied to their loss-making assets while lacking the necessary financial resources 
to undergo change. 
Up to a certain point, this development also applied to the group C firms Epsilon and 
Zeta. However, the cases of both Epsilon and Zeta demonstrated that despite the presence 
of self-reinforcing effects that provided strong incentives to further pursue their once 
entered development paths, these focal firms were capable of overcoming these 
stabilizing forces in order to enter a new path of development. In particular, Epsilon was 
able to break its path of conventional energy generation while establishing an alternative 
path by focusing on renewable energies in Phase III. In Phase IV, both Epsilon and Zeta 
actually succeeded in consciously overcoming self-reinforcing effects and terminated any 
further investments in renewable energies while focusing on becoming a service firm. 
Although Epsilon and Zeta did not completely abandon their existing renewable energy 
generation capacities at that point in time, such as through divestitures, their behavior 
could still be described as path-breaking. Both firms again entered a new path of energy-
related services that continues to accelerate even today.  
According to literature, without the occurrence of exogenous shocks or at least a “second-
order observation,” organizational paths cannot deliberately be escaped as the idea of 
path breaking contradicts the definition of path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009, p. 702). 
Thus, in the process of path dependence, it is assumed that actors continuously lose 
influence over the development of the firm, while self-reinforcing mechanisms 
increasingly assume control (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). In fact, 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
184 
in this sense it would be contradictory to assume that the same actors reflect on hidden 
dynamics and change their course of action (Sydow et al. 2009). 
However, besides the cases of Epsilon and Zeta, which have demonstrated path-breaking 
behavior, even in the development of Alpha and Gamma, one could observe the two focal 
firms being able to overcome scale, learning, coordination, and expectation effects at 
some points in time. Although Alpha and Gamma were not able to break their paths of 
conventional energy generation, the findings have nevertheless highlighted their 
capacities to consciously overcome self-reinforcing mechanisms, even without the 
occurrence of external influential factors, i.e., external shocks or disturbances. 
Thus, the findings of this dissertation strongly challenge the idea of “self-reinforcing” 
mechanisms being irreversible by corporate actors and leading to organizations’ 
increasingly stabilized activity patterns (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 
2012), culminating in a state of strategic lock-in (Koch 2011). Hence, the question arises 
of what actually are these influential factors? On the basis of the insights generated by 
the case studies and particularly those of Epsilon and Zeta, the findings suggest a 
reconceptualization of scale, complementary, learning, coordination, and expectation 
effects. So-called self-reinforcing mechanisms should rather be understood as temporal 
influences on firms’ strategic initiatives that appear to have either a widening or a limiting 
effect on the scope of alternatives available to an organization, depending on the 
contextual situation. 
Thereby, the findings not only encourage a reconceptualization of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms, but rather challenge a basic assumption of the concept of organizational 
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path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). If there is no “self-
reinforcement” of the driving forces of path dependence – understood as an 
organizational development in which the range of available alternatives continuously 
decreases (Sydow et al. 2009; Koch 2011; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012) – then the concept 
of path dependence in fact loses its deterministic character (David 1985; Arthur 1990, 
1989). Whereas the path dependence literature argues that self-reinforcing dynamics 
work behind the backs of individual agents (Giddens 1984; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012) 
and increasingly and unnoticeably assume control of firms’ developmental processes, the 
findings of this dissertation rather highlight the influence of managerial agency, even in 
a state in which such mechanisms are already at play. Although self-reinforcing 
mechanisms provide strong incentives to adhere to a certain path of development, 
managers seem to remain in the driver’s seat. 
By emphasizing the path-breaking potential of firms even without the occurrence of 
external disturbances, the case study findings shed light on the “problematic coexistence 
of path irreversibility and managerial intentionality” (Vergne and Durand 2011, p. 365). 
Self-reinforcing mechanisms do not automatically lead to fixed activity patterns and 
prevent organizational adaptation. As the case studies of Epsilon and Zeta have 
demonstrated, firms are still highly capable of overcoming those influencing factors that 
encourage adherence to established activity patterns and, as a result, are able to deviate 
from specific developmental paths.  
In line with the philosophical perception of human nature applied in this dissertation –
i.e., humans’ ability to alter their behavior even within restrictive contextual situations 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998) – this dissertation suggests an understanding of the concept 
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of path dependence in a less deterministic manner (Sydow et al. 2009). Despite the 
presence of stabilizing influencing factors, there remains scope for variation. This 
dissertation thus follows the argumentation of Garud and Karnøe (2001) and Djelic and 
Quack (2007) that agency matters in the concept of path dependence. That is,  
entrepreneurs may intentionally deviate from existing artefacts and relevant 
structures, fully aware they may create inefficiencies in the present, but also aware 
that such steps are required to create new futures (Garud and Karnøe 2001, p. 6). 
 
7.2. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In today’s rapidly changing business environments, which are shaped by dynamism and 
uncertainty, one can frequently observe formerly successful companies failing to cope 
with and adapt to such changing circumstances. Voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously 
or unconsciously, these firms seem to follow a once entered path of development, which 
ultimately leads them down a dead-end road.  
It has been argued that firms’ endeavors to adapt often fail due to their inherent tendency 
to persist within processes of strategic change (Fainshmidt and Frazier 2017). Thereby, 
the literature has stressed that firms’ development is subject to “self-reinforcing” 
mechanisms, which lead to automatized and stabilized activity patterns and thus inhibit 
organizational adaptation (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012).  
However, even after 20 years of research on organizational path dependence, a clear 
understanding of the modes of action of those drivers of persistence is still missing 
(Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Vergne and Durand 2010; Vergne 2013). In 
particular, previous literature has failed to provide empirical findings that explain how 
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self-reinforcing mechanisms develop and unfold within organizations, and how exactly 
they impede or prevent organizational adaptation (Vergne and Durand 2010; Vergne 
2013).  
While unpacking self-reinforcing mechanisms in practice (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg 
et al. 2011) and detecting the underlying components of the driving dynamics that keep 
organizations on a development path, this dissertation not only contributes to research on 
organizational path dependence, but also suggests a reconsideration of three elements of 
the concept of path dependence in general, and self-reinforcing mechanisms in particular: 
The level of analysis; the limiting effect on the scope of alternatives; and the influence of 
managerial agency.  
First, previous literature has identified five distinct “self-reinforcing” mechanisms that 
establish organizational paths – scale, complementary, learning, coordination and 
expectation effects (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Apajalahti and Lovio 
2012; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012) – but these mostly remain at a superordinate level of 
analysis. However, to gain a profound understanding of how these effects impede 
organizational adaptation, a more detailed perspective regarding the underlying dynamics 
of self-reinforcing effects becomes necessary. Thus, this dissertation not only gets to the 
bottom of the dimensions of self-reinforcing effects that have only been briefly discussed 
in previous research (Sydow et al. 2009; Apajalahti and Lovio 2012; Schreyoegg and 
Sydow 2012), but also adds and discusses seven new dimensions of learning, 
coordination, and expectation effects. Thereby, this research advances understanding of 
self-reinforcing effects by providing in-depth explanations for their stabilizing effects.  
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Second, according to previous literature on path dependence, self-reinforcing effects 
initiate increasingly stabilized and automatized activity patterns that impel firms to adhere 
to their previously entered development paths (Sydow et al. 2009; Vergne and Durand 
2011). Thus, it is argued that in the state of path dependence, scale, complementary, 
learning, coordination and expectation effects continuously narrow the range of 
alternatives available to firms, eventually leading them into a state of strategic lock-in 
(Sydow et al. 2009; Koch 2011).  
Without restrictions, this dissertation empirically substantiates these theoretical 
assumptions with respect to the influence of scale and coordination effects. However, 
regarding complementary, learning and expectation effects, this dissertation disconfirms 
the notion of self-reinforcing effects exclusively having a limiting effect on the scope of 
alternatives. Even in a state of path dependence, complementary, learning and expectation 
effects have been found to also have a widening effect on the range of alternatives in 
certain dimensions and contextual settings. Thus, this dissertation contributes to an 
understanding of self-reinforcing mechanisms in two respects. On the one hand, the 
findings provide insights into how these effects influence organizational adaptation. On 
the other hand, this dissertation mitigates the deterministic character of self-reinforcing 
effects while demonstrating that they may also support firms in entering new development 
paths. 
Third, whereas the existing literature suggests that in the state of path dependence, self-
reinforcing mechanisms increasingly gain control and thus stabilize and automatize 
firms’ activity patterns (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012), the empirical 
findings of this dissertation emphasize that the influence of scale, complementary, 
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learning, coordination and expectation effects in its different dimensions does not 
necessarily intensify over time. Hence, this dissertation challenges the notion of “self-
reinforcement” and suggests a reconsideration of these dynamics as being temporal 
influencing factors on firms’ decisions. 
This absence of self-reinforcement consequently questions the deterministic character of 
the understanding of organizational path dependence (David 1985; Arthur 1989, 1990; 
Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012). Indeed, whereas self-reinforcing 
mechanisms are conceptualized as working behind individual agents (Giddens 1984; 
Schreyoegg and Sydow 2012), increasingly and unnoticeably assuming control of firms’ 
developmental processes, the findings presented here instead emphasize the influence of 
managerial agency (Garud and Karnøe 2001; Djelic and Quack 2007), even in a state of 
path dependence (Vergne and Durand 2011). It has been empirically shown that 
companies are quite capable of overcoming these influencing factors and subsequently 
breaking existing paths. 
Accordingly, this dissertation not only provides evidence for the existence of the 
stabilizing forces denoted as “self-reinforcing” effects, but also furthers understanding 
of how these effects can be overcome. Thus, through investigating these mechanisms’ 
modes of action, this dissertation goes beyond the mostly conceptual or meta-level 
research conducted to date (Vergne and Durand 2011; Vergne 2013). While providing 
empirical substantiation for a reconceptualization of the prevailing understanding of 
organizational path dependence and its driving dynamics, this dissertation follows the call 
of Vergne and Durand (2011) for further empirical observations of the path dependence 
phenomenon. Indeed, as Vergne (2013, p. 1194) has stated, “organization and 
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management scholars [so far] have done a poor job at exploring path dependence 
empirically.” 
The fact that some firms were able to overcome the stabilizing effects of scale, 
complementary, learning, coordination, and finally expectation effects indicates that the 
intensity of these mechanisms may vary across firms. Indeed, the argumentation of Den 
Hartigh and Langerak (2002), stressing that in practice, self-reinforcing effects may occur 
in combination and overlap, in turn potentially amplifying their effects as a driving force 
of organizational persistence, seems to be more appropriate than ever. The fact that the 
number of self-reinforcing effects that could be identified at Alpha, Beta, Gamma and 
Delta was significantly higher than the number of self-reinforcing effects identified at 
Epsilon and Zeta reinforces this proposition. 
Moreover, this phenomenon might further indicate that these firms possess highly 
effective functions that allow them to perceive environmental changes and undertake the 
necessary alterations earlier than their competitors. That is what the literature refers to as 
dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Zollo and Winter 
2002). Thereby, dynamic capabilities are conceptualized as an aggregate multi-
dimensional construct that can be disaggregated into three distinct but related capacities 
(Teece 2018, 2007), none of which alone represents a dynamic capability (Barreto 2010). 
That is, “strong dynamic capabilities will generally mean strong in all relevant areas of 
sensing, seizing, and transforming” (Teece 2018, p. 43). Being weak at one specific 
capacity – potentially due to the impact of those temporal influencing factors denoted as 
“self-reinforcing” effects – precludes the company from taking the necessary steps 
toward organizational adaptation (Teece 2018). Thus, effective dynamic capabilities are 
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based on the interplay of three distinct capacities – sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring 
(Teece 2007; Teece and Leih 2016) – for which indications appeared in the cases of 
Epsilon and Zeta.  
Both Epsilon and Zeta were able to perceive changes in market development, such as 
increasing uncertainties in the renewable energy sectors and the growing relevance of 
energy-related services, which might indicate the presence of a highly effective sensing 
capacity (Teece 2007). Both firms made timely and market-oriented decisions regarding 
the execution of market opportunities and threats – such as by choosing to terminate 
further investments in renewable energies – providing a strong indication of their seizing 
capacity (Teece 2007; Barreto 2010). Finally, Epsilon and Zeta successfully reallocated 
resources and capabilities to more future-oriented businesses and technologies in order to 
cope with market change, exemplifying their reconfiguring capacity (Teece 2007). 
Thus, shedding further light on the influence of these micro-foundations of dynamic 
capabilities and particularly on their power to overcome the stabilizing dynamics of scale, 
complementary, learning, coordination and expectation effects may constitute a 
promising area for future research. In fact, both research streams – organizational path 
dependence and dynamic capabilities – may strongly benefit from combining these two 
perspectives on organizational persistence and organizational adaptation. This is 
particularly the case because the dynamic capability perspective places considerable 
importance on the influence of managerial agency in facilitating organization adaptation 
(Teece et al. 1997), which is also advocated with respect to future research on 
organizational path dependence. 
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7.3. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
More than ever, managers are compelled to make decisions under uncertainty and 
ambiguity. They face rapidly changing business environments in almost every industry, 
driven by frequent market disruption and competitive pressure from new market entrants, 
or what the literature defines as hypercompetition (D’Aveni 1995; Teece and Leih 2016). 
In particular, they must cope with changing consumer behaviors, technological changes 
that occur at increasingly shorter intervals, and shifting legal and political requirements 
that alter the business cases for their investments (Barreto 2010). In such environmental 
settings, continuous organizational adaptation is vital for long-term survival and success. 
However, as the examples of Nokia and Apple offered in the introduction of this 
dissertation as well as the cases studies of Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Delta have all 
demonstrated, firms often tend to replicate formerly successful activity patterns and 
thereby adhere to a certain development path, a phenomenon that the literature describes 
as path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg et al. 2011; Schreyoegg and Sydow 
2012). Thus, organizational adaptation becomes more and more difficult to implement. 
To avoid such a development and to ensure that a firm remains amenable to adaptation, 
this dissertation particularly offers two critical implications for managers. First, this study 
has uncovered and analyzed the temporal influencing factors that impede organizational 
adaptation and keep firms on a once entered path. Indeed, this dissertation has visualized 
how these effects unfold their stabilizing character within different contextual settings. 
Previous research has only superficially dealt with these influencing factors and failed to 
discuss the underlying dynamics of their effects, that is, their dimensions and 
manifestations, hence managers’ understandings of the notion of path dependence and the 
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drivers of this phenomenon have remained rather vague and elusive. The insights 
presented in this dissertation therefore provide concrete practical guidance for managers 
to increase their awareness of such stabilizing forces that narrow the range of alternative 
options within strategic decision making. 
Thus, it can be observed for example that formalization and standardization (as one 
dimension of coordination effects) lead to efficiency gains by setting clear investment 
guidelines, and thereby only take into consideration investment opportunities that meet 
these criteria. On the other hand, this also means that opportunities beyond this spectrum, 
which might promise greater future potential and are strategically more important in the 
long term, are not taken into account. Consequently, future-oriented investments are 
continuously excluded, resulting in a lack of suitable alternatives in times of market 
change. At the same time, these old investments along the once entered path lead to 
problems that might be hard to reverse, especially with the resources available to the firm.  
Accordingly, one key take-away from this research is that firms tend toward familiar 
businesses and technologies for which results are typically more stable, more certain and 
closer in time, than exploring new businesses and technologies. Thus, firms are often 
oriented toward efficiency while losing sight of effectiveness. This inherent proclivity is 
exacerbated by the influence of stabilizing forces that the literature defines as “self-
reinforcing” mechanisms. Indeed, to be successful in the long term, managers must be 
aware of these influencing factors and be capable of overcoming them in order to balance 
both efficiency and effectiveness. 
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Second, this dissertation strongly suggests that even in a highly deterministic theory of 
path dependence, corporate managers matter. It has been argued that within a state of path 
dependence, stabilizing forces increasingly and unnoticeably assume control of firms’ 
activity patterns. For managers, these forces are difficult to reverse, even when they are 
recognized.  
However, in contrast to the prevailing theory of path dependence, the findings presented 
in this dissertation emphasize the influence of managers on the development path of 
companies. The case studies of Epsilon and Zeta in particular provide managers with 
concrete insights into how these stabilizing forces can be overcome and thus how 
continuous organizational adaptation can be achieved. One key point to be learned from 
Epsilon and Zeta is that the managers of these firms have constantly questioned previous 
decisions behind changing circumstances and have established the appropriate structures 
and processes to perceive environmental changes. Moreover, these two success stories 
illustrate that the two focal firms have continuously created new alternative options and 
have not been afraid to seize them, even if this meant abandoning their core business. 
Figure 13 summarizes the most important success factors that have enabled the focal 
firms – in particular Epsilon and Zeta – to overcome these stabilizing forces. This list 
should be seen as a blueprint for managers, enabling organizational adaptation in order to 
cope with change. As these success factors have been extracted from the success stories 
of a single industry, their generalizability is inevitably limited. Nevertheless, the 
suggestions outlined above might still be substantive for managers in other industries, at 
least in certain ways.  
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Figure 13: Ten Key Success Factors for Organizational Adaptation 
 
7.4. LIMITATIONS 
Inevitably and despite its rich contributions to both literature and managerial practice, 
this dissertation has three limitations, related to the research design and the 
methodological approach chosen. 
The first concern deals with a widespread critique and even a stereotyped view of many 
researchers stressing that case study research tends to lack the necessary rigor (Yin 2009), 
particularly with respect to validity (i.e., external validity, internal validity, and construct 
validity) and reliability (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008). Thus, to ensure a rigorous case study 
approach, this dissertation applied a variety of measures (Eisenhardt 1991; Gibbert and 
Managers should …
1. Not only focus on achieving synergy potential with their investment decisions, but rather consider 
diversification concerns to prevent concentration risks. 
2. Challenge previous investment decisions with respect to their future potentials.
3. Constantly search for new businesses and technologies (in adjacent areas), in which existing 
competencies can be applied.
4. Proactively challenge existing routines to avoid doing things, because they have been done in the past.
5. Consciously balance centralization versus decentralization, i.e., efficiency versus flexibility.
6. Scrutinize existing investment scenarios and its underlying assumptions, particularly behind the 
backdrop of changing environmental conditions.
7. Not consider assumptions as generally valid, but as being subjective measures. 
8. Question existing investment criteria to avoid excluding future-oriented investment opportunities, 
because the do not meet those fixed criteria.
9. Pay attention to weak signals that might indicate changing environmental conditions, even thought 
they are only hardly qualitatively measurable.
10. Listen to new ideas and impulses without ideologically initiated prohibitions and encourage 
employees to report those.
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Ruigrok 2008). External validity means generalization, and given its very nature, case 
study research provides little basis for this (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008; Yin 2009). 
However, this does not necessarily imply that case study research is entirely devoid of 
generalization (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008). Thus, while case studies lack statistical 
generalization, i.e., they are not representative of a population (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007), they may allow for analytical generalization, that is, generalization from empirical 
observations to theory (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008; Yin 2009). Therefore, certain 
measures should be applied.  
To ensure analytical generalization (external validity), this dissertation has followed the 
argumentation of Eisenhardt (1989) and Gibbert and Ruigrok (2008) suggesting a cross-
case analysis of four to ten case studies as well as a clear rationale for case selection. In 
this dissertation, the case selection aimed to create a setting of focal firms that would 
enable considerable cross-case comparison. In particular, the focal firms in this research 
could be divided into three groups that are internally homogeneous and externally 
heterogeneous with respect to their initial resource equipment and development path. 
Thereby, the cases were sampled for theoretical reasons, that is, contrary replication of 
findings as well as theory advancement based on the emergent findings. Thus, the 
theoretical implications suggested in this dissertation can be regarded as analytically 
generalizable (Eisenhardt 1989; Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008).  
While a multiple-case study “typically yields more robust, generalizable, and testable 
theory than single-case research” according to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 27), 
the method has nevertheless been criticized for being too superficial and thereby missing 
the context of cases (Dyer and Wilkins 1991, p. 617). Additionally, opponents of this 
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approach frequently argue that multiple-case researchers tend to confirm versus 
disconfirm already existing theories while not letting analysis emerge over time (Dyer 
and Wilkins 1991, p. 617). To counter these arguments, this dissertation has provided a 
rich description of the context in which the focal firms’ resource allocation and 
investment decisions took place. Moreover, this dissertation has clearly outlined how new 
dimensions of the theory of organizational path dependence emerged during case 
analysis. 
To enhance internal validity, i.e., to provide plausible arguments and logical reasoning, 
this dissertation followed the suggestions of Eisenhardt (1989), Gibbert and Ruigrok 
(2008) and Yin (2009), that is, formulating and following a clear research framework, 
comparing empirically observed patterns among different contextual settings, and 
adopting multiple perspectives to verify findings.  
To ensure construct validity in the process of data collection, this dissertation resorted to 
different data collection strategies and data sources (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Gibbert 
and Ruigrok 2008; Yin 2009). In particular, the dissertation drew on archival data in the 
form of business and trade press articles and annual reports, and primary data gathered 
through interviews, in-depth discussions, and workshops with firm representatives with 
different hierarchical and functional backgrounds.  
Finally, to ensure transparency and replication, or what the literature describes as 
reliability (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008), this dissertation has 
provided a complete description of how the research was conducted, enabling replication 
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by future investigators, as all data collected were documented and organized within a case 
study database using the software NVivo 12 (Leonard-Barton 1990; Yin 2009). 
A second limitation is related to the number of interviewees. Whereas the total time of 
interaction with the focal firms’ representatives was high, one may still argue that the 
number of interviewees at each of the six focal firms was low. This may be a valid 
limitation in the context of a single in-depth case study. However, given that the 
methodology applied in this dissertation was a multiple-case approach, in which greater 
emphasis was placed on comparing replicated patterns among the focal firms than on an 
in-depth description of a single firm’s actions (Eisenhardt 1989), the quantity of 
respondents was less important than the respondents’ overview of the historic activity 
patterns of resource allocation in order to generate insightful findings.  
Moreover, various types and sources of data were used to overcome the limitations of a 
relatively low number of interviewees and, as mentioned above, to ensure construct 
validity (Jick 1979; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Gibbert and Ruigrok 2008; Yin 2009). 
Thus, firm-specific interviews and workshops with the C-level executives and middle 
managers of the focal firms were enriched by interviews with the C-level executives of 
other German utility companies, senior-level industry experts, and more than 2,500 pages 
of archival data containing business and trade press articles, annual reports, and internal 
documents such as decision proposals and memos. 
A final limitation is related to the longitudinal research design, and in particular to the 
process of data collection. Given that the interviews and in-depth discussions were long-
term retrospective, the methodology applied might be subject to potential critique with 
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respect to memory loss and retrospective rationalization (Danneels 2010). In order to 
mitigate the potential for retrospective response bias, this dissertation followed the 
recommended precautions of Huber and Power (1985). Thus, concerning the process of 
data collection, information from interviews was compared to that from other interviews, 
workshop notes, and contemporaneous secondary data to ensure data validity (Jick 1979). 
That is what the literature defines as triangulation (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007; Yin 2009). However, despite these potential weaknesses in terms of 
memory loss and retrospective bias, one could also argue that the time that had elapsed 
since the specific activities of the focal firms occurred, enabled the interviewees to be 
more open and transparent (Danneels 2010). Such behavior could be observed in various 
answers. For example, one former Manager, Internal Consulting of Beta admitted that 
“we have procrastinated on the issue of the nuclear phase-out and have not really taken 
it seriously.” Moreover, he confessed: 
All our previous strategies over the last five years were actually wrong. And this is 
not only my personal opinion, but that of the strategy head of Beta. He told me that 
actually none of what we thought was right. 
Indeed, the openness and the transparency of the interviewees more than compensated for 
the room for critique with respect to the respondents’ memory loss and retrospective bias.  
In conclusion, the author is confident that despite this dissertation’s limitations, but 
mainly because of the mitigation strategies applied, the findings presented are of genuine 
theoretical and practical value. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Change before you have to. 
Jack Welch 
 
This dissertation has shed light on the role of self-reinforcing mechanisms, that is, the 
drivers behind organizational path dependence (Sydow et al. 2009; Schreyoegg and 
Sydow 2012), in impeding organizational adaptation. In order to unpack the self-
reinforcing mechanisms in practice and to crystalize the components of these driving 
dynamics that keep organizations on a development path, a multiple-case study approach 
has been applied to investigate the particular development of six German utility 
companies in the time period between the liberalization of the German energy market in 
1999, and 2015. Therefore, this research has followed strong calls from existing literature 
claiming that a clear understanding of the underlying driving forces of path dependence 
remains absent (Vergne and Durand 2010; Vergne 2013), and that the theory would 
greatly benefit from empirical substantiation (Vergne 2013), particularly through the use 
of multiple-case studies (Schreyoegg et al. 2011). 
Twenty years since Sydow et al.'s (2009) seminal work, research on organizational path 
dependence has not progressed much further and many researchers are still somewhat 
skeptical of the theory (Vergne and Durand 2010; Vergne 2013). This is largely because 
the role of the manager has to date hardly been taken into account, whereas other theories 
– such as the dynamic capabilities perspective (Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000; Helfat and Peteraf 2015), which emphasizes the importance of managerial agency 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
201 
and its influence on corporate development – have received much more attention. In 
response, the findings presented in this dissertation help to bring the theory of path 
dependency back into scientific focus. On the one hand, the findings clearly show how 
companies stick to development paths, as well as the particular role played by “self-
reinforcing” effects in this path-dependent behavior. On the other hand, this dissertation 
has made important contributions to a renewed understanding of the theory of 
organizational path dependence and its driving forces.  
In particular, this dissertation has left the superordinate level through identifying and 
explaining the underlying dynamics of such stabilizing effects in order to increase 
understanding of how these mechanisms work. Thus, this dissertation has found that such 
stabilizing effects may also have a facilitating influence on organizational adaptation in 
certain contextual settings. Finally, this dissertation has highlighted the possibilities of 
corporate managers overcoming the stabilizing influences of “self-reinforcing” effects, 
even in a state of path dependence. In these ways, this dissertation has emphasized that 
path breaking is more than just a theoretical idea. 
To become a grand theory, path dependence scholars are encouraged to focus on both 
theory-building and theory-testing studies (Eisenhardt 1989). To this end, this dissertation 
strongly suggests that future research on organizational path dependence additionally 
focus on quantitative reasoning, which to date has received very little attention (Vergne 
and Durand 2011; Vergne 2013). By crystallizing the underlying dynamics of these 
stabilizing forces and thus furthering their operationalization, the present dissertation 
provides an empirically tested framework for quantitative verification. Again, this would 
be an important step to further advance theory and increase its robustness and 
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defensibility (Miles and Huberman 1994; Creswell 2013), as there remains significant 
opposition to the theory of organizational path dependence, which due to the prevalent 
single-case study methodology, also offered much scope for attack. Therefore, the 
application of quantitative methods could increase the theory’s generalizability and 
coincidently diminish the room for critique.  
Consequently, future research is advised to apply the insights generated from this 
dissertation to different contextual settings. Indeed, industries with a high level of market 
dynamism may provide an appropriate empirical research setting. While the phenomenon 
of path dependence inherently implies a processual dimension (Sydow et al. 2009), 
research should apply a time-based perspective in order to verify the role and deepen the 
understanding of such stabilizing effects as driving forces of path dependence. Thus, 
longitudinal research designs are preferable over cross-sectional methods as they 
incorporate the dimension of time and generate powerful insights. 
The author of this dissertation hopes that the novel insights presented here will encourage 
scholars to further explore the theory of organizational path dependence and the role of 
the stabilizing forces identified on organizational adaptation, in order to further enhance 
understanding of organizational path dependence, to increase the theory’s acceptance in 
the scholarly community, and finally to establish a more holistic theory. Thus, the author 
trusts and is confident that the suggested reconsiderations of the theory of organizational 
path dependence, especially with respect to its deterministic character, will increase the 
proportion of scholars supporting the path dependence story. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interview Guideline 
 
Interview Guideline 
 
 
 – 1 – 
UNDERSTANDING THE GERMAN ENERGY SUPPLY MARKET:  
MARKET MECHANISMS & MARKET PARTICIPANTS’ BEHAVIOR 
 
– MARKET PERSPECTIVE – 
1. KEY MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
a. Please characterize and define the energy market.  
b. Since its liberalization, what were the key changes in the market to which market 
players had to respond and (re-)align themselves? 
c. What were the key drivers of change? 
§ Politics (defining the direction of development through energy focus and 
competition accelerating or inhibiting decisions/ sanctions) 
§ Importance of external influences (e.g. climate change, sensitization of consumers) 
§ Innovations of competitors/ new market players 
 
2. SUCCESSFUL MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
a. How did successful market players respond to market changes? What were the key 
success factors? 
b. How to define success in this sense? How to measure success? 
c. What were these market players’ (corporate) strategies? 
§ E.g. establishing new innovative companies in the field of renewable energies, 
divestitures in non-core business units/ businesses 
d. What is the role of technological competences and capabilities? 
 
3. PRECONDITIONS 
a. Can it be assumed that market players entered the liberalized market/ competition with 
‘equal’ preconditions in terms of resource endowments, access to resources, size etc.? 
b. Were there milestones inhibiting the development of individual market players to a 
certain/ particular degree? 
c. Conversely, were there factors (e.g. particular assets) putting individual market 
players into a superior starting position? 
 
4. COMPANY TYPES 
a. How do the discussed issues (response to market changes, success factors, corporate 
strategies, preconditions and inhibiting versus promoting factors) differ with respect to 
different company types? 
b. What are the key distinguishing factors between company types (e.g. size, age, energy 
mix, value-added steps)? 
 
5. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASES 
a. Do you agree with our understanding of the market development in terms of key 
events and the breakdown into five developmental phases? 
b. If not, how would you break down the market development? What were the key 
developmental events? 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guideline (continued) 
 
  
Interview Guideline 
 
 
 – 2 – 
– ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE – 
6. RESOURCES 
a. What are the key resources in the market/ for market players? 
§ E.g. tangible assets (financial resources, properties, power plants) intangible assets 
(human capital, capabilities, knowledge, structures, systems, corporate culture, 
technologies, technological competences and capabilities) 
 
7. RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
a. How are resources allocated? 
§ E.g. markets, value-added steps, technologies, business units (distinction of 
business units by technologies for example) 
b. What meaning does resource allocation play for corporate success? 
c. How dynamic is the process of resource (re-)allocation? Is there a constant 
questioning and adaptation of decisions/ actions? 
 
8. PROCESSES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
a. Are there clear processes of resource allocation between business units, technologies, 
markets, functions etc.? 
b. What practices, tools, techniques promote the allocation of resources? 
c. What steps and key activities does the process of resource allocation encompass? 
§ Reconsidering and challenging existing resource allocations 
§ Searching for/ identifying market opportunities and threats 
 
§ Re-evaluating existing resource allocations in the light of changing market 
conditions and requirements 
§ Evaluating and balancing market opportunities and threats 
§ Deciding for (re-)allocating resources in a timely and market-oriented manner 
 
§ (Re-)allocation of resources to new and sustainable businesses/ technologies 
§ Divestitures in non-conventional energy divisions, non-core business units/ 
businesses, or established businesses in order to free up tied resources to be  
(re-)allocated to future businesses/ technologies 
§ Acquisition of external resources to support the development of future businesses/ 
technologies 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guideline (continued) 
 
 
Interview Guideline 
 
 
 – 3 – 
9. OBSTACLES OF RESOURCE (RE-)ALLOCATION 
a. What factors/ forces delimitate/ counteract the (re-)allocation of resources? 
§ What for example impedes the allocation of resources to new, future-oriented 
businesses/ technologies? 
b. Are there effects/ mechanisms that repeatedly confirm/ reproduce/ rigidify the existing 
allocation of resources and thereby, making the (re-)allocation of resources 
increasingly unattractive? 
i. To what extend did scale effects influence the resource (re-)allocation? 
§ Economies of scale (e.g. through capacity expansion of existing power plants 
to decrease the average costs per unit) 
§ Economies of scope (e.g. through expansion of natural gas production 
capacities for own gas power plants) 
ii. To what extend did complementary effects influence the resource (re-)allocation? 
§ Growth opportunities in complementary/ adjacent businesses (e.g. energy-
related services business) 
§ Shared resources (e.g. skills, competencies, customers) 
iii. To what extend did learning effects influence the resource (re-)allocation? 
§ Efficiency improvements (e.g. improvement of fuel utilization in coal power 
generation; reduction of emissions from coal/ gas power generation) 
§ Exploitation of existing businesses/ technologies (e.g. focusing on conventional 
energy generation because of existing core competencies) 
iv. To what extend did coordination effects influence the resource (re-)allocation? 
§ Centralization (e.g. centralization of energy generation businesses) 
§ Formalization/ standardization (e.g. written investment policies) 
§ Planning, budgeting, and goal setting (e.g. making assumptions for preparing 
business cases) 
v. To what extend did expectation effects influence the resource (re-)allocation? 
§ Social expectations (e.g. expectations of population with respect to nuclear 
power plants) 
§ Social belonging and being on the winning side (e.g. following others’ in 
establishing renewable energies) 
§ Informal/ unwritten norms (e.g. generally accepted norms) 
§ Legitimacy for decisions (e.g. acceptance of decisions) 
c. How can these effects be overcome? Are there any examples how these effects have 
been overcome? 
 
 
